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HIGHER CRITICISM.

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On scarcely any topic are opinions more widely divided than in relation to Higher Criticism. There are a very great many Christians and some leaders who have the ear of multitudes to whom the very name is an offence. A great denomination has been made responsible for the declaration, "We thank God that there is no Higher Criticism among us."* In short, as a most eminent American scholar said, "It has come to be considered one of the most dangerous forms of infidelity, and in its very nature hostile to revealed truth."† On the other hand, it is most highly exalted, not only by those who practice it and are expert in its use, but no less by throngs who accept the conclusions of their favorite critics without debate or question. The fact is that most people have only the most vague and hazy ideas as to what Higher Criticism really is.

This uncertainty and ignorance can scarcely astonish one in view of what appears on consulting the dictionaries. Of the three leading English dictionaries consulted, the first gave no definition at all, under either "Higher" or "Criticism." Nor did the other two agree. While giving substantially the same definition for "Criticism," as being inquiry into the text, origin, character and authenticity of literary and historical documents, they then part

* Bible Student and Teacher, April, 1906, p. 324.

† Professor W. H. Green, D.D., Preface to the Higher Criticism of the Pentateuch.

company. One says, "Higher criticism concerns writings as a whole; lower criticism concerns the integrity or character of particular parts or passages," a distinction really incorrect and misleading because out of harmony with its ordinary use by scholars; the other remarks, "The lower criticism commonly deals with the text of such productions, the higher criticism with the historical and literary features," a statement pointing in the right direction, but neither fully accurate nor sure to be grasped by all.

Should we undertake to form our own definition, we may well begin by noting that criticism is judging, and as applied to a book it would be forming an opinion about it in any way, as in art or music critic denotes one competent to form an opinion, a skilled judge. But if criticism is judgment, what is "Higher" criticism? It may be noted at once that the name is unfortunate. Higher Critics are often sneered at as if by their very designation of their undertaking they had set themselves up as superior, and this sneer has even shaped the title of a book, "The Higher Critics and the Highest Critic." (Was the author ignorant or malicious in choosing this title?) In spite of the fact that the name has been in use more than a century, it remains unfortunate. It came into use in this way. The first critical study of the Bible having been in relation to the establishment of the text, when the step was taken to more advanced study of the documents in the Bible, the distinction between textual study and broader study of the character of the writings was made by calling the former lower criticism and the latter higher criticism,* and though unfortunate, the name has somehow stuck, though more freely used in English than in German.

Various attempts have been made to introduce other names. In German we sometimes read of "innere kritik," (internal criticism). So too the names "literary," "historical" and the combination "historico-literary" have

* Eichhorn seems to have been the first to use these names.

been suggested, but no one of these seems likely to gain common acceptance, and most probably we shall continue to have the name "Higher Criticism," though many do not understand it, most would call it unfortunate, and same make a mock at it.

It is also to be understood that Higher Criticism is practiced no less outside the sphere of Bible study than within it, although it less often bears the name. Whenever any written thing is studied to see what story it tells of itself, its own origin, its own purpose, its own character, then we really have Higher Criticism. It matters not whether it is in a court of law, where a contract, a deed, a will, a letter or any other written evidence is scrutinized, or in the classroom or study of a teacher or student of any literature, ancient or modern, where some book is cross-examined, so to speak, till a confession is wrung from it, or in the public or private library or governmental archives, where the historian weighs the worth of some document, old or new, anywhere, everywhere, where the evidence of the written matter itself is gained, the process is really Higher Criticism. And while some well-meaning but ill-advised persons, in their reverence for the Scriptures sometimes protest against all Higher Critics and Higher Criticism, I never yet found one who would not use on his side of the argument any and all evidence which he could gather from the study of the Bible itself, and this made him in spite of himself a Higher Critic.

Of course not all study in relation to the Bible is properly to be styled Higher Criticism. A late author in the book which he entitles "The History of the Higher Criticism of the New Testament" says that "Criticism is Bible study, or interpretation, as it must needs be pursued in an historical age. * * * The Higher Criticism, the original text having been found, aims at the historical interpretation of Scripture."* But there

* Professor Henry S. Nash, D.D., p. 11 of the book named above.

is a great deal of Bible study to-day, in what this author would presumably call "an historical age" (he doubtless meaning by this somewhat inexact phrase, an age in which prevails widely a disposition to consider how things came to be)—there is to-day, as there ought to be, much Bible study outside the realm properly characterized as critical.

First, there is all the study which goes to the establishment of the correct text of the Scriptures, for which, to be sure, most persons lack alike training and materials, but which is to some extent forced upon all in these days by the common use of the various revisions. Then there is exegetical study, the scrutiny of the language so as to answer the question, "What does the author mean?" Sometimes this study is slighted by the declaration, "The Bible means what it says," a saying not so much untrue as misleading. It ought to be put rather, "The Bible says what it means," and the finding out what is meant and consequently what is really said, is a very important part of Bible study, but lying outside the sphere of Higher Criticism. Then there is what has been called the literary study of the Bible, the investigation of the literary forms employed and the rhetorical significance of these forms, a branch of Bible study which has only lately come up, but likely to have increased attention hereafter, and having little connection with Higher Criticism. Then there is the study of all the history which may throw light on the Scriptures. All that can be learned of the past, its dates, politics, manners, customs, ideas, all has been used to throw light on the Bible, and this is important Bible study, but it is not Higher Criticism, though if combined with Higher Criticism it may gain higher value.

Higher Criticism is properly the making of the Bible, to illuminate itself, as a whole and in its several parts. Sometimes a great ocean steamer is brought into the harbor by the aid of half a dozen tugs, sometimes it comes in by the use of its own steam. Now Higher Criticism is

letting the Book navigate by the use of its own steam. It gathers the testimony, direct and indirect, all the testimony of the Bible itself to itself. And this testimony is of the highest value. Nothing about the Bible can be as important and as trustworthy as is the Bible itself. Of course this evidence must be searched for with diligence and scrutinized with care. The consequences are so momentous that we must guard ourselves against any false conceptions of the books which we receive as inspired, their date, their authorship, their composition, their transmission, and in answering these questions no evidence can be more conclusive than that furnished by the books themselves. The testimony of the Bible itself is all important, and consequently the gathering of this testimony and the weighing of its real meaning and worth, which is Higher Criticism, are of the greatest importance and value. If this work has not always been done fairly, carefully, well, the remedy is not to deny the possibility or the right of doing it well, but rather to demand and to exemplify fair and careful doing of it. If Higher Criticism, because of the use of faulty methods or false premises, has resulted in erroneous conclusions, these can be properly set aside only by better and more accurate Higher Criticism which carefully starts from verified premises and proceeds by correct methods, so that the conclusions are no longer erroneous. To be sure, when a man's position is due to prejudice, wilfulness or blindness, without reasons, it is usually hopeless merely to multiply arguments and ply him with reasons; but it is no less true that a man ought never to be asked to lay aside a conclusion derived from reasoning however faulty without showing him his error and giving him better reasons for a better conclusion. It is thus with statistics. Though it is proverbial how misleading they are, yet we must, provisionally at least, accept conclusions based upon figures, until we can find and show how they have been misused and how they ought to be used. In the same way, I admit, I insist that conclusions professedly

based on Higher Criticism are erroneous because of mistake in data or processes, but this means fighting fire with fire, using Higher Criticism to correct Higher Criticism. Where truth has been undermined by Higher Criticism wrongly used, it must be re-established by Higher Criticism rightly used.

There are many difficulties in relation to the practical applications of Higher Criticism which may well make us cautious in accepting critical conclusions, however confidently presented, until confirmed and verified. It is often spoken of as a science, and heed to its conclusions is demanded because they are "scientifically" reached. But in one important use of the name science, it does not properly belong to Higher Criticism. For instance, Morley said of Voltaire, he "hardly left a single corner of the field entirely unexplored in science, poetry, history, philosophy." Now as the word is here used, Higher Criticism is no more science than it is history or philosophy. Here science applies especially to the natural sciences, where the possibilities of experiment or the abundance of material renders verification of hypotheses so easy that certainty is practically assured. When this is the meaning of science, criticism like history and philosophy stands outside its realm. To be sure the name science has another application in which it may be used of Higher Criticism. If by science we mean merely ordered knowledge, a definite relation established between principles and facts according to a regular procedure, then the name may be allowed to Higher Criticism. But then we must be on our guard lest we surreptitiously bring over the element of certainty which rightly belongs to the name in its first sense and attach it wrongly to what is science only in the second use of the name. Great uncertainty still attaches to the practice of many a science in the second sense of the word. In this sense history is a science, but all over its field uncertainties abound. If history is a maze of uncertainties, uncertainty may attach to the conclusions of Higher

Criticism, though likewise dubbed a science. Even in the natural sciences there is somehow, somewhere chance for error. Medicine is a science in the strictest sense, but that does not guarantee its results.

Again, it ought to be remembered that there has never yet been a thorough, systematic and standard formulation of its principles as a science. In conversation with a physician of high standing not long ago the writer was informed that this physician studied under the first medical professor who ever taught the principles of diagnosis; that is, men had been practicing medicine more than two thousand years since Galen and Hippocrates without a careful statement of how to proceed in diagnosing a disease. In a similar way, men have been using Higher Criticism out of the Bible ever since they began to study written documents attentively at all, and have been Biblical Higher Critics by name more than a century, and there is not yet any recognized statement of the principles and methods of the science.* If the science of chemistry were in such a condition, with no accepted formulation of its principles and processes, a jury would be false to its oaths which did not have reasonable doubt whenever its verdict hinged on the testimony of a chemical expert.

Now this is not to be understood as casting discredit on all critical work. Some critics have done work that has been careful, successful, really scientific. The classic example of this sort of work is of course Bentley's "Dissertation on the Epistles of Phalaris." Similar credit is due to the discussions of the forgeries of Chatterton and Macpherson. The writer is told by a friend that Bancroft's Life of Van Buren was critically shown to have been written long before its publication. All this is pure Higher Criticism and has been successful and commendable. A piece of work substantially similar has been done in the sphere of the New Testament. The Epistle

* This statement should not be understood as slighting the very helpful popular work of Professor Zenos, "The Elements of Higher Criticism."

to the Hebrews was traditionally assigned to Paul, as may still be read in our Bibles, even the Canterbury Revision. But after thorough study of the letter itself, its style and thought, it has been decided with practical unanimity by scholars that it cannot have been the work of the Apostle to the Gentiles, a piece of pure Higher Criticism, but well done.

On the other hand, the work of Higher Criticism sometimes results in demonstrably complete failure. In 1899, the Critic, a literary journal, advertised a series of articles by a well-known Thackeray expert, in which were to be published hitherto uncollected papers of the great humorist, gathered from Punch. But at once another critic wrote in the same journal of "the absolutely untrustworthy character of the papers" already published, and the latter proved his contention by showing that he had had access to the payrolls of Punch and had verified from them the names of the real writers of the articles in question. In discontinuing the publication the Critic said, "An investigator writing at a distance from such first sources of information as the records in the office of Punch was not, of course, in a position to speak with any final authority concerning these unidentified contributions," words which might well be hung as a motto in the studies of many critics who at a greater distance from first sources of information assume to speak with final authority.

In any case we search in vain for a clear statement anywhere of the principle employed in proving or disproving authorship by Higher Criticism. Perhaps it might be stated thus. If unlikenesses increase beyond a certain degree, a single authorship becomes increasingly improbable until this improbability becomes sufficient to justify us in acting on it, though it can never reach positive certainty. Conversely, as resemblances are noted, confidence that there was only one author of both increases, it may be to conviction. The same principle is involved in the identification of persons and of signatures

and other handwriting, but all are more or less familiar with the practical uncertainties which beset such applications of it. It is no less uncertain business to apply it to literary compositions.

It may be interesting in several ways to consider the application of this principle to certain Epistles usually ascribed to Paul. In certain letters, notably those to the Colossians and Ephesians, the style is quite different from the Roman and Corinthian Epistles, and the thoughts, as well, are in many respects different. The documents have been searched as with a microscope, and the likenesses and particularly the unlikenesses have been carefully drawn off. The German critic Holtzmann has devoted special attention to this work and probably it would not be unfair to find in the Commentary of which he was general editor his own final conclusion, though the form of the following statement is to be attributed to von Soden: "If we combine all these observations as to style, ideas and literary position, we are forced to the conclusion that Ephesians cannot have had Paul as its author."* But Jülicher, a later, and many will say greater expert, who wrote in view of all his predecessors' work, concludes his own discussion thus: "Although, then, Ephesians may not belong to our unquestioned Pauline heritage, it would be equally impossible to deny the Apostle's authorship with any confidence."* Next in order of time Professor McGiffert, an eminent scholar of great freedom from any bias in favor of traditional views, while recognizing that the great majority of what he calls the "critical school" deny the Pauline authorship of Ephesians, yet himself holds that even on grounds of style identity of authorship "with Paul's acknowledged letters is not impossible," and finds that the doctrinal utterances are "sufficient * * * to confirm the explicit claim of the letter to be Paul's own production."† And

* Translated from Handcommentar, III (2te Aufl.), p. 100.

* Introduction to the New Testament (Eng. trans.) p. 147.

† Apostolic Age, pp. 383, 385.

latest comes Professor Bacon, of Yale, utilizing the materials of his predecessors and no less free from traditionalism, and he brushes away the arguments from style by saying we shall "find it easy to explain a few peculiarities of language and style,"‡ and by a course of argument in relation to the thought, too long to quote here and too compact to summarize, turns the ideas contained into weapons in defence of Paul's authorship. While this bit of history forcibly exemplifies the uncertainties which beset the conclusions of Higher Criticism, it at the same time shows no less conclusively that the way to meet Higher Criticism which is unsound and erroneous is not to ignore it, still less to denounce, but to use it rightly and to turn its methods against itself.

An element of uncertainty, a possibility of error must always remain in the inevitable subjectivity of Biblical Higher Criticism, that is, in the fact that its measures are individual judgment and personal opinion, not any objective standard and test. If Holtzmann thinks that the arguments lead to the conclusion that Paul did not write the Epistle to the Ephesians, there is no way that he can verify and demonstrate his view as the Punch records showed that Thackeray did not write certain papers attributed to him. If a man thinks that free trade or prohibition is desirable, the experiment can be tried, in England or Maine, perhaps elsewhere, and his view is checked up. If a man holds that vaccination will lessen smallpox, or radium cure cancer, there is always a chance to test the accuracy of his opinion by experiment, but Biblical Higher Criticism unavoildably goes on unchecked and unverified to the end of the chapter in almost every case.

Another source of difficulty is the limited amount of material which can be used. In many cases where actual experiment is impossible there is much material. For testing theories in language or sociology there are vast and

‡ Introduction to the New Testament, p. 121.

varied fields in which tests may be found. But the Bible presents phenomena which have no parallels elsewhere in literature, and so Higher Criticism has to deal with unique facts. For example, there is no other such problem in literature, ancient or modern, sacred or profane, as the so-called Synoptic problem. So, too, the problem of the Pentateuch stands alone. This problem is just the opposite of the Synoptic problem. There, to give the conclusion without the reasons, it seems that several sources have been differently combined in the several Gospels; here the different documents, if they ever existed, have been strangely combined into one book or series of books, and there is no exact parallel elsewhere in all known literature to such a fact.

Now the scientific method imperatively demands verification. The cornerstone of the inductive sciences is experiment or observation to check up hypotheses and previous results. If possible, an experiment is actually tried. If a chemist holds that helium is an emanation of radium, he watches the behavior of radium. If it is announced that photographs can be taken by X-rays, immediately all the physicists interested try it. If it is impossible actually to reproduce the phenomena desired, then the test comes by extended observation. Geologists are not quite certain as to their hypotheses concerning the formation of rocks and the earth itself, because they cannot reproduce the situation in question. But there must be verification, and so they search the world over and compare results gathered from a wide area, and these fresh inductions serve as in some sense equivalent to experiment. But neither course is possible for the Higher Critic, and so his hypotheses unavoidably go unverified.

Now one might think that this fact would lead to modesty on the part of those who practice this science, but few need to be told that it has not had this result. The men who constitute the great body of "the critical school" are peculiarly unlike most of the men versed in natural science, in their loudness of claim, their fre-

quently almost ferocious positiveness and self-confidence. Is it not possible that the explanation lies in the fact just mentioned, the impossibility of verification? Think how a great scientific man, a Liebig, a Helmholtz, a Virchow has been taught by his mistakes. He thought that he knew, but the first experiment taught him better and sent him back to interrogate nature more carefully. There is an old story of a difference in opinion of doctors by the bedside of the patient, and one ended his discussion with the simple remark, "You'll find out at the autopsy." The Higher Critic has no such test. He cannot experiment, he cannot verify, and while on that account he ought to be all the more modest in feeling and guarded in statement, the result has been the opposite.

Another thing which the man who gives himself to the natural sciences has to learn is to exclude everything but the one thing sought. The seismometer is to measure the earthquake shock, then it must be set where the vibrations of traffic cannot affect it. The astronomer wants simply the light of the star, then he must set his observatory away from everything which would interfere, and so the Lick Observatory is set on the top of Mount Hamilton. If chemicals are to be combined to prove anything, everything else must be excluded, and so a chemist of my acquaintance tells his students, to begin with, that they must wash their beakers so clean that if they had contained strychnine, they would not be afraid to drink out of them. Failure here means necessarily absolute failure in the experiment. But something, possibly again lack of verification, has led many Higher Critics to fail in this point. Higher Criticism ought not to be mixed with philosophy, and observation of facts should not be affected by theories. But unfortunately such has been the case. The conclusions of the most prominent Higher Critics have been protested against by many Christian teachers, and often with good reason, but in most cases, though the objectors have failed to understand it, what was really objectionable was not the

critical method, but the domination of the critics by philosophical theories. German Higher Criticism is very largely not this science by itself, a registry of purely scientific results. The procedure from beginning to end is controlled and warped by the idea of naturalistic evolution, or evolutionary naturalism, as one may prefer to put it. Evolution as evolution is not necessarily to be set aside, no more as a historical hypothesis than as a biological hypothesis. What is objectionable is naturalism seizing on evolution as a means to dominate Higher Criticism. By naturalism is meant of course that philosophy which excludes God from history, even when it claims to include him in all history, and which approaches the story of Judaism and of Christianity as recorded in their documents with the fixed presupposition that this history is like any and every other history, and so that it can be asserted that things *must* have happened thus and thus, in this order and with such and such results, and garbles the documents, and rewrites the history and denies the facts solely because of the theory that a merely natural evolutionary process controlled the whole, without any supernatural element, with no peculiar intervention of God. If on philosophical grounds it is asserted that God never specially intervenes in human affairs, that there is no prophecy, that miracles never happen, that God dealt with the Jews in the same way as he has dealt with all nations, and that there has been no incarnation, no resurrection, no divine guidance in history and no inspiration in composition, that is a comprehensible position to be proved or disproved on philosophical grounds. But the mischief in Higher Criticism has been that these purely philosophical presuppositions have controllel processes which should have been purely critical, and consequently have entirely vitiated them. It is to this importation of naturalistic philosophy into a field where it does not at all belong that we owe, in my judgment, the complete rewriting of Jewish history which stands out in most minds as the chief re-

sult of Higher Criticism. But this is in fact a vicious arguing in a circle. First the documents are rearranged to conform to a theoretical course of history. Then from these rearranged documents are drawn data which are thought to confirm the presupposed history. But nothing is gained logically by this process. Of course the magician can take out of the hat every rabbit he puts into it, and of course if the documents have been rearranged according to a theory, even by cutting them in shreds to make them fit, they will fit the history.

To this protest against adulterating Higher Criticism with philosophy, may perhaps well be added another against warping it to meet historical considerations. To be sure, most of us are not practically engaged in Biblical Higher Criticism. But it is to be remembered that the Higher Critic sustains to the common student a relation parallel to that of expert and juryman. The expert gives his judgment with his method and reasons; the common man decides the case. It may then be helpful to point out some of the possible sources of error on the part of the critical expert. Now sometimes assertions have been made as in the name of Higher Criticism which rest rather on historical and archeological considerations. When, for instance, it has been argued that there could be no element in the Pentateuch dating back to Moses, because writing could not have been known to him and his circle, that is not a critical but a historical position, which has of course been shown by the discovery of the Tel-el-Amarna letters to be such a gross blunder that those who made it only wish it forgotten. So, too, the argument that the Pentateuch could not have dated back to Moses because such a codification of laws would have been impossible at that time, an argument which the Hammurabi Code has shown to be another blunder, may have been put out by Higher Critics, but that did not make it critical, for it was supposedly historical in character, and should have been used and received as such. Care must be constantly exercised to distinguish con-

clusions which are really critical in character from those based on other grounds.

In this paper, a definition was first reached for Higher Criticism as the investigation as to the origin and character of books on the basis of what is in the books themselves, they being made to turn states evidence, as it were; then some of the difficulties in the practical application of the science were pointed out; then were named some of the elements, philosophical or historical, which are erroneously taken as essentially critical. It may be well in conclusion to point some of the results thus far attained by the practice of Higher Criticism. A late writer* has named but three: 1, the composite nature of the Pentateuch; 2, the proof that our present books of Isaiah and Zechariah are each the work of more than one author; and 3, the composite nature of the Synoptic Gospels. To these the present writer would add two more, one, already mentioned, that the author of Hebrews could not have been Paul, and the other that the author of the Fourth Gospel must have been, if not John himself, then one closely associated with him, a disciple of his and a product of his teaching. Of these the second, the plural authorship of Isaiah and Zechariah, shocks many students greatly, but needlessly. This conclusion does not militate at all against the character of these books, as they have been recognized by the church in all ages, nor is it based on any doubt as to the existence or nature of inspired prophecy. It rests simply on the principle that God adapted the message which he inspired to the men who received it, and that part of the messages in these books are adapted to one age and part to another. It may be added that we have no sufficient reason for asserting that the works of prophets could not have been combined in transmission. It need shock the faith of no one to accept this conclusion, if proved. That the Synoptic Gospels show the use of documents in their

* Dean Burnham in The Encyclopedia Americana, art. Higher Criticism.

composition is in line with the claim of Luke to have investigated and used all sources of information, and that earlier documents should have been incorporated in the Pentateuch is no more surprising, and in neither case is there any decision as to the date of composition. Finally, it will be observed that the conclusion stated as to Hebrews is not out of harmony with ancient tradition, and that the conclusion as to the authorship of the Fourth Gospel is, so far as it goes, directly in support of the ancient and uniform view of the church.

It is often represented on both sides that the work and results of Higher Criticism are destructive to the view that the Bible is due to the peculiar agency of the Holy Spirit. Those who pose as especial friends of the Bible fear it; those who hold to the opposite view rejoice in what are claimed as its conclusions. The fact is that both are in error. While many Higher Critics are hostile to the view that the Bible is God's book in a unique and authoritative way, yet it cannot be fairly asserted that the results of the assured principles and carefully guarded processes of Higher Criticism are such in any sense. Reverent Biblical scholars have but to master the principles and methods of Higher Criticism to make it serve their cause. As captured Russian battleships swell the Japanese navy, so Higher Criticism will yet contend for the age-long truth.

THE THEORETICAL VALUE OF MORAL AND RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE.

I.

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The significance of this theme may be otherwise expressed in such questions as these: Is morality ultimate? What is the final meaning of moral and religious experience, so far, at least, as religion is related to morality? How should the facts of the moral consciousness be valued by him who would construct a philosophical system?

A word as to the conditions under which morality might be regarded as ultimate. The moral good cannot be defined except in terms of itself; the moral good is that which satisfies the desire of a moral agent; the moral good is "the realization of the moral capability."* Note also the distinction between ultimate morality and morality as ultimate. We cannot know because of the limitations of our developing life what the final state of moral beings would be. We may know, I think, that the ethical Ideal is finally real, that that for which a man strives is realized in a living existence and is a controlling principle of reality, indeed, is an attribute of the World-Ground and an essential factor, although perhaps not the only factor, in the supreme end.

The following positions may be taken: First, that we cannot know the Absolute and so cannot say that morality is ultimate; secondly, that morality has an ultimate significance but only when transmitted into some higher experience; thirdly, that theoretically we do not know whether morality is ultimate or not, but that through the soul's unique function of faith, we know that it is and that the Divine Being is moral; fourthly, that a philosophical investigation of our experience of both the real and the ideal can only lead to the conclusion that the

* T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, Secs. 171-2.

Absolute is a moral Personality realizing himself in a society of moral selves, in consequence of which it may be said that morality is ultimate. It is the purpose of this paper to offer some considerations as to the manner in which this last view may be successfully maintained in a philosophical system.

But what, after all, is philosophy? It is not easy to define it nor is it easy to be convinced that the task implied by its definition can be accomplished. Who is bold enough to say that philosophy is a well-wrought-out science which has a definite history and is now in its most complete stage of development and is universally accepted? The fact is that there is no such thing, never was and never will be. Hence the surprise and in a measure the disappointment on the part of the beginner. How can there be a history of philosophy, for the absolute truth does not change in time? Or, if you have history, you have not philosophy. Philosophy is rather self-knowledge which includes a knowledge of the world and of God as dependent upon a knowledge of the self.* If so, how can we escape the conclusion that there are as many philosophies as there are selves and that philosophy is a certain aspect of individual experience, a certain attitude of reason towards life in all its complexity, both material, economic, social, religious, indeed, the entire compass of experience? As to any other kind of philosophy—a philosophy which can claim to be a science, verified and universally accepted, I doubt if there be such, either in the past or present. And yet some have been courageous enough to undertake a history of philosophy, seeking to find a logical order in the development of the world's thought, tracing the genesis and order of conceptions as they have appeared throughout the centuries. If philosophy be a personal affair and yet these personal views of succeeding generations fall into some discoverable order exhibiting a development towards a larger and more satisfying whole of truth, it is a fasci-

* Kuno Fischer, Descartes and His School, 1–14.

nating thought, causing us to raise the question whether the springs of our life are not deeper than we had believed, even in the eternal Spirit, else how account for this strange harmony amidst the individual diversities?

I would, then, define philosophy in this personal way, as "self-knowledge"—as an attitude of reason—an adjustment of the man to his living—an adjustment gained through reflection upon himself in relation to the world and to God, striving after, though not always gaining, a consistent view.

Why should this reflection be undertaken? Why not be satisfied with the piece-meal view of things? Because we must live, and the true life is the inner life, and the inner life seeks completeness and harmony of experience without which the mind cannot rest. Every contradiction impels forward. The mind ceaselessly puts forth new demands and refuses to take any answer as the whole truth because the mind itself is implicitly larger than the questions it can ask or the answers it can give. How must I think of myself and the not-self, call it world and God, if you please? What in my experience can I depend upon as having final significance? Does it make any difference how I conduct myself, and if it does, why should it? A few such questions arouse the mind from indifference—it may be only to fall back into despair, discovering no satisfying answers to its questions. Philosophy is a personal soul-struggle for the light of truth.

Another fact seems to complicate the difficulty, namely, consciousness and conscience admit no protesting appeal —what is true—what is right—must be at last my own decision. I may be taught by others past or present, but finally the belief in the truth and the right is my own response to the collective reasons that I have gained in my experience thus far.

It would seem as though those features of my experience which are of most significance in the conduct of my life should be given most importance in my final decisions concerning the truth, that they should convey

to me the deepest significance of my own reality and of all reality—in short, those principles which are pre-eminently practical and social—the moral and religious. Is it not true that the moral and religious experiences become most developed comparatively late in life, as though they could come into clear consciousness only as the confirmed result of long and complex experience?

Moreover, the plain man is forced to regard the universe from the moral and religious standpoint. He may be easily confused if asked whether the moral law is as real as the stone at his feet whose weight he lifts and whose form and hardness he experiences. The senses may have chronologically the first claim upon him for acceptance of what they reveal as final truth, but he at the same time conducts his life according to principles that transcend the senses, counting those principles as real and necessary in dealing with reality as what the eye and the hand reveal. And certainly in the later history of his mental life, a man would sooner doubt his own eyes than the final trustworthiness of a moral principle. How easy to regard the world as having a moral order—as grounded in a moral Personality who has intimate relations with real finite moral agents—how necessary to say this in the light of experience! Few would hesitate to accept such a statement as the truth. But only a little attention to the history of philosophy is needed to convince one that the above proposition is yet perhaps the boldest and most comprehensive of syntheses, full of difficulties, for can we after all say that the self is a real moral agent with moral responsibility? That the world-order is moral, consequestly purposeful, even having the moral as at least one factor in the supreme purpose? That the World-Ground is a moral Personality --not only self-conscious thought and will, but also moral, therefore, realizing in His own perfectness the moral Ideal? It is, then, of much importance to determine the place of morality in a philosophical system.

First, consider some examples of the skeptical reply

that we do not and cannot know the nature of the Absolute. Restricting the discussion to narrow limits, I refer to the negative result of the Critique of Pure Reason, which has proved acceptable to so many, that this negative, skeptical position has in consequence been regarded by some as the essential teaching of Kant. This negative position concerning the ultimate consists in limiting knowledge to sense phenomena in space and time. Our sense perceptions are indeed determined by the subject according to certain pure concepts and principles. The result of this synthesis is the world of experience with its laws. Space, time, things and self are "empirically real but transcendentally ideal." Concepts without sense intuitions are empty, and to become knowledge must be intuitionalized in space and time and causal relation. Hence the limits of knowledge. To be sure we have other conceptions like soul, world and God, but they are regulative, subjective principles necessary to the highest possible synthesis of knowledge, but to regard these conceptions as signifying ultimate realities would be to give objective validity to what are only *a priori* regulative principles. The influences of this negative results of the Critique of Pure Reason have been widely felt.

Mr. Shadworth Hodgson furnishes an illustration of the influence of this negative result of Kant's work. His "Metaphysics of Experience"* leaves us at last in the presence of Unknowable Power. Hodgson maintains that he continues the Kantian limitation of knowledge to experience, but also holds that he is more true to Kant's position than was Kant himself by insisting that the analysis of experience be undertaken without any assumptions. He will not, therefore, like Kant, assume forms of knowledge, a self that knows and a noumenal reality. All there is, is consciousness and its states which transform themselves into an external world, a human body and a self, distinguishing itself from yet knowing

* "The Metaphysics of Experience," Vols. I, II, III, IV., by Shadworth H. Hodgson. Longmans, Green & Co. 1898.

the world, possessing the body and being self-conscious. This process is not the unfolding of the life of a metaphysically real soul, for there is no such thing—there are only conscious states becoming of themselves in turn body, external world and the self in contrast to, yet in peculiar but different relations to world and body.

Moreover, conscious states are simply the accompaniment of brain states. The real agency is not consciousness but nervous changes; the order of conditioning is, brain state, then conscious state and this order is never reversed. Even in the highest forms of intellectual synthesis and ethical choice, the nervous elements interacting are the real agencies.*

While Mr. Hodgson says he is a materialist in psychology, he is not a materialist in metaphysics. Matter indeed marks the limit of our knowledge; matter embraces the nervous system which in the cerebral changes conditions our consciousness, but matter itself is in turn conditioned by a higher though unknown realm of real conditions—the unknown Power which can be conceived neither as matter nor as a universal consciousness, but which embraces in itself both the seen and the unseen. With these conceptions our positive knowledge ends.

Turning to the moral and religious sphere, we find that Mr. Hodgson follows Kant's example in the Critique of the Practical Reason, although he does not leave us with a like confidence in the postulates of Practical Reason. Kant leads us to believe that he himself really meant more than his clumsy words enabled him to say, namely, that the postulates of God, freedom and immortality are the highest form of knowledge and worthy of all confidence as the truth about reality. But Mr. Hodgson shows that the completion of the conception of the Unknown Power is accomplished through the "moral ideas and feelings which are the creatures of conscience."* Hence this addition to the conception of the

* Ibid., Vol. III, 310-311, 335. Vol. IV, 53-54, 20. Vol. 1, 416.

* Ibid., IV, 203-6.

Unknown Power "that sustains the universe" is speculatively gratuitous. We know only that there is such a power to which neither blame nor praise, nor, least of all, moral goodness and self-conscious interest in human life can be attributed. Yet Mr. Hodgson would have conscience follow implicity with "the confidence, that the power which we exert in so acting is identical in kind, and continuous *in fact,* with the inmost nature of the Infinite and eternal Power which sustains the universe."*

I think that Mr. Hodgson is here trying to keep with one hand what the other takes away, for if the World-Ground is not known as moral and as interested in moral agents, how can there be any confidence that in obeying the imperatives of conscience we are any more in harmony with the Unknown Power than in disobeying them? If the principles and conceptions which express the moral consciousness have not an objective as well as a subjective significance—if they are not the deepest meanings of all reality trustworthy to the core, what do I care about them? Why not make a lie my good? There is no answer. Mr. Hodgson's final position is disappointing and full of a stinging bitterness in the discovery that those things which I hold supremely valuable and significant are neither ultimately valuable nor significant. I do not intend to misrepresent this author's view of moral experience; but when he cuts it off from any final significance, condescending to recognize the moral as only a phase of the practical—all the practical being only the conditionate of an Unknown Power—I must indeed have great faith if I am to act upon a moral principle and regard it as identical and continuous with the Unknown Power.

What I have just said is supported by the treatment of theology in its relation to philosophy. Theology is regarded as simply the conceptual representation of the practical—the moral and the religious. It has no connection with philosophy and does not have the value of

* Ibid., IV, 206-7.

knowledge. It does not in any sense throw light upon the nature of the Absolute. Theology, however, serves a useful purpose, in that it formulates the moral and religious experience of a given age. As a poem like Dante's Divine Comedy formulates the prevailing thought and spirit of an age in a pleasing manner and to a useful end, although the poet would not expect his statements to be received as a theoretical expression of the nature of reality, just so theology serves its day and generation without being able to claim acceptance as speculative truth about the Absolute. Theology is not knowledge, which amounts to saying that theology is not a possible science.

It is evident that "The Metaphysics of Experience" gives no prominent place to morality in its structure, although it is treated at much length. We feel that such a system can not be true. Why? Because the author undertook to base his metaphysics upon experience—which, of course, is the only correct thing to do—and yet has been untrue to the most significant factors in that experience—the moral and religious—regarding these factors out of their proper relations in the whole and consequently reaching a result which cannot prevail as a system satisfying to the subjects of these experiences.

Moreover, this theory attempts to explain morality on a naturalistic basis and according to a materialistic psychology, although we must give Mr. Hodgson the benefit of his assertion that he is not a materialist in metaphysics. T. H. Green in his "Prolegomena to Ethics" has shown that such an attempt cannot succeed. How can fear and compulsion generate the sense of moral obligation, and the energy of material forces have as its result the ideal of "the ought to be?" Prof. Huxley, although sympathizing with a line of thought like that of Hodgson, confessed that "all modern as well as ancient scientific effort has utterly failed" to bring the order of things into harmony with the moral sense of man, and "the cosmic process has no sort of relation to moral

ends." And to Spencer's question: "If the ethical man is not a product of the cosmic process, what is he a product of?" Prof. Ladd replies: "The naturalistic view of ethical phenomena has, of course, no sufficient answer."* I believe that moral experience can be satisfactorily understood only from the point of view of moral personality, both human and divine.

I now, however, call attention to a system which takes an intermediate view and maintains that morality has final significance but cannot as such be predicted of the Absolute. This is Bradley's "Appearance and Reality" —a work in which many difficult questions are acceptably treated. As I wish to show the value given to moral experience in this system, it is necessary briefly to outline it.

First of all, Bradley's starting point is acceptable, namely, "that the object of metaphysics is to find a general view which will satisfy the intellect—and—that whatever succeeds in doing this is real and true, and that whatever fails is neither" (553-4). It may be that to restrict this satisfaction to the intellect rather than the whole man is too narrow; but I think Bradley means all our experiences expressed in terms that will satisfy the intellect, and when so expressed we have to take the view as both the real and true. The world of "appearance" is the world of "experience"—using the term "experience" in the Kantian signification—and includes our thoughts, volitions and feelings—the world of things, events and selves. We must think of all these—not as illusions—but as appearances not in themselves real, manifestations of ultimate Reality. The world is not made up of real existences conceived as independent and persisting through successive changes, for "so understood the world contradicts itself; and is therefore appearance and not reality" for, whatever cannot be conceived without contradiction is less than reality and must be regarded as a fragment, as reaching beyond itself to a whole in which it is embraced as a constituent but trans-

* Quotations from Ladd's Philosophy of Conduct, p. 603.

muted factor. Measured by this standard, space, time, change, causation, even the self are not ultimately real but are real only as "appearances," as experiences.

What, then, is reality? Reality is the only individual, embracing all finiteness, even selves and their acts, in a perfect harmony of "sentient experience" (p. 142). The Absolute Reality is never less than its appearances in thought, feeling and volition, but all this diversity of the finite actual is taken up into the Absolute Unity and so transmuted that, while all is retained, yet the differentiations disappear in an inexpressible highest unity of experience. Perhaps the undifferentiated state of feeling —the supposed condition of the self before the distinction of subject and object and relations arises—may furnish an analogy of what that highest unity of experience in the Absolute is. Somehow the things of the natural world, finite souls, the good, the true, the beautiful, "ugliness, error, and evil, all are owned by, and all essentially contribute to the wealth of the Absolute," but "all of these are worthless alike apart from transmutation" (489).

It is at this point that Bradley's theory of the Absolute becomes mystical. In one sense we may say that the Absolute is personal—for all finite personalities are in Him —indeed, it is better to call the Absolute personal than impersonal, but better still super-personal, super-rational, super-moral—an undifferentiated whole of immediate experience.

The "appearances" constituting the finite world differ in rank. Thus Bradley tries to avoid Pantheism which regards everything as equally divine (551). The relative rank and value of appearances is determined by the degree of freedom from contradiction and incompleteness, or, in other words, by the amount of transmutation and supplementing necessary to reach the Whole, the Absolute. For example, the evil and the good differ in degrees of realness and value, both being manifestations of the Absolute. To be evil is to suffer loss

and perish, because in the end the evil is overruled and transmuted into the inexpressible unity of the Absolute experience which is above the distinctions and relations of the finite yet possesses this finite in this perfect unity. But the good, though suffering transmutation, stands nearer the harmonious whole and is consequently of more value in the scale of appearances.

But why is the morally good not ultimate? Stated very simply, the moral life consists in the volitional effort to realize one's self-perfection with as great an extent and as perfect a harmony as possible. But it is soon found that this perfection of the self involves self-assertion and self-denial and that moral goodness requires now one and now the other. The more comprehensive the life, the more self-assertion and self-denial are required, and yet the assumption of morality is that the life may be a harmony. But how can these contradictions, self-assertion and self-denial, which are evidently two factors of moral goodness, be brought into unity? Their unity is inconceivable. So morality must issue in religion. Consequently, the next step after morality is religion which is the anticipation of the ultimate unity of all opposites in the Whole (438-440).

In a paradoxical sentence, Bradley says: "The moral duty not to be moral is the duty to be religious," for religion feels the unity even of good and evil in the Absolute experience. And yet religion itself is not final, but must be transcended and transmuted. Religion is incomplete and inconsistent because its faith is a "making believe," and yet because religion is practical, "it is at the same time a making as if one did *not* believe," i. e., the felt, the anticipated, final unity of good and evil found in religion contradicts the practical inability to escape the difference and the recognized necessity of living as though there never could be any transformation and unity of the good and the evil in something higher than themselves (440-3).

Another reason why religion is inconsistent and con-

sequently not ultimate lies in the relation between God and man which is supposed to be an essential factor in the nature of religion. But relation destroys the independence of both terms which can only stand in a unity embracing both. Consequently, man and God become finite forms of the Whole. In the realm of appearances, God and man may both stand as related personalities, but personality cannot be applied to the Absolute nor reality to the finite person. On the other hand, religion shows its inconsistency and consequently its incompleteness and unreality by its effort to attain the perfect unity of God and man. "And, if so, nothing would in the end fall outside God." But, "if you identify the Absolute with God, that is not the God of religion. If again you separate them, God becomes a finite factor in the whole. And the effort of religion is to put an end to, and break down this relation—a relation which it none the less presupposes. Hence, short of the Absolute, God cannot rest, and having reached that goal, he is lost and religion with him" (440-447).

I will now emphasize some of the features of this theory which are worthy of favorable consideration in any attempt to estimate the value of the facts of moral and religious experience in a philosophical system.

First, moral and religious experience is an expression of the Absolute Reality. The Absolute is its appearances and is not less real than are they. This is a far stronger position than that taken by Hodgson. In moral and religious experience we may be confident that we are gripping true Reality. It is my conviction that we must in the end ground moral and religious experience somehow in ultimate Reality. It is thus that I understand and accept Bradley's meaning.

Secondly—It does make a difference to the Absolute unity whether one is good or evil, for each contributes according to its nature to this Absolute whole of immediate experience (430).

Thirdly—It is a fair inference that the morally good

is relatively nearer the Absolute fulness—is more real than the evil—needs less correction—less transmutation to be brought into the Absolute Whole.

Fourthly—Judged by the principle involved in "degrees of reality and truth," religion in which morality culminates is the highest in rank among the appearances of the Absolute Reality. "There is nothing more real than what comes in religion." "The man who demands a reality more solid than that of the religious consciousness, seeks he does not know what" (449). I would draw especial attention to religion as the climax of the process in the world of finite experience, and the reason why it stands highest is that it is the most complete experience, the nearest approach to the unity of experience in the Absolute.

Fifthly—Moral and religious experience as certainly lays hold of the Absolute reality as philosophy, and in some respects is superior to philosophy. Neither religion nor philosophy can be said to be the completion of the other (454). As a mere intellectual expression of ultimate truth, philosophy may be said to stand higher than religion; but, on the other hand, so far as religion succeeds in its "attempt to express the complete reality of goodness through every aspect of our being—it is at once something more, and therefore something higher than philosophy" (453). To one man, philosophy, to another the intensity of religious experience may be the way to the Divine (6, 7).

But, on the other hand, there are some positions taken by Bradley which present great difficulty. For example, without attempting any definition of the moral good and evil, let us ask this question: Is God good, morally good? I cannot avoid the affirmative answer, and yet there are difficulties. Certainly, so far as we know, good is relative to evil, yet Christian faith holds that God is all in all, overrules the evil and causes the good to triumph. But how are error and moral evil to be in the All? Surely the temptation is strong to say with Bradley that the good,

the evil, the ugly, the erroneous are but "appearances," manifestations of the one Reality which holds all these, "transmuted," in a highest unity of experience wherein distinctions and relations do not exist. Of course, there is no telling how, but somehow this highest unity of experience is the highest, indeed, the only complete fact. Is this the way in which we must think of God over-ruling the evil and making the wrath of man to praise Him? Has Bradley offered the only solution?

Let it be remembered that Bradley has shut the door of escape by way of the free initiative of man as a moral agent rebelling in his evil independence against the divine Person, for man and God were shown to be only correlatives in conscious experience, both phenomenal, both adjectives of the Whole. To escape this conclusion seems to me almost impossible. How can anything be outside the Whole in order to be related to it as God (519)? How can there be created an independent-dependent being, namely, man as a moral agent? Are we driven to say that all including man's moral history is simply a process of the one Absolute Reality?

Another difficult point raised by Bradley is contained in his assertion that there can be no real moral progress except in the phenomenal order. In one sense of the term Absolute it would seem as though we were obliged to accept this denial of ultimate real progress and confine progress to the swiftly passing order of human life. But I am unwilling to admit that our triumphs are not real moral advances with ultimate significance—more than mere appearances. Are we shut up to Bradley's conclusion?

I frankly confess that I do not know how to get over the difficulty involved in the relation of man and the Absolute. To say that man is created by God and given moral independence is little short of a makeshift—and yet, that something has been granted to man which cannot be metaphysically expressed it seems unavoidable to maintain in behalf of the validity and trustworthiness of the principles of morality, but even then we may not have

escaped monism; we may have only made the difficulty involved in the relation of the finite and the Infinite a little less pronounced. To this end, I offer the following suggestions: Is knowledge of anything and the actual experience of it a necessity in the divine Life? Is it not possible that God may know a moral human act, yet that act not be, as such, the divine experience? Surely we know the act of another which is not made thereby our own. How can we hold that the human moral act which is an object of knowledge for the subject of it is at the same instant "transmuted" into something other than it is known to be by that human subject without destroying confidence in the trustworthiness and possibility of knowledge? Surely there cannot be two different kinds of truth about the same thing nor a finite experience which in its transmuted form is the same thing; and yet has not Bradley asked that this be granted?

Is it not conceivable that the very nature of God must realize itself in a society of moral selves in whom, indeed, there is struggle, passion, ignorance, and evil, initiated by their own volitions and in whom there is a separation between their conceived moral ideal and their moral attainments, while in God the ideal and the real form a true unity in virtue of which He is the perfect moral Person in fellowship with finite moral persons? Moreover, is it not possible that in such a society of moral selves the divine ends are progressively realized and so moral progress is real even from the absolute point of view?

NOTE—The second division of Prof. Ten Broeke's article will appear in the January Review and Expositor.—Editor.

THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS.

II. Chapters vii-x. 18.

BY W. T. WHITLEY, M. A., LL. D., PRESTON, ENGLAND.

With chapter seven we enter on the main theme of the epistle, the Priesthood of Jesus. After the many hints and the cautious preparation for it, less than a third of the space is spent on proving it. Direct and continuous exhortation follows from the middle of the tenth chapter, which will occupy our attention another time, with its modern application.

The theme met difficulties certain to be felt by most Jews. They were deeply attached to the sacrificial system descended from antiquity. It is therefore shown to be essentially prophetic, valuable not for itself, but for its hints of a deeper reality now presented in Jesus. No advantage is taken of the unworthiness of recent high priests, such as Annas or Caiaphas; the system is taken at its best in the person of Aaron; the sordid realities and reeking shambles of Jerusalem are not held up to disgust, but the ideal directions of Leviticus are chosen. These at their very best are shown to be inadequate. And was the system antique? yet it originated long after Abraham, who met a priest of an older and better type; and when it did come, it was only copied from a heavenly pattern, now presented not to Moses alone, but to all in the person of Jesus; the second-hand system must be abandoned for the first-hand.

There are three steps in the argument: First, that Jesus is a Priest, then that Aaron's high priesthood was only temporary and prophetic, then that Jesus is the High Priest prefigured, doing in reality what Aaron only excited hopes of. These points are then summed up. The

turns in the argument are at viii. 1, ix. 11, x. 1. It may be thus represented:

JESUS IS A PRIEST.

"Consider Melchizedek, the strange figure once in contact with our father Abraham. Not king alone was he, but priest also. As priest he blessed Abraham and received a tenth of his spoil. Of descent, of inauguration, of resignation, we know nothing; he is like the Son of God declared in the psalm to be priest. Such priesthood is permanent.

"Contrast him with the Levitical priests in the matter of the tithe. They tithe by law, he by merit. They tithe only their brethren, he the patriarch himself—yes, and bestowed on him a blessing also. They are dying off constantly, he is spoken of as living. Indeed as they were latent in Abraham, they themselves paid tithe to Melchizedek.

"See how inadequate is the Levitical priesthood. After many centuries' trial, its failure was declared in the promise that a different priest should be appointed after the order of Melchizedek. With this downfall of the priesthood comes the downfall of the whole Law. For observe the facts about the hero of the psalm, Jesus. He belongs to Judah, not Levi, and yet is priest; how about the Law there? Look at the promise in the psalm; our Priest is installed not by an arbitrary rule of hereditary descent, but by the inherent value of an indestructible life: 'After the order of Melchizedek.' This utterance repeals the former rule as to the priesthood as feeble and unhelpful—for the whole law was no real help—and substitutes a better hope which does bring us near to God.

"And this priesthood of Jesus was inaugurated with an oath, for 'the Lord swore;' whereas the Levitical priests had no such solemn appointment. This again guarantees us a covenant that is better.

"These priests have become numerous as death carries

off one after another, but Jesus as He abides 'forever' has His priesthood changeless. Herein again He can thoroughly save those who approach God through Him, as He is still alive to intercede for them.

"How suitable is such a High Priest for us? Sundered from sinful men and exalted above the heavens, He need not, like those high priests, offer constant sacrifices; this He did once for all when He offered Himself. And thus, instead of an arbitrary succession of weak men, there is the Son of God, installed by His oath, consecrated forever.

AARON'S HIGH PRIESTHOOD WAS ONLY SECONDARY.

"Next to advance a step and crown this result. Of what stamp is our High Priest? He is seated on the right of the heavenly throne, minister of the Holy Place and of the original tabernacle pitched by God, not by man.

"High Priests exist to offer gifts and sacrifices; what has our High Priest to offer? The Levitical priests on earth offer their legal sacrifices; but they serve what is a mere copy and imitation of the heavenly realities, as Moses was warned when he was told to construct the Levitical tabernacle: 'Mind and make them after the pattern shown thee in the mount.'

"Consider the whole covenant with which the Levitical priesthood is bound up. How far better is that covenant which Jesus negotiated, based as it is on better promises. For if that covenant at Sinai had been faultless, there would be no room for a second; whereas God did find it faulty and say: 'The time is coming when I will make a new covenant with Israel.' When God uttered that phrase, a new covenant, He branded the other as old. But what was becoming old and growing obsolete even in the days of Jeremiah, is not far off destruction.

"Now even that first covenant had rites divinely appointed, and its sanctuary, ornamental in a way. For there was a tent prepared, in two parts, full of emblematic

furniture which there is no time to expound in detail. Attend to the significance of there being two parts. Into the outer tent the priests may go freely, performing their duties; but into the inner tent may pass the High Priest alone, and he only once a year, after sacrifice. This is the divine meaning, that while the outer tent stands, there is for a sinner no way into God's presence. This symbol receives its explanation at this present time. And it is only as symbols that Levitical gifts and sacrifices are offered; they cannot help the conscience of a worshiper for they, like the food and drink and the various baths of the Levitical law, are rites affecting merely the flesh, imposed until a time when all should be set right in reality.

THE HIGH PRIESTHOOD OF JESUS IS REAL AND EFFECTIVE.

"Contrast the work of Christ, who ascended to usher in the new age. The blessings He offers come by means of the real original tabernacle, not the manufactured imitation; He depended not on the blood of the dumb goats and calves, but on His own blood; He entered once for all into the true Holy Place, obtaining thereby a redemption that is eternal. For if animal blood and ashes sprinkled on a man set him apart technically so far as his body is concerned, how much more shall the blood of Christ, who deliberately offered Himself to God, sinless, cleanse our conscience from lifelessness and enable us to serve the living God?

"His death has a double reference. Not only did it ratify a new covenant, but it redeemed those who transgressed the old covenant, and enabled them to enjoy the inheritance promised to Abraham. For a covenant involves the death of him who breaks it, as is represented in the actual death of the victims at the sacrifice which ratifies the covenant. But the death incurred by the general breach of the old covenant was borne by Jesus.

"That old covenant, important as it was, was inaugurated merely with blood. For Moses took the blood of calves and goats, and sprinkled both the book recording

the covenant, and the people, and the tent, and all the utensils for the ritual. Indeed I may almost say that everything is cleansed in blood according to the Law. And if without shedding of blood no forgiveness is granted, these earthly copies of the heavenly tabernacle must be cleansed—in blood. Cleansed, in blood!

"But the real cleansing of the heavenly original must be with better sacrifices. For Christ did not enter an imitation holy place, but the very heavens, where He now represents us before God. Nor does He keep on offering Himself, as the earthly priest goes yearly into the holy place, with blood, and that not his own! Once only, at the crisis of the ages, has He manifested Himself to abolish sin by a real sacrifice of Himself. He is like us in death and judgment; but His death was to bear the sins of many, though Himself sinless; and sin being done with, the judgment is an award of triumph, namely that He may come again and complete the salvation of those who earnestly expect Him.

"Or look at the sacrifices. The Law simply foreshadowed the blessings to come, but did not pretend to bestow them; the priests cannot free worshippers from sin by those sacrifices which they keep on endlessly offering. For if the worshippers ever attained an easy conscience by a real cleansing, the round of sacrifice might cease, whereas it continues year after year reviving the recollection of sins without removing them.

"The fact is that no amount of bloodshed can take away sin; material acts cannot rectify spiritual wrong. And so when the Word became flesh, He took as His motto the old psalm which on the one hand declared that God wanted no sacrifice or burnt-offering, and on the other announced, 'I am come to do Thy will, O God.' Sacrifice, ordered indeed in the Law, is yet abolished, and obedience is exalted. Jesus never slew and offered a beast on the altar, throughout His life He obeyed God. And God accepting that obedience which culminated on the cross, willed to pronounce us thenceforth free from sin.

"Those Levitical priests toil away at their useless drudgery, while our Priest is content with His one effectual life and death, and now confidently awaits in glorious rest the final issue of His work. For brief as was His career, it suffices thoroughly to make and keep men right with God. Have we not a clear promise of this? When Jeremiah was commissioned to announce the New Covenant, it proved to consist not simply in touching the hearts and consciences of men, but also in blotting out from God's mind the memory of sin. And since this is so, further sacrifice can only recall sin again to mind, and undo the work of Christ."

Perhaps the best way to study this great argument is not to follow it point by point, but to examine its teaching on four great topics: Covenant, Law, Sacrifice of Christ, Priesthood of Christ.

COVENANT OR TESTAMENT; CONTRACT OR WILL?

That a covenant was in question was almost hidden from the reader of the Authorized Version by the wrong translation Testament. Now in the Revised Version the true translation is given in such places as vii. 22, viii. 6-13, ix. 1-15, 18-20, x. 16. But right in the middle of a connected argument the RV breaks it up and makes it illogical by keeping the old rendering for two verses. It may seem plausible to say that the only document which first comes into force at the death of him who made it, is a Will; but this shirks two points: There is nothing to limit our consideration to a document; the argument before and after is about a Contract, not a Will. Moreover the Jewish Law did not admit of wills; property was divided between the children with a double share to the oldest. If it be said (without much evidence) that wills had been introduced under Roman influence, the answer is plain, that a Roman will did come into force when made, before the death of the maker. Besides, who is the "Mediator" of a will, the Executor or Trustee? And

who is supposed to die that the will may come into force? Christ? Then He willed away His gifts to others and was left destitute, which is absurd. The Father, so that Christ is joint-heir? The idea is unthinkable.

Trying then if the author is not more logical than the revisers think, we have as a literal translation of ix. 16-17: "For where there is a covenant, there must necessarily be borne the death of the covenanter. For a covenant is valid over dead (victims), since is it then of force in case the covenanter lives?" The translation is easy enough, but the question staggers a modern reader. This is only because we are more familiar with contracts signed, sealed and delivered, than with ancient Jewish covenants. These were usually ratified by a sacrifice, as we see in the cases of Abraham and Jacob, Genesis xv., xxxi. The meaning of this seems to be that each covenanter invoked on himself in case he broke his word, such a death as the victims actually bore. Now on this understanding the question in the epistle is most pertinent. The men who made the first covenant broke it and incurred the penalty of death; but Christ bore that penalty and so redeemed their transgressions, leaving them pardoned and able to benefit by the promise of the eternal inheritance. This promise had been made to Abraham, long before the Law, and was quite independent of it, permanent not parenthetical, vi. 12-17. But whereas hitherto only the promise had been inherited, since the death of Christ the fulfilment also was available for all who were called. Such is the steady view of the epistle, xi. 39.

THE COVENANT.

Apart from these two verses, there is now no doubt that the main thread of argument is about not a Will, but a Contract; or rather about the Old Contract made at Sinai, and the New one promised through Jeremiah and arranged through Jesus, superseding the Old. The parties

to the old contract were Israel and God, while Moses was the middle-man. For the new contract the middle-man is Jesus; the parties are not defined here, except by the quotation from Jeremiah and by the vague phrase, "They who have been called;" it was not expedient to annoy Jews by obtruding the fact that all men were now free to contract with God; throughout the epistle the horizon is limited to Jews.

This subject of the Covenants has been specially obscured by a Dutch theology which ignores the Bible usage of two historical contracts, at Sinai and at Calvary, and which dwells on two theological covenants "of works and of grace." To understand Hebrews these modern ideas must be banished from the mind. At Sinai the people promised to do what God asked, they heard His orders spoken direct or read by Moses from the Book of the Covenant, they held a solemn meeting and promised anew, they offered sacrifices to ratify the covenant, and they joined in the final meal before God. But within six weeks they broke one of the leading conditions, thus ending the covenant and absolving God from His promise; on the intercession of Moses He condescended to renew it. The next generation was equally faithless, but again it was renewed on the plains of Moab. Every succeeding generation broke it, and after a solemn renewal in the days of Josiah and a wholesale apostasy under Jehoiakim, the prophets took up the thought of Hosea i. 9-11, and treated the covenant as broken beyond repair, so turned their hopes to a new one, Jeremiah xi., xxxi., xxxii., Ezekiel xvi., xxxvii., Isaiah xxiv., lxi. Ezra also felt that the old covenant was ended, and hoped he could be the middle-man of the new one, for which he elaborated a long service, Nehemiah ix. It does not seem to have occurred to him or to Josiah that while they were in earnest, they had no invitation from God to renew the covenant, and no token whatever that He paid any attention to their proceedings. Later ages instinctively perceived this, and ignoring them, harked back to the transaction at Sinai,

where undoubtedly God manifested His approbation, and took the initiative. But with strange blindness they fancied that though their side had never been kept, the contract was still in force, and that God was pledged to fulfill His side. With equal one-sidedness modern Jews still hold that this Covenant is available for them, though they explain away their obligation to fulfill half the conditions explicitly stated.

Really the New Covenant was announced by Jesus; the terms of this new contract were Love to God and Man, and the benefit offered was Pardon for sin and Help to do better. The ratifying service culminated at the cross, where the penalty of breach was borne by Jesus; and He ordered a festal meal in memory of the whole transaction. The new contract is open for any one to enter into on his own account; Jesus has arranged it and is surety that it will be carried out, surety for the Father to the contracting sinner, surety for the sinner to God. And whereas the Old Covenant had no promise, open or implied, that it could be begun again after failure, one of the leading features here is that when we fail to keep it, we may repent and confess to God, and find it still available.

THE LAW.

From the Covenant we pass to the closely related topic of the Law. This is the Jewish Law, contained within the five books of Moses, especially in the three great collections, Exodus xx-xxiii., Leviticus with a few supplements in Numbers, Deuteronomy xii-xxvi. This Law is declared to be obsolete, and a variety of depreciatory terms are heaped upon it—changed, carnal, preliminary, annulled, weak, unprofitable, shadowy. Such amazingly strong language was necessary to drive into the patriotic heart of Jewish Christians that there was no sin in disregarding what was already repealed. If the great American Constitution with its history of 118 years was repealed from top to bottom, and no longer had any binding force,

yet sentiment would cause millions to act voluntarily along its lines still. And if it should be highly inexpedient that such obedience should be given—may the profane supposition be forgiven—then the innovator would have to smite with sledge-hammer blows in order to break the links of custom.

There is however no explicit reference to the act of abrogation, nor any mention of a new Law substituted for the old. The matter had been implicitly settled when Peter publicly stigmatized the Law as "a yoke which neither our fathers nor we were able to bear," language unrebuked at Jerusalem, even by James. Those who acquiesced in such contempt had really conceded that the Law was done with. James had frankly admitted that whoever stumbles in a single point, keeping all the rest of the Law, was yet guilty of all; this is evidently a *reductio ad absurdum,* and he infers that the ancient Law is repealed and replaced by the Royal Law, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. No debate expressly on this point has been recorded, for in Acts xv. the point was whether the Law should bind Gentiles; but Paul's arguments to the Galatians, including many who were "Jews by nature and not sinners of the Gentiles," go nearly to the root of the matter. The Law was added till the Seed should come; now that faith is come, we are no longer under a tutor; Christ set us free from the yoke of bondage; the whole Law is fulfilled in one word; fulfill the law of Christ. While to the Romans he discussed chiefly the point of justification, yet he widened to say, Ye were made dead to the Law through the body of Christ, we have been discharged from the Law. If this may be understood of a few individuals exempt from the Law, which yet remains generally, he deals with it objectively to the Colossians, saying that Jesus blotted out the bond written in ordinances and took it out of the way, nailing it to the cross; and he goes on to drop a seed which finds here ample growth, that ceremonies are but shadows of a substance now come in Christ.

Nailed to the cross. When Jesus declared with His dying breath, It is finished, He announced that the time had arrived at which He had hinted when He said that no jot nor tittle could pass from the Law "till all things be accomplished." Even then He had criticised isolated details of the Law, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not forswear thyself, An eye for an eye; in place of these He had offered one comprehensive and deeper precept, declaring that it was the Law, All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, even so do ye also unto them. And thus in one sense He filled the Law full; but in another sense His whole life was a fulfilling it, obeying it in every minute detail. If to John He said at the outset that He must fulfill all righteousness, He declared to the Father at the end that He had accomplished the work assigned Him, and the claim was admitted in the resurrection. Christ then had fulfilled the Law, and his death brought down the whole scaffolding with a crash, leaving instead His own permanent command, Love one another.

Now in this epistle the moral side of the Law is not touched, it is the temple ritual that is chiefly discussed; but it is urged that a change even in any detail of ritual really means a change of the whole Law. The position of James is endorsed, that the Law is one and indivisible. This was indeed the general Jewish view; Paul warned that obedience to the law of circumcision was useless unless the burden of the whole Law was assumed; Moses had bidden Israel neither add nor diminish. It may suit the modern Jew to classify the 613 precepts of the Law into four groups, and to say that the sacrificial laws are not binding because there is no temple, the political laws are not binding because there is no Jewish state, so that only the ceremonial and moral laws still hold; but no passage in the Law warrants this division and this putting half of it into obeyance. The Law stands or falls as a whole. And it fell, when Christ died.

This epistle deals directly with only one part of the

subject, that the sacrificial laws are not binding on Jews; but the far wider conclusion is warranted, that no solitary part of the Law is now binding on any man whatever simply because it is part of the Jewish Law. Indeed this conclusion is drawn by others, and taught on the authority of Christ. Paul summed all the commandments in the word Jesus had quoted, Love thy neighbor as thyself, and said that love was the fulfillment of the Law. As a standard of conduct it has faded out of Peter's thought in his epistles, and he allegorizes in the strain of this epistle. Mark never mentioned the Law at all, in any part of his Gospel; and he commented on our Lord's saying about clean and unclean, that it virtually made all meats clean. Luke the Gentile hardly mentions it except in reporting the speeches of others; if he mentions it on his own account it is usually with a significant qualification, such as, The Law of Moses. Matthew has preserved for us the two great utterances of our Lord, which concentrate and implicitly supersede it, vii. 12, xxii. 40. John even in his gospel seems equally detached, reports Jesus as calling it "your Law," contrasts it with the grace and truth that came through Jesus Christ; and in his epistles he never alludes to it; it is no rule of life to which he refers, it is not even a danger to be warned against, it is off his horizon, while the duty of a Christian is to keep Christ's commandments, summed up and repeatedly referred to in the phrase, Love one another.

It is astonishing that after this plain exposition by many writers, Christians often hanker after the Law, or after a few fragments of it. When we have a compact announcement of the will of Christ, the one Law-giver, who has all authority in heaven and on earth, how foolish to rake over the Jewish scrapheap and rescue a rusty chain or two to wear as a yoke of bondage! We live under the New Covenant, not the Old; our law is the will of Christ, not the Law of Moses. History attests that once men meddle with that obsolete rubbish, they are tempted to take up more and more of it, until in ritual they blossom out

with robed priests offering sacrifices on altars, in ceremonial they have holy days and celibacy and unclean food, in politics they have a doctrine of the infallibility of the Pope, and in ethics their "moral theology" stinks to high heaven. If many of us shudder at this as almost an apostasy from Christ, let us remember that he who appeals on any point whatever to the Law rather than to Jesus Christ, has in principle admitted all this declension, and when he himself presently feels inclined to stop will be powerless to draw any line.

THE SACRIFICE OF CHRIST.

When the Jewish law of sacrifice was criticised, the true meaning of sacrifice was set forth in the case of Jesus. First it was shown that the main purpose of the old animal sacrifices had been misunderstood. Whatever the old heathen meant by sacrifice, whether a totem feast, a sacramental meal, a harvest festival, or what not, yet the main thing meant by God for the Jews was, a reminder of sin. Sin was the one thing dwelt on in sin-offering, trespass-offering, burnt-offering, atonement-offering. This was well known. But there was some novelty in saying that sacrifice served only to recall sin to mind, not to banish it and give an easy conscience. Even spiritual psalmists had not seen things quite in this light; they knew that God wanted broken and contrite hearts, but saw no connection with sacrifice, and were somewhat inclined to withhold it; while mere ritualist choirmasters editing the psalms for public worship, cheerfully acquiesced in the notion that to roast a bullock whole on the altar was itself good.

It was a splendid contribution to thought that sacrifices were to recall sin to mind and make the conscience uneasy. Missionaries still find the Christian application true, that when talking about duty will arouse no sense of sin, yet the story of Jesus dying on the cross can cause shame and repentance.

Then came the next problem, how to get rid of sin; and the notion is brushed aside contemptuously that blood can do it. If this is to us axiomatic, to them it was revolutionary. An educated Hindu to-day thinks that he can get into communion with God by putting his limbs into a certain position and stroking his stomach; small wonder that educated Jews then still dallied with the thought that blood could cover up sin. This writer can hardly conceal his scorn of such materialist notions; and his insight is the more remarkable if he had not actually seen and smelt the steaming slaughterhouse of the temple, but simply read as we do the directions in Leviticus. According to the Law, nearly everything is cleansed with blood! Apart from shedding of blood there is no forgiveness! We must have better sacrifices than this.

What then does he rely on, the blood of Christ? Not so, if that phrase be taken literally. He uses it as a halfway house in his exposition; but he presently speaks also of the Body of Christ. And when he discards metaphor, he lays the stress on the Obedience of Christ. "Lo, I am come to do Thy will." This is comprehensible. Man's sin is dealt with by man, not by bulls and goats. Man's disobedience is met with man's obedience. These things are on a plane.

How far was this obedience carried? Through life to death, and we are not warranted in dissecting them apart and discarding either. Christ's life was one perpetual obedience, from birth under the Law to acquiescence in a condemnation for blasphemy at the lips of the high priest. He announced publicly that He came to fulfill the Law; He bade the leper go and obey the rule as to purification. He openly challenged His foes whether they saw any fault in Him, and except for mutterings about the Sabbath, which He met by saying that He disregarded their traditions, there was no reply. The general people, a hostile council, an intimate like Judas, a dispassionate observer like Pilate, all concurred in seeing no fault. But a crucial test came in Gethsemane, to cease obeying;

hard was the struggle, yet the issue was as usual, Thy will be done. And so He was obedient, even to death. The twelve legions of angels were not summoned, the sword of Peter was ordered back to its sheath, the taunt "Himself He cannot save" was allowed to pass; and He died on the cross. With that the sacrifice was complete, and instantly the veil of the temple was rent in twain in token that once again, as in the days of Ezekiel, the place was abandoned by God, and its secrets were exposed to all.

THE PRIESTHOOD OF CHRIST.

While the sacrifice is important, the Priest is the central topic here. There were priests before Aaron, the memory of them remained in the days of the Levitical priests, and a future priest of one such type was promised; in Jesus he appeared. Such is the argument.

But what is the most important duty of a priest? And from the analogy of the Day of Atonement the answer is, To enter the Holy of Holies after the sacrifices, and intercede for forgiveness. This was no novel doctrine; every priest, if physically unblemished, might butcher an animal, tend the fire, daub the blood; but to enter the temple and burn incense was a far greater honor, only possible for a few, and so dealt out by lot, and permitted only once in a lifetime. And to enter the inner apartment was permitted to the high priest alone, on one day only in each year.

So from this analogy the chief priestly work of Jesus came after His sacrifice; and therefore it lies in heaven. When sacerdotal metaphor is dropped, we find it stated in such terms as these: To show mercy and bestow grace to help in time of need; to be the author of eternal salvation to all that obey Him; to be our forerunner in heaven; to lead us nigh to God; to save to the uttermost by making intercession; to cleanse our conscience from dead works; to serve the living God; to appear before the face of God for us; and, yet in the future, to appear before

us for God to complete our salvation by the abolition of sin and taking us into full fellowship. While then the initial atoning work of Jesus receives ample recognition, yet the emphasis is thrown on the continuous intercessory work to culminate in the Second Advent, when we too pass within the veil.

Christ's prophetic work is over; no longer does He teach in person, that was done once while He lived on earth; now we are His deputies to speak for Him and announce salvation. His kingly work is hardly begun, except where the few enthrone Him in their hearts; He is sitting and waiting till His foes be made His footstool, that He may take His great power and reign. But His priestly work is at its zenith. For all who accept Him as their representative, He is the ambassador at the court of heaven, presenting our praise and our prayer. He takes the initiative and pleads what He has wrought. Through Him passes upward our confession of sin, through Him pass downward forgiveness and cleansing and help.

ATTEMPTS TO ELIMINATE THE SUPERNATURAL FROM THE GOSPEL HISTORY.*

I.

BY PROFESSOR JAMES IVERACH, D. D., FREE CHURCH COLLEGE, ABERDEEN, SCOTLAND.

It is impossible, within our limits, to enumerate the attempts which have been made to eliminate the Supernatural from the Gospel history. They vary from age to age, they depend on the tone, spirit, and tendency of the time, but whatever these may be the attempt is ever renewed, and those who make the attempt are always persuaded that they have been successful. At all events they proclaim loudly that they have succeeded. Yet every fresh attempt is a criticism on all former attempts, and a confession that so far former attempts have been a failure. Recall to mind the criticism of Strauss on the rational endeavors of the Aufklarung movement, and the subsequent criticism of Baur of the theory of Strauss, and the reply of Strauss to Baur. One might write a history of these failures, from the writings of those who successively have been in the van of the attack. Yet this is not the place for such a work.

The attempts have in the main proceeded from science, from philosophy, or from those mainly interested in history. Typical illustrations of the attack from the scientific side are to be found in the writings of Huxley and Spencer; from the side of philosophy one may find the attack proceeding from the various schools, materialistic or ideal, but both schools are equally determined to reduce the processes of Christianity to that level which will bring them within the grasp of the principles they regard as sufficient for the explanation of the world and

* In our January issue will appear the second part of Prof. Iverach's article, in which his suggestive argument will be completed.—Editor.

of all the changes within it. Then there is the attack from the student of history, who is resolved that all historical movements shall be explained on grounds common to them all, and that there will remain in history no movement that cannot be explained from principles which operate along all the lines of history. There is one thing in common to all these attacks. Science claims that all the changes in time and all the movements within the world are to be explained by the general laws of science. Philosophy demands that the Whole and all the interrelations within the Whole shall be explicable through the working of the categories which philosophy has excogitated as the principles which regulate the ongoing of the Whole. And the historical critic is not behind these in his demand that reality shall conform to the canons of historical criticism which they have found to be applicable over a wide range of history. Now all these have their rights, and all of them have a high and noble function to perform. Science, philosophy, and criticism are among the highest achievements of the human mind, and without them the work of man in history could not go on. For my part, I owe too much to them all ever to deny their place and power in the evolution of man.

It is one thing, however, to recognize the worth of the work which these have done in the history of man, it is another thing to yield to their claims when they tend to imprison the human spirit within the cramped, and confined boundaries drawn by rules abstracted from reality, and made absolute in a negative direction.

To abstract is necessary; it is the condition under which finite intelligence is able to deal with the complexity of the real world, if we are to have any possibility of understanding that world. We must isolate certain aspects of experience if we are to have any mastery over it. But then we are apt to place the aspect we have isolated as if it were the reality, and to ignore altogether the elements we have neglected. Thus a chemist complains, as Ostwald did the other day, that the abstractions of the

physicist leave out of account those very aspects of reality which are the essential notes of matter from the chemical point of view. Sufficient for the purpose of the physicist, they misrepresent altogether the objects of the chemist's vision and research. So we might pass round the circle of the sciences and note that each one makes its own assumptions, looks at its own problems from its own point of view, and states its problems according to its own method of procedure. Each of them, too, ignores to a large extent the problems of the others, and each of them tends to describe reality in terms derived from its own abstractions.

Let me recall to you the twofold process of science, philosophy, and criticism. There is a process which we all know. Is it not described in every text-book of logic, is it not set forth in every manual of philosophy? Induction, deduction, generalisation, the process of discovering more and more general laws, till you come to the highest and widest generalisation of all. So you arrive at such laws as those of gravitation, conservation of energy, and the like. These are largely useful, and helpful in many ways. But their use is largely in the way of limitation. They describe conditions which are universal, conditions to which the world is subject, and which the changes of the world must submit to. They are of little use for purposes of explanation. Architecture must be limited by gravitation, but gravitation does not explain architecture. General laws will never account for particular effects. Mill, or Bain, or others, say Jevons, will tell you all about induction, and so on. They will not tell you anything about the other process which after all is the greater part of science and philosophy. They will not tell you how to recognize the uniqueness of the unique, nor enable you to recognize that unique assemblage of qualities which make the thinghood of the thing. What I contend for here is just this, that science, philosophy, and criticism are as much interested in, are as much bound to recognize the concrete reality in its individual concreteness, which

makes it what it is, and not something else, as it is interested in, and bound to recognize the linkage which connects one thing with every thing else. The bearing of this remark on our subject will appear very soon. Abstract science can never represent the real world. Abstract science deals only with those aspects which they have abstracted, and those features of reality which have been neglected clamor for recognition, and must have their place in any final or adequate interpretation of experience. This is true for all science, it is emphatically true of those sciences which deal with man. The synthesis of particulars, which from one point of view is the goal of all science, is accentuated in the case of the most complex of all known objects, the individual being which we call a human person. In dealing with men we have not only to deal with general rules, not only with those qualities which are common to all men, but with that uniqueness which makes this individual a being unlike all other beings, one in all respects never to be repeated, one that has a place which no one else can take, and a work to do which no one else can do. Not to speak of science generally any further let us take psychology, and what we have to say of psychology will be so far true of all science. I take psychology for various reasons. For one reason I take it because of the demands made in its name by men like Sabatier, Amiel, Percy Gardner and others. In their hands psychology has become the almost universal solvent of views regarding the Gospel History which have been the accepted beliefs of generations of Christians. Amiel demands that Psychology shall take the place of history. His statement is, "What our age needs especially is a translation of Christianity from the domain of history to the domain of psychology." Professor Percy Gardner gives his emphatic approval to the statement of Amiel and endeavors to work out the thesis in his *Exploratio Evangelica.*

These writers take the mind of the believer as the

primary object of investigation in religion. What is belief? How does it work? How has it manifested itself throughout those generations of men regarding whom we have sources of information more or less trustworthy? Thus we have any number of investigations into the beliefs of mankind, their nature, their laws of growth, their recurring notions, and the various ways by which they strive to make their beliefs correspond with their experience. It is this vague and large sphere of investigation that is indicated by Amiel, rather than the domain usually indicated by psychology. But even then it is a demand which can hardly be justified. To clear our views let us hear one or two of the masters in psychology. Dr. Ward, universally acknowledged to be one of the foremost psychologists of our time, says: "To be characterized at all, psychology must be characterized from the standpoint from which this experience is viewed. It is the way of expressing this that widely different schools of psychology define it as subjective, all other positive sciences being distinguished as objective. But this seems scarcely more than a first approximation to the truth, and is apt to be misleading. The distinction rather is that the standpoint of psychology is what is sometimes termed 'individualistic,' that of the so-called objective science being 'universalistic,' both alike being objective in the sense of being true for all, consisting in what Kant would call judgments of experience. For psychology is not a biography in any sense, still less a biography dealing with idiosyncracies, and in an idiom having an interest and a meaning for one subject only and incommunicable." (Encyc. Brit., art. *Psychology*). Munsterberg says: "Psychology is not at all an expression of reality, but a complicated transformation of it, worked out for special logical purposes in the service of our life." In truth the idea of psychology apparently, in the minds of Professor Gardner, Sabatier and others, seems to be on a level with that idea of psychology which has given us the popular expressions psychological moment, psychologi-

cal atmosphere, and the like, which must be characterized simply as mostly psychological nonsense, the product of imperfect knowledge, and inexact thinking.

"Psychology is not a biography in any sense," says Dr. Ward, and when he says it, he disposes of the notion of Sabatier that Christianity has to be translated from the domain of history to that of psychology. For professedly the claim advanced by Christianity on the part of its founder is one which can be tried not on the grounds of psychology, but on that of a biography. It is a personal, not a racial question. A biography in general terms is a failure. A biography must give us the man in his habit as he lived, must paint him with the warts, must set him forth in all the idiosyncracies which make up uniqueness of his personality, as well as in those common to him with all men. Processes described by psychology are here only limiting conceptions, descriptive of bounds beyond which you may not pass, and of conditions within which you must work.

My contention is that, while you bring to the study of the origin and character of Christianity all the knowledge you can possibly gather from the general history of mankind, from the nature and working of human belief in general from the conditions, circumstances and characteristics of the special time in which Christianity had its origin, you must not be content with that; you must have regard as well to those features of Christianity which make it what it is. What I ask in relation to Christianity is nothing more than is conceded willingly in relation to those periods of history which may be described as epoch-making. In the sciences you seek to set forth processes, laws, recurring cycles, movements which are regarded as continuous, but in history as it is, not merely as we write it, you have to deal with events which only happened once and never again, with persons who lived and worked, and appeared only once in all the uniqueness of their personality in this world's history. It is well to describe the sphere of their work, the condi-

tions of their life, but not to forget their concrete reality. From the point of view of physical chemistry, Napoleon, Wellington, Newton and Goethe, represent only series of complicated chemical processes, which physiologically complete themselves within a certain cycle, to the psychologist they are only a series of psychological processes which went on between their birth and their death, yet history has much to say of these men, and they form for history a series of problems of exceeding interest, so difficult is it for us to think out all those determinations which meet in the life and work of those men. You must recognize in Julius Cæsar more than the expression of the tendency of the Roman people towards a centralized form of Government, and Plato is not a mere type of Greek genius. It is not enough for you in practical life to know man, you must know men. It is not enough to known general tendencies about a period of history, you must come to particulars, and become acquainted with the men in whom moved the spirit of the time in a definite and concrete form.

Thus, in relation to the origin of Christianity, it is not enough to know the history of the times in which it originated, not enough to trace the history and development of the Hebrew people, and to recognize the dominating conception of the time, not enough to trace the laws of human belief as these have been ascertained by a comparative view of the action of the human mind as far as these can be known; there must be here as elsewhere a definite recognition of the actual phenomena of the Christian movement as a whole. Not one of us but recognizes with gratitude the real and helpful work done in psychology, archæology, history and in other spheres by the many workers of the last century. We all gladly welcome the light cast on the New Testament by the persevering and varied research of the present time, we hail with pleasure the descriptions of the life, thought, feeling of the world, Jewish, Greek and Roman, in the first century of our era, and we welcome any connection which may be

traced between Christian life and thought and the life and thought of the time, but we venture to say that no amount of such investigations can give a sufficient account of the origin and character of Christianity. It is simply rigidly, scientifically true that one cannot account for Christianity apart from the creative personality of Jesus Christ. Most of the attempts I have read from the Wolfenbuttel Fragmentist down to the most recent are attempts to turn the story of Christianity into a story which began after Christ. After we have studied with minuteness, accuracy and impartiality the connections between Christianity and former and contemporary faiths, let us study Christianity itself with like minuteness, accuracy and impartiality. Many of our friends neglect the particular study, or reduce the peculiarities of Christianity until nothing is left save that which it has in common with the ordinary processes of human history.

Critics bring to the study of the New Testament a number of generalisations which they have taken from the study of history, of psychology, of anthropology, and of science in general. They have learned something from the history of myth, and they carry with them to the study of Christianity what they have learned from the study of mythology. Legendary literature has its characteristics, and they search for such characteristics in Christianity. Then there is the maxim that any given literature bears the marks of its time, and shares the limitations of the period of its production. Then, too, we are reminded often that ancient history is never history in the modern sense of that word. Ancient peoples never cared for what actually happened, they never recorded fact for the sake of fact. History was written for didactic purposes, for edification, for the glorification of a cause, for patriotic purposes, or simply for artistic purposes. They never sought or desired, so we are told, to know what really happened; facts were manipulated in order to point a moral or adorn a tale. In this there

is no doubt a measure of truth. But it is greatly exaggerated. But what truth is in it is equally true of modern history. Read Hegel on the history of philosophy, or on the philosophy of history and you will find that history is simply an illustration of the Hegelian process, thesis, antithesis, synthesis. Read Lange's History of Materialism, and you will find an illustration of what has been described above as the very spirit of ancient historians. Read Macaulay and you will find a strong subjective bias, apologetic throughout of the whig party. Read Mommsen, the greatest of modern historians, and one of the most objective of them, and you find a history of Rome written throughout with an eye on the problems of Prussian Politics in the Nineteenth Century. Read Ihne alongside of Mommsen, and you have a history colored throughout by antagonism to Mommsen. Yet we do not accuse these eminent historians in philosophy and history with that wholesale disregard of fact which we find thrown out by Professor Gardner as the note of ancient history. Let us acknowledge that even ancient history had some appreciation of what actually had happened, that Ramsay's claims that Luke was one of the great historians of the world has truth in it, and that that claim can be justly made for other ancient historians as well.

Let us be thankful for the fact that this generation knows the first century of our era as no generation ever did. What the Old Testament and the history of the Hebrew people really was, and what was the influence of the great Hebrew tradition in Palestine and the Diaspora on the life in Palestine in the First Century is known in great fullness. The political conditions and the religious atmosphere of the time are also known. The ideas, the expectations, the hopes and fears of the Hebrew and Hellenistic worlds are so far understood, and in the light of all that knowledge the uniqueness of Christianity shines forth more and more.

We know something about myth which was unknown

to Strauss. Tendencies can be traced with more exactness than could be done by Baur with the means at his command. And there is the further advantage that the documents of the New Testament are acknowledged by most critics to be documents of the First Century. Any processes which are descriptive of the growth of the New Testament history must have their scope within the First Century. Nay, further, mainly in relation to the Synoptic Gospels, the processes through which the materials of the Gospels passed must have their limit within fifty years after the events happened. That is the state of New Testament criticism at the present time. Of course, I must acknowledge the existence of the Encyclopædia Biblica, and of Professors Schmiedel and Manin. These writings have been described as Midsummer Madness. I do not object save in the limitation of the noun by the epithet.

Time will not allow me to ennumerate in historical order the attempts which have been made to eliminate the supernatural from the Gospel history. Nor is it necessary, for many of them are obsolete, or survive only in an attenuated form. We need not go back to the Wolfenbuttel Fragmentist, or think of Paulus and the like. Strauss has placed them forever in the museum of the superannuated. Nor is Strauss himself much in evidence at the present time. Yet he is in evidence in another form and his mythical theory appears in a transfigured form in Professor Percy Gardner. Strauss has exaggerated, they say, the mythical theory, but there is something in it. So also with Baur, he has exaggerated the tendency criticism. He has extended it over too wide a field, his successors tell us, and has lengthened its action for too long a time. But they say Baur discovered a true cause. But he did not discern its true character, nor its true scope. He ought to have seen that its action began earlier, and its function was more fundamental. The modern form of the Tendency Criticism is to say that the "Synoptic Gospels are the resultant of several factors.

They represent not merely the contemporary feeling and opinion actually within Christian circles between 70 and 100, but also the processes of reflection, the dominant interests and activities of faith, the mental and devotional attitude to Jesus, which must have been current through the memory and teaching of the early Christians during the years that intervened between 30 and 70. "Thus the modern form of the principle of Baur is that the Gospels are the outcome of two main tendencies, first of the impression made on the first disciples by Jesus, and the interpretation of that impression by the first generation of Christians. If you read the Exploratio Evangelica of Professor Percy Gardner you will be struck with the fact that all the principles by the use of which Christianity was reduced to the level of ordinary history are present in his book in an attenuated form, but none the less effective on that account. You will remember, too, that all the processes at work are supposed to have completed their action within the First Century. That is the limit set to that process by the concession that the documents of the New Testament are of the First Century. Briefly the contention set forth is that the New Testament and all that it signifies is the work of a multitude, is the outcome not of Jesus Christ's person, work and teaching, but the work of a generation of men of the ordinary stature of humanity. The reflection of these men produced alike the character, the teaching and the work of Jesus Christ. Let me quote from Professor Percy Gardner: "Our Gospels belong to the great formative time, when the great ideas of Christianity were surging up, when inspiration flowed to mankind in a broad stream, and found itself a place amid worldly surroundings with a rapidity which is astonishing. Some geologists hold that there have been periods in the history of our planet when all the processes of biologic evolution took place with far greater rapidity than now. There have also been times of sudden growth of mankind. The first half of the Fifth Century B. C. was to the Greek spirit such a

time when art, poetry, the drama, all the great fruits of Hellenic genius suddenly ripened. Such a time to the Teutonic spirit was the age of Luther and Calvin, when great systems if doctrine arose suddenly. Such was the earliest age of Christianity, of which the New Testament is the eternal fruit. But great times of creation are of all times least critical. Personality and the bias that goes with it are at their strongest, while the absence of self consciousness prevents men from taking precautions against their own bias, or being at all aware of it. It is precisely the power of the inspiration of the early Church which makes the life of Jesus, from the critical and historic points of view, so embarrassing." It is a remarkable passage, and other passages quite as remarkable might be cited from his interesting book. Observe what is alleged. A great period of inspiration flowing to mankind in a broad stream, great ideas surging up, coming we know not whence, working we know not how. We were wont to think of this stream of inspiration as flowing from a personal source, and the great ideas of Christianity as originating in a single mind. And if that creative personality be what his disciples believed him to be, we had a real source of the inspiration, and a real thinker with whom the great ideas of Christianity originated. Apparently great ideas are more intelligible to Professor Gardner, if they do not originate in a single mind. It is a consolation to have from Professor Gardner and those with whom he agrees that there were great ideas in Christianity, and that these ideas require a special inspiration to account for them.

Let us look, however, at the contention that the synoptic Gospels are the result of many factors, and especially that they are the product of Christian reflection. This is the special modern attempt, the special machinery whereby it is sought to reduce Christianity to the level of the ordinary. We read the Synoptic Gospels, and we seem to come into contact with a unique figure, who makes that impression on us which he appears to have made on His

contemporaries. We, too, feel that he speaks as never man spoke. We feel a power of superhuman goodness manifested in his character and action, and we yield ourselves to that impression and feel that there has been no one else of whom it could be said simply and sublimely, "He went about doing good." Yielding to that impression we find that he makes claims on our thinking and acting, a claim to our loyalty and obedience and trust which is absolute. Then, too, in many passages he seems to claim all the future of the world as belonging to Him, and as His own in a very definite sense. He seems to foresee a time when His cause and kingdom will be so visible and successful that men will seek to be identified with them from other motives than those which actuated his first disciples. Are we justified in yielding to these impressions, and in taking him to be what he seems to be in the Gospels? Well, the criticism with which we at present deal comes to us and says, "No, you may not trust those impressions." It is necessary to find out what in the Gospels is fact, and what is the product of reflection on the fact. We must start with the minimum, with that which was intelligible to the first generation of the Jerusalem Church, with what they were able to assimilate. Then we have an ideal construction of the capacity of the Jerusalem Church. We had one picture already from the pen of Prof. Gardner. But the favorite picture is to describe the earliest generation of Christians as merely Jews, with one additional article of faith, that Jesus is the Messiah. Clearly, they say, "Whatever is beyond the accepted comprehension of the early church in the Gospels must be set down as the product of Christian reflection." Thus you must shut out of the original Gospel every universal statement regarding the mission and work of Christ, and every statement regarding the mission and work of Christ, and every statement regarding the world-wide mission of the Christ must be set down as not spoken by Him. This one principle makes an amazing sweep, and if you apply it rigidly, you will be

surprised to find how many of the sayings of Christ it sweeps away. All that is universal is late, then there is another principle at work. All that seems to raise Jesus Christ above the stature of ordinary men, all that claims for Him power beyond ordinary, or insight more than human, must be set down to reflection. Schmiedel acting on these principles reduces the authentic sayings of Jesus to a very few, and these have not much significance. Of any saying of Jesus, of any deed recorded of Him, of the scope of His character as a whole, on these principles you have only to ask, was this a likely thing to be accepted by the Jerusalem Church? and the answer quickly comes, it is far beyond their horizon, it is something they could not have understood, or have accepted. I do not know what the materials are from which the critic derives his view of the early church, and at present I do not inquire. For I find that the picture drawn of the primitive church, of its range of mind, of its qualification generally, only place difficulties in the way of the critical assumption by which the New Testament literature is accounted for. On the one hand the early church is narrow, bigoted, exclusive, the people in it are Jews, holding the whole circle of Jewish beliefs. On the other hand, this people by a process of reflection have transcended their own narrowness, have passed from bigoted particularism to a universalism unknown in the world before, they have created an ideal of a man and of a humanity unsurpassed before or since, they have set up a conception of the fatherhood of God and of the brotherhood of man, confessedly beyond the reach of any other literature, ancient and modern; in short, they have set up a standard of life and conduct and thought which is the standard yet. I say look on this picture and on this, and ask yourselves, are they consistent with one another? Either the early church was much greater than is set forth in the one picture, or the New Testament literature was not the product of the reflection of the early church.

THE MUSICAL TITLES OF THE PSALMS.

BY REV. LLEWELLYN L. HENSON, D. D.

A most remarkable book, "The Titles of the Psalms," by James William Thirtle, LL. D., of London, has recently reached its second edition. In this book, the author stoutly maintains that he has found the long-lost key to an understanding of these hitherto mysterious titles.

Some of the psalms have no titles at all, as 1 and 2. There are, to be sure, in connection with all the psalms in the American Revision, certain explanatory editorial notes, such as are placed elsewhere at the top of the page, and similar notes are found in the Authorized Version. But the English Revised Version prefixes nothing whatsoever to the thirty-four psalms which have no inscriptions in the Hebrew text.

Others, however, and by far the greater number, do have titles. Sometimes it is a mere note of authorship as "A Psalm of David," "A Psalm of Solomon," "A Psalm of Asaph," etc. Sometimes the historical setting is also given as "When Saul sent and they watched the house to kill him," Ps. 59; again a word may indicate the literary character of the psalm as the word "Song" at the beginning of 46, or "Prayer" prefixed to 86, or "Michtam" which precedes 56 and which means a private prayer; and yet again there aften appear, either with or without such note of authorship or historical background or literary character, certain other titles which go by the name of "Musical Titles" as "For the chief musician, set to Al-tashheth," Ps. 57, or "For the chief musician, set to Aijeleth hash-Shabar," Ps. 22, or "Shoshannim Eduth," Ps. 80, or "Gittith," 81.

The titles which refer to authorship, to literary character and to historical connection are, of course, more or less understood by biblical scholars at large, but the

musical titles have been a puzzle for two millenniums or more. Many attempts to interpret them have been made, it is true, and many different meanings have been suggested as possible solutions, but the fact remains that they have defied the scholarship of the ages, being for thousands of years a veritable "sphinx to interpreters." Kirkpatrick says, "Many of them are extremely obscure and their meanings can only be conjectured," and Driver adds, "The terms . . . . . are frequently obscure." Wellhausen tells us that, "In most cases these musical directions are unintelligible to us," and Franz Delitsch goes so far as to say, "The Septuagint found them already in existence and did not understand them. . . . . The key to their comprehension must have been lost very early."

As is well known, the original manuscripts were written without division or paragraph or punctuation. If there was no title there would be no break between any two consecutive psalms, but all the titles or words of benediction that follow any psalm and all the titles that precede the following psalm would thus be thrown together between the two. In separating the psalms from each other, therefore, that each might stand alone, one can easily see how all the titles between any two psalms might have been set apart together as belonging either to the psalm that immediately precedes or to the psalm that immediately follows. And it now seems that at some remote period the possible did actually happen and all the titles occurring between any two given psalms were put together as belonging to the second, thus placing every title at the beginning of some psalm and not one at the end, even as they appear in the Psalter to-day. In other words, all *sub*scriptions were removed and were made parts of the *super*scription of the following psalm so that we have in the headings of various psalms words that being misplaced have been for ages "a stumbling-block for lexicographers, critics and commentators."

Thus great violence has been done these titles. Words

which in other connections are easily understood become in their new surroundings veritable enigmas "enshrouded in mystery." The fact is, they don't fit. Frequently there is nothing in the following psalm to which these words can refer. Their usual and well understood meanings are absolutely foreign to the thought of the psalms to which they have been attached. This led naturally enough to the most fanciful interpretations of these harmless and ill-used titles. They have been interpreted as being the names of old and long-forgotten musical instruments as "a harp of eight strings" or "a trumpet in the shape of a lily," although such instruments are not known to Semitic literature or oriental antiquity; or they were called catch-words of popular ditties—rag-time music forsooth—which had been caught up from one of the surrounding heathen nations and introduced into the worship of Jehovah, or they were said to have a mystical meaning, which was safe, of course, for no one pretended to say what that meaning might be.

Dr. Thirtle, in his study of the psalms, was led to believe that the psalm found in the 3rd chapter of Habakkuk, standing alone as it does, might be a normal psalm, for no other precedes it from which it could steal a title and no other follows which might rob it of that which is its own. It has at the beginning the usual notes as to class authorship and character, viz.: "A prayer of Habakkuk the prophet set to Shigionoth," but the musical description, "For the chief musician on my stringed instruments," appears at the end.* So, using this psalm in Hab. 3, as his model, our author went to work upon the Psalter and, picking out all the musical titles he proceeded to move them back in each instance from the position which they occupy at the head of various psalms to the end of the psalm that immediately precedes, and in the latter part of his work he has given

* Something similar to this may also be seen in connection with the Psalm in Isa. 38, and Col. Conder, the noted English archaeologist and Palestine Explorer, now testifies by way of confirmation that the titles on Assyrian tablets often occur at the end.

us a new edition of the book of the Psalms in accordance with his new, and as he believes, proper arrangement.

Now one naturally asks, Is this simply a new theory, and a fanciful one at that? Or does the key really fit the lock and open to us the door to an understanding of these much-discussed titles? A brief examination of some of the titles themselves will perhaps be the best answer to these and other questions of like import.

Take *Shoshannim* for example. In the Revised Version it stands at the beginning of Psalms 69 and 45. In the margin at each place its meaning is given as "lilies." But why should a word meaning "lilies" be placed at the head of either of these psalms? No one has been able to point out any real connection between either of the psalms and the word we are discussing, and therefore we have been in the dark in the matter of its interpretation. Gesenius says the word in the singular means a lily, but he adds that according to most interpreters it also means an instrument of music so called perhaps as resembling the form of a lily. And referring to these particular passages he says it is here nothing more than lilies and indicates some well-known song or poem after the measure and numbers of which these psalms were to be sung. The German edition of that great work says there is no indication of its meaning. Haupt says it may mean with Susian instruments, and Kirkpatrick tells us that it was a melody to which the psalm was to be sung—some well-known song beginning with the word Shoshannim—and Fürst declares it is a proper name of one of the twenty-four music choirs left by David and so called from a Master Shushan. These quotations show us the difficulty which scholars have met in trying to interpret this one word. But Thirtle tells us that the word does not belong to Ps. 69 and 45 at all and that it ought to be pushed back in each instance to the preceding psalm. That would locate it with Ps. 68 and 44, and so he has placed it in his book. The question now is, can it be understood in this, its new location? The word means

"lily" as used elsewhere. Will that meaning fit here and can it be maintained in these new connections?

Dr. Thirtle in support of his theory, maintains that Shoshannim does mean here, as elsewhere, "lilies," and as such it represents flowers in general and stands for the springtime and in that, as in Israelitish life, the springtime meant the Passover, the season recalling the feast; the reference here is to the first of the two great feats, viz.: that of Unleavened Bread or the Passover. He quotes Dr. Post in the Hastings Dictionary, who says the word in Arabic is a general term for lily-like flowers being as general as the English term lily and that the Hebrew word must be taken in the same general sense. This word, therefore, has, according to Thirtle, been placed in connection with these two psalms because the chief musician or precentor had received them into his repertory for special use in the liturgical service at the time when Israel celebrated by the Passover Feast her deliverance as a nation from her bondage in Egypt. It was, so to speak, his mark of endorsement of these two psalms for use on that particular occasion from year to year.

Or take the word "Gittith." That word in the Revised Verson stands at the beginning of Ps. 8, 81 and 84, but we are told that it really belongs to Ps. 7, 80 and 83. Among the meanings suggested by various scholars for this word are Upon the Gittite lyre, an instrument with a joyous sound. A march of the Gittite guard, a musical body of Levites of the city of Gath, and belonging to the city of Gath, though it must be admitted that the true meaning, relating to winepresses, has been suggested by other scholars prior to Thirtle. As the former word referring to the flowers of the springtime stands for the Passover, so that word referring to winepresses suggests the autumn and stands for the great feast of that season, viz., the Feast of Tabernacles. This feast, the joyous "Harvest-Home in Israel's land," brought afresh each year to the minds of the people the keeping power of

Jehovah, and this word marks these three psalms as selected by the musical leader for use in connection therewith.

In support of his thesis our author calls attention to the fact that these two ideas of lilies and winepresses or flowers and fruit occur together oftentimes and in various ways. On the pillars of Solomon's Temple were lilies and pomegranates, 1 Kings 7:20-22. On the table which Ptolemy Philadelphus gave to the Jews were lilies and clusters of grapes, Jos. Antiq., 12:2, 9. On the veils that covered the doors of the Temple of Herod were flowers of purple and golden vines. Jos. Antiq., 15:11, 3. And the high priest's robe had golden bells (in the shape of lillies) and promegranates of blue. Ex. 28:33. In the remains of ancient synagogues which have been excavated in Palestine are lintels and cornices decorated with lilies and wine-bowls or clusters of grapes, and the old coin, the half shekel, has on one side a triple lily and on the other a wine-bowl. These and other symbols that might be mentioned seem to sum up and bring vividly before the eye and mind of the people the two great thoughts which the two great feasts symbolize, viz.: That Jehovah is the Redeemer and the Keeper of Israel. It is not strange, therefore, that certain psalms should be selected for use in connection with these feasts, and exactly that it is claimed was done, the two words under discussion being but the marks that indicate those psalms.

But perhaps the best and most convincing proof will be found in an examination of the psalms themselves to which these words are now attached. Two or three instances must suffice. In psalm 68, one of the Shoshannim psalms, at verses 7 and 8, we have:

"O God, when thou wentest forth before thy people,
When thou didst march through the wilderness,
The earth trembled,
The heavens also dropped rain at the presence of God;

Yon Sinai trembled at the presence of God, the God of Israel."

And at verses 19 and 20 we have:

"Blessed be the Lord, who daily beareth our burden,
Even the God who is our Salvation.
God is unto us a God of deliverances;
And unto Jehovah the Lord belongeth escape from death."

In Psalm 44, the other Shoshannim psalm, we have verses 1-3:

"We have heard with our ears, O God,
Our fathers have told us,
What work thou didst in their days,
In the days of old,
Thou didst drive out the nations with thy hand;
But them thou didst plant;
Thou didst afflict the peoples;
But them thou didst spread abroad,
For they get not the land in possession by their own sword,
Neither did their own arm save them;
But thy right hand, and thine arm,and the sight of thy countenance,
Because thou wast favorable unto them."

Certainly Shoshannim, meaning lilies and representing the springtime and suggesting the great Feast of the Passover, is a note that fits these two psalms in a most remarkable way.

Or in Psalm 80, one of the Gittith psalms, take verses 8 to 11:

"Thou broughtest a vine out of Egypt;
Thou didst drive out the nations and plantedst it;
Thou preparedst room before it,

And it took deep root and filled the land.
The mountains were covered with the shadow of it,
And the boughs thereof were like cedars of God.
It sent out its branches unto the sea,
And its shoots unto the river."

This passage, it will be admitted, brings before us in a most beautiful way the fact that Jehovah is the Protector of Israel.

Once more take the phrase "Jonath Elem Rehokim" from Psalm 56 and give it to Psalm 55, where it really belongs, and you are impressed at once with the fitness of things. Indeed the correspondence of the title of Psalm 56 to the text of Psalm 55 has often been noted before, for these words meaning "the dove of the distant terebinths" are plainly a reference to the moan of David, verses 4 to 8 of Psalm 55. Hear him as he cries:

"My heart is sore pained within me;
And the terrors of death are fallen upon me.
Fearfulness and trembling are come upon me,
And horror hath overwhelmed me,
And I said, Oh, that I had wings like a dove!
Then would I fly away and be at rest.
Lo, then would I wander far off,
I would lodge in the wilderness."

Certainly "the dove of the distant terebinths" is a splendid name for the psalm that contains that passage.

Likewise many other examples of a similar and perhaps equally convincing kind are given, and there are enough of them it would seem to make good the claim with which the author approaches his task. Thus these words so little understood heretofore are now allowed to mean what they mean elsewhere and therefore are easily understood. In other words, the key does seem to fit the lock. Prof. Price says: "The main contention of the author is certainly true. He has the key that has been

lying within sight of scholars but unseen for long centuries." His claims are "certain in some cases, probable in most and doubtful in only two or three."

One other probable result of this discovery ought also to be mentioned. In an indirect, but nevertheless in a very forceful way, it gives us proof of the age of the psalms. If these titles were misunderstood when the Septuagint was made say 250 to 200 B. C., if the scholars of that day had so far forgotten the temple service that the precentor or chief musician was unknown to them, if the liturgical use of the psalms in this worship had been so long forgotten as to be lost sight of entirely, if the meaning of *Alamoth* and *Sheminith* was to them unknown, if these musical notes had been made and used and discontinued and forgotten two or three centuries before Christ, it does seem to show that the psalms themselves to which the titles had been attached must have been older than the titles could possibly be, and therefore must date from long before the Maccabean age. How much older they are let the critics proceed to show, but it may turn out that this *obiter dictum* is the most important result of the new discovery.

PREVAILING TENDENCIES IN MODERN THEOLOGY.

BY THE REV. PROF. JAMES ORR, D. D., GLASGOW, SCOTLAND.

Coleridge was once asked by a lady if he was afraid of ghosts. "No, madame," was his reply, "I have seen too many of them." The thoughtful observer of the signs of the times may be pardoned if, in the existing clash and conflict of theological opinion, he sometimes feels like that philosopher. He has seen too many theories, had to do with too many novelties of speculation, each one claiming to be the last word on the subject it was dealing with, each, too plausible in its own way, to be unduly carried away by the cry that criticism "demands" this, or science has "finally established" that, till at least a little time has been given to test results. The present writer, speaking for himself, is far from thinking that there is in the present situation any reason for discouragement—much less for panic. For the moment there is perplexity, as there has often been in the history of the church before, but he can see no cause for being shaken, or troubled in mind, as to the ultimate outcome. What is needed at the present moment is not excitement, or the loud beating of "the drum ecclesiastic," but an endeavor to approach these modern movements sympathetically, and with the fullest desire to do justice to whatever soul of good is in them—above all, a cool head, strong faith, a little patience, action like that of the mariners with Paul, who, when they feared lest they should have fallen among rocks, and when for many days neither sea nor stars appeared, sensibly dropped four anchors, and waited for the day.

At first sight the theological world in which we move seems a scene of confusion—all kinds of currents are melting and commingling in it. When, however, we begin to know it better, it is not quite so incomprehensible. Those whose business it is to work and study in this world

soon forget to feel that, amidst the multifarious side eddies, there are certain main currents which give its set and direction to the stream of thought, and that even these are not unconnected, but are more or less the expressions of a common spirit of the age. Among these main currents—these influences and tendencies which at present dominate theology and stamp a character upon it—one may specially distinguish five, on which it will be the object of this paper to offer a few remarks.

1. A first powerful current flowing through a large section of existing theology is that derived from *the modern idealistic philosophy*, with which may be associated the later *Monism*. Of the former we have a well-known German example in Professor Pfleiderer, but much more influential in moulding the thoughts of the high-minded and intelligent youth of Britain and America has been the Neo-Hegelian influence proceeding from the school of the late T. H. Green, of Oxford, and from Dr. Edward Caird, now master of Baliol in the same university. Only a shallow-minded person will speak lightly of the philosophy of Hegel, but time has shown that it is hopeless to look to it as an ally of Christian faith. Discarding the blind evolution of the naturalists to be afterwards commented on, this philosophy substitutes the more rational conception of an idea immanent in nature, and gradually realizing itself through ascending kingdoms and stages, till it culminates in the self-conscious activities of man. The effect of this in theology is, under the name of a doctrine of the divine immanence, to lead to an identification of God—or of the divine life—with the process of the world. Even where a certain self-consciousness is attributed to God, He is still regarded as nothing more than the rational principles which binds together the various stages or movements of the world-process. A good deal of Christian terminology can be employed in this theory, and it is supposed by many that by means of it a new and profounder meaning may be put into such doctrines as the Incarnation. But, in reality, the Scrip-

tural meaning of these doctrines is altogether lost, and the character of Christianity essentially transformed. The point at which the theory needs fundamentally to be dealt with from the theologian's point of view is that just noted—the merging of the divine life in the process of the world. Any view which, under the name of exalting the divine immanence, identifies God with the process of nature and history—makes the world as necessary to God as God is to the world—is fundamentally irreconcilable with a Scriptural theology. A God in process is of necessity an incomplete God—can never be a true personal God. His being is merged in that of the universe; sin, even, is an element of His life. It is indubitable that God, in order truly to be God, must possess Himself in the eternal fulness and completeness of His own personal life; must possess Himself for Himself and be raised entirely above the transitoriness, the incompleteness, and the contingency of the world-process. Only where this is recognized are we on Christian ground. We are then enabled to think of the world and history, not as the necessary unfolding of a logical process, but as the realization of a free and holy purpose; and inconsistency is no longer felt in the idea of an action of God along supernatural lines—above the plane of mere nature—as wisdom and love may dictate, for the benefit of His creature man.

The day of Hegelian idealism, however, has now somewhat declined, and attraction is felt rather in one or other of the imposing systems which display the flag of Monism. It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss monistic systems in detail, but only to weigh the value of the general idea for theology. Numerous books have recently appeared on both sides of the Atlantic which have for their immediate object to rescue this idea of Monism, as that of a Single Power manifesting itself continuously and progressively in the universe, from the false uses made of it by such naturalistic writers as Haeckel, and to turn it to account in the service of a true theology. Will

the present writer be pardoned if he says that the effect of the study of these works has been to make him feel increasingly that the term is an unclear and ambiguous one, and that a Christian theology, while recognizing the truth that underlies its various uses, will do well to discard it for formulas better adapted to its own purposes. In a sense, indeed, every truly theistic system is monistic. It denies dualism, or the co-existence of eternally distinct principles, say, of good or evil, mind or matter, and recognizes but one ultimate and eternal Being, Power, and Will, from which all else that is in the universe proceeds. Christian theology has never invested the world with a being apart from God, or independently of Him. It has taught that the world is God's creation—that it derives its being and its powers from Him—that He is present and active in all its forces—that it continues to exist by His sustaining energy constantly imparted to it, and sustaining it in existence. But it contends at the same time that the world is not God, but the creation of something other than God; not simply an aspect or manifestation of God, but a constituted system of beings and forces which God distinguishes from Himself and uses as the means for the revelation of His glory. But it is precisely this fact of a distinction between God and the world which "Monism," as ordinarily understood, rejects. For the idea of a creation of the world by God, and of a world distinct from God, yet dependent on Him, it substitutes the notion of a Power, or "Substance," or unknown Somewhat, of which the worlds of matter and mind are a two-sided "manifestation"—two aspects of the same "Reality"—identical in their origin, in their essential nature, in the Power that operates in them. Not only is this the common acceptation of the term; it is one also into which those who seek to give to Monism a spiritual and Christian interpretation are involuntarily compelled to fall. Thus, in a recent able work (Walker's *Christian Theism and a Spiritual Monism*): "It cannot be doubted that Life and Mind are but different forms in which the

one all-working Power is manifested, * * * Matter, Ether and Energy, Motion, Life and Mind; if we follow out the conception of these, as far as they are known, we shall find ourselves always carried back to the working of a Single Power." Plato of old had difficulty in making clear his thought of the "participation" of things in the "idea;" it is hardly less difficult for the Monist to make clear his idea of the relation of God to the world. For this reason many may think it is better to discard the name "Monism" altogether in theology, as prolific of misleading, if not of positively false, associations.

2. A second powerful current flowing through our theology in the immediate present is that that *specially associated with the name of Ritschl.* This has been so often discussed that it is not necessary to dwell on it at great length. In one respect the Ritschlian influence is the direct antithesis of the speculative tendency just described. It is throughout of the nature of a reaction—a reaction against scholasticism in dogmatics, against the intrusion of philosophy into theology, against the overstraining of mystical feeling to the neglect of the historic in Christianity. It has for its avowed aim to free Christianity from extraneous supports, and in the immediate appeal of the image of Christ to the heart to find a ground of certainty which shall be independent of science and criticism, and of the changing moods of philosophy. The watchwords of this influential school, so far as it has affected theology in English-speaking countries, will be readily recognized—theology without metaphysics, a return to the historic Christ, and the idea of the Kingdom of God. It need not be pointed out how powerfully these ideas, coalescing with a certain weariness of dogma, and with the social spirit of the age, have taken hold on many—not, be it granted, without a certain rejuvenating effect upon theology. The Ritschlian movement is not without its wholesome side; but, like every other reaction, it tends to pass over to an opposite extreme—an extreme in which it seems to deny its own first principles, and

practically to come round in its results to the very rationalism which it condemns. Disclaiming dependence on philosophy, it is governed at bottom by a peculiarly subtle and dangerous philosophical theory of the agnostic type. Under pretext of extruding metaphysics from theology, and of expressing religious truth in the form of "value-judgments," it expels from Christianity most of its profounder and characteristic doctrines, e. g., the Trinity, the pre-existence of Christ, the Incarnation of the divine Son, His heavenly reign, etc., and gets rid of the Divinity of Christ in any but an ethical sense; boasting of a return to the historical, it really sacrifices the historical at the shrine of theory, giving up, e. g., the miraculous birth at the one end of Christ's life, and His bodily resurrection at the other, as non-essential elements of Christianity; professing to go back to the pure evangel, etc., to free it from later adulterations, it excludes from it vital and essential elements of the apostolic Gospel, e. g., the whole doctrine of the propitiatory character of Christ's death. These are worse than mere defects in a system of theology—they involve, under color of stripping off metaphysical accretions, a transformation of the whole substance of Christianity—a reduction of it to a humanitarian and non-miraculous level. It was inevitable therefore, that a disintegration should take place in Ritschl's school, some going more to the right, in a return to many of the conceptions he had discarded, others more to the left, in the direction of "historical-criticism" and naturalism. Prof. A. E. Garvie, a sympathetic expounder of Ritschl, tells in a recent paper how this reaction is emphasized by the late Prof. Reischle, of Halle, in his *Theologie und Religionsgeschichte.* Although a disciple of Ritschl, Reischle "expressly mentions" as one of the reasons for a changed attitude to Christianity "a reaction among the younger disciples from some of his one-sided views." Ritschl raised, but did not solve, the historical problems of the Person of Christ and the Kingdom of God. By violent exegesis he forced

his system on the New Testament teaching. He ignored the history of religions, tried to impose what he regarded as a normal type of piety in opposition to mysticism, and expressed himself too arbitrarily in regard to the relation of Christian faith to science and philosophy." This is pretty much what some critics of Ritschl have been saying from the beginning.

3. A third powerful current which all must recognize as flowing into theology at the present moment is that which has its source in *Old Testament—now also New Testament—Criticism.* This, despite all quietives, is occasioning perplexity to many, and surely not without good reason. The time is past for urging that the case is one only for experts. There are portions of the field which only experts can deal with, but the critics themselves have ceased to speak or write only for experts. They have come out into the open, and address themselves to all. The subject has reached a phase in which it is no longer a matter of option with the non-expert whether he will occupy himself with it or not. The conclusions of the critics are forced on him with a persistence, and with a confidence and authority, which compel him, whatever his inclinations, to take up some attitude to them. If it were, indeed, merely a matter of "doubtful disputation" about secondary and unessential points, he might be content to leave them to the discussion and decision of those more learned than himself, but this is not its character. There is, no doubt, a *per contra* side of the account. The critical movement is not, as some would have it, evil and only evil continually. It was inevitable that such a criticism should come, and even already certain compensating advantages have resulted from it, which should do something to mitigate the alarm with which many are disposed to regard it. It is much of itself to have had a new breath of life infused into Old Testament studies. But this is not the aspect in which the ordinary man commonly regards it. He sees that what he is asked to do is practically to surrender the view

of the Bible to which he has been accustomed all his life, and at the bidding of the critics to adopt another which seems to him at the first blush to reduce it to a *caput mortuum* of traditions, legends, fictions, inventions of men, not without a considerable admixture of fraud, in which he finds it difficult to see how he is to retain anything which can be to him a sure word of God. The critics ought frankly to face this difficulty. The question is not one of mere dates of books—of whether there is a first and second Isaiah—or of the compatibility of trifling inaccuracies with inspiration. It is a question whether many of the historical books of the Bible are books of history at all—whether, e. g., the books of the Pentateuch are any more historical than the opening chapters of Livy, or Buchanan's narratives of the Early Scottish Kings. Much is said of critical "settled results," but one cannot go far into this subject without perceiving that the forces which engender much of the criticism, both of the Old and of the New Testaments, lie a good way below the criticism itself. That was conspiciously illustrated in the Tübingen theories of the New Testament of sixty years ago—now everywhere discarded—and it is just as true of the critical theories of to-day of the Old Testament. This, one may be excused for thinking, is a defect of our critics of the more believing school, that they do not sufficiently recognize the solidarity which exists between the theory of religious development which they reject, and the critical opinions which they retain, and in consequence do not do justice to the logic of their own positions.

This, however, is a matter which will right itself—so far as it needs righting—in time. A believing theory of the Bible will not fail in the end to work out critical results in harmony with its own—that is, the Bible's own—presuppositions, and it may be expected that these will differ very materially from theories which start from a naturalistic basis. It is too early to predict, but it may be affirmed with great certainty, that the last word is

still very far from having been spoken on Old Testament questions, and, when it is spoken, it may be found that we are not so remote as many people imagine from what the church has always believed about the Bible. Meanwhile, notwithstanding the complacency with which the critics move along in their assurance about "settled results," there are not wanting indications that, through developments in their own circles, and the new perspective created by archaeology, the ground is cracking in all directions beneath their feet in a way that portends great changes. To take but one example—the J and E distinction in the Pentateuch. Those who harp on this as a "settled result" appear to have little conception of the extraordinary changes which have taken place on this part of the theory in later years—the multiplication of sources (J^1, J^2, J^3, E^1, E^2, E^3, etc.), the lowered dating, the conversion into "schools" of writers—which really nullify a simple J and E distinction. It is comparatively easy to postulate two writers, one, say, in the South Kingdom, using the name "Jehovah;" another in the North Kingdom, using the name "Elohim" (God); but how are we to conceive of two "schools" going on for long years side by side, even after the Northern Kingdom is broken up—both, therefore, now Judean—yet one persistently clinging to the use of E, and perpetuating its style, the other as pertinaciously adhering to the use of J. The thing is incomprehensible. A yet greater blow, one may anticipate, will be given to the certainty of Old Testament methods when it is seen what havoc these make when fearlessly applied to the New Testament, as they are now beginning to be applied. On this a few words will be said below.

4. A fourth powerful current affecting theology at the present time is that flowing in from *the sciences*—especially from *the general acceptance of the idea of evolution.* There is no mistaking this current either. Evolution is an idea which has laid hold upon our age with a fascination which is fast in danger of becoming a super-

depth of divine possibilities latent in the breast of the lowest savage, effectually knocks this on the head. The lowest barbarian is yet in every essential respect a man. Here also, as in the region of criticism, it is necessary to receive with caution the assertions even of experts. The strongest case of a "middle link" between man and the ape family is the *Pithecanthropus erectus* of Java, a few remains of which (top of a skull, teeth, a femur) were found by Dr. Dubois in 1891-2. Yet Virchow, to the end of his life, refused to admit that it was anything else than a large Gibbon. To convince the writer of the contrary a scientific friend—a Professor—put into his hands a text-book of repute, W. L. H. Duckworth's *Morphology and Anthropology,* in which elaborate calculations are given, based on "cephalisation" (ratio of brain-weight to body-weight) to show that demonstrably the *Pithecanthropus* was a form intermediate between man and ape. Unfortunately the learned author had neglected to work his own sums, and, when an obvious discrepancy led the present writer to test them, they were found to be hopelessly—even ludicrously—astray. It is right to add that the error, on being pointed out, was frankly admitted. In brief, what is true and proved in evolution is not incompatible with anything in Christianity. To quote what has been said elsewhere: "With man, from the point of view of the Bible, we have the rise of a new Kingdom, just as when life first entered, the entrance on the stage of nature of a being self-conscious, rational, and moral, a being made in the image of God, and it is arbitrary to assume that this new beginning will not be marked by differences which distinguish it from the introduction of purely animal races."

5. The last important current affecting theology which need be noticed is that entering from *the new "historical-critical" school,* and from the *science of comparative religion.* There are signs that this is the dominant influence with which Biblical learning and theology will have for some time to do, and against which the older methods,

malism, "when the germ of moral consciousness first appeared," being "in a position to choose deliberately in any given instance whether he would strive upward, or obey the animal nature which pulled him in an opposite direction," and to add, "If, for an instant, he chose the lower, and refused the higher, sin would for the first time exist in the world." "The stress and strain caused by his animal tendencies he must feel; but it was not necessary even to yield to them where they conflicted with his upward progress." But reduce this to the concrete, and what does it amount to. Has any such creature a freedom fitted to cope with the whole force of unrestrained animal impulse? Is not the whole conception of freedom, as existing in such a nature, abstract and unreal? Not to say that even moral failure has only the character of *sin* when it is brought into relation with *God,* the idea of Whom is here absent.

There seems little question, therefore, that, if this hypothesis is to rule the Christian system, our theology must be recast from top to bottom, if, indeed, theology remains to us at all. But is there need for this? If we go strictly by what is proved, there surely is not. Certain it is that the production of a first human pair by gradual transformation from the animal is an assertion which yet lacks all scientific evidence—towards the proof of which, as time goes on, science even does not seem to get any nearer. And if that is not proved, the essential point in the Biblical account of man's origin and primitive state is left untouched. Science itself is beginning to distinguish between evolution and Darwinism, and to recognize that evolution may admit of new starting-points, and does not invariably proceed by slow and insensible gradations.* The savage has been thought to be the intermediate stage between developed man and the animal, but the work of missions, to speak of nothing else, by discovering the

* See the writer's book on the Image of God in Man and its Defacement in the Light of Modern Denials.

depth of divine possibilities latent in the breast of the lowest savage, effectually knocks this on the head. The lowest barbarian is yet in every essential respect a man. Here also, as in the region of criticism, it is necessary to receive with caution the assertions even of experts. The strongest case of a "middle link" between man and the ape family is the *Pithecanthropus erectus* of Java, a few remains of which (top of a skull, teeth, a femur) were found by Dr. Dubois in 1891-2. Yet Virchow, to the end of his life, refused to admit that it was anything else than a large Gibbon. To convince the writer of the contrary a scientific friend—a Professor—put into his hands a text-book of repute, W. L. H. Duckworth's *Morphology and Anthropology,* in which elaborate calculations are given, based on "cephalisation" (ratio of brain-weight to body-weight) to show that demonstrably the *Pithecanthropus* was a form intermediate between man and ape. Unfortunately the learned author had neglected to work his own sums, and, when an obvious discrepancy led the present writer to test them, they were found to be hopelessly—even ludicrously—astray. It is right to add that the error, on being pointed out, was frankly admitted. In brief, what is true and proved in evolution is not incompatible with anything in Christianity. To quote what has been said elsewhere: "With man, from the point of view of the Bible, we have the rise of a new Kingdom, just as when life first entered, the entrance on the stage of nature of a being self-conscious, rational, and moral, a being made in the image of God, and it is arbitrary to assume that this new beginning will not be marked by differences which distinguish it from the introduction of purely animal races."

5. The last important current affecting theology which need be noticed is that entering from *the new "historical-critical" school,* and from the *science of comparative religion.* There are signs that this is the dominant influence with which Biblical learning and theology will have for some time to do, and against which the older methods,

alike of criticism and of apologetic, will not be of much avail. It is, at the same time, not easy to explain the genius and methods of this new tendency, to which the criticism of Wellhausen has already become antiquated, and which boasts of effecting a radical transformation in the literary and historical treatment of both Old and New Testaments. There is as yet little cohesion in the ranks of its adherents, or unity in its results; but Gunkel, Bousset, Winckler, Cheyne, may be named as representatives of it from different standpoints; T. G. Frazer is another type, in the general field of religion. It is a chief characteristic of the school that it refuses to look at any people or religion in isolation from general history, and aims at explaining any given religion from the circumstances of its environment ,and from analogies and parallels drawn from other religions. It recognizes, ordinarily, no distinction of origin in religions; treats with bold scorn the older cautious (or incautious) methods of textual, literary, and historical criticism of books, and enters on a course of new construction from a broader basis. The religion of Israel is to be explained from ancient Semitic, Babylonian, Arabian, Persian ideas and usages: Christianity is to find a key to much in the life of Christ, and to its early institutions, in the same, or like sources. Prof. Robertson Smith gave an impulse to this way of handling the Old Testament in his studies on the religion of the Semites: an extreme newer phase is the "Pan-Babylonianism" of the Winckler school, against which Old Testament scholars themselves are setting themselves with sturdy determination. Harnack, again, paved the way for the application of the method to the New Testament in his theory of the penetration of early church dogma by Greek influences; but the movement has now assumed proportions, and yields results for the Gospels and Apostolic history, far beyond what he can approve. One feature of the method is that it desires to do away with theology as a separate discipline altogether; theology is to be merged in a historical and comparative

treatment of religions, or in a general philosophy of religion. This is not the place for an exhaustive enumeration of the tendency in question—more revolutionary, it will be seen, than any that has gone before—and the glance here taken will have reference chiefly to the New Testament.

The fountain-heads of this new stream of influence are, first, archaeology, laying bare in amazing fashion the civilizations and religions of the East, in part also, as in Crete and Greece, of the West; and, next, the comparative study of past and existing religions, higher and lower, as that has been pursued with rare indefatigableness and brilliant results during the last half century. These fascinating studies have opened up new worlds, appealed to the imagination, and naturally set new problems. Christianity, no more than the religion of Israel, can any longer be looked at by itself, but must submit to closest scrunity in the light of all that has been discovered of other faiths. Sacred books are pitted against sacred books; moral codes against moral codes; Jesus against the founders of other religions; Gospel stories against legends of the Buddha; ideas like those of the Virgin-birth, the Incarnation, the Resurrection, against seeming parallels elsewhere; miracles in the Bible against miracles on other soils. It cannot be said that the comparison gives us nothing to think of. One discovers much that is in itself remarkable and interesting; and admiration is involuntarily awakened by the breadth and elevation of the moral teaching, the nobility of personal character, and the depth, and even spirituality of the reflection occasionally met with. The conviction is forced on us that if heathenism has sank to such depths of degradation as history shows, this has not been altogether for want of light; the world has always had a great deal more moral light than it knew how to make use of. There are sides of the religions of China, of Japan, as of Mohammedanism (its mystical schools), we are only yet beginning to know. How curious, e. g., the development of

Buddhism into the doctrine of the Incarnation of the Dharma, or in Japan the doctrine of Amida Buddha, with its repudiation of works, and inculcation of salvation by faith! The religions of the ancient Orient disclose yet stranger wonders. What marvel if all this takes hold on the imaginations of modern historical scholars, and that they are tempted to proclaim that the religions of Moses and Jesus are but two more among the rest. The Rev. C. H. Johns, e. g., has discovered apparently, that, on the whole, the prophets of Isreal must take a back seat in comparison with that of Babylonia! "They by no means everywhere attained a level of approach to what is now regarded as true, that was higher, or even as high, as the highest reached in Baylonia." It is interesting to know that so much excellent morality is found by Mr. Jones in his Babylonian tablets, but it may be predicted that the star of the Hebrew prophets is not likely to be eclipsed just yet. What are moral counsels without a living God of righteousness, as potent to save and to bless as He is to judge and to punish, behind them!

The stream that has thus gathered to flood is now pouring its full force upon the Gospel history, and many and strange things are the results. The old mythical theory has served its day, and this new theory of mythological borrowing from other religions has come to take its place. It is Christ, as before, that is in the center, and the aim, likewise as before, is to strip Him of all supernatural and Messianic prerogatives, and reduce Him to the level of a simple religious teacher—a genius in religion, let it be owned, of the first order—but still no more. Whether there may not yet be a greater is left a moot question, for it would outstep the limits of this new mode of criticism to admit the "absoluteness" of Christianity! It has often been noted how this is the goal of so much "modern" thought about Jesus—humanitarianism. It is in part the instinct to make sure that we have true humanity in Jesus; not one foreign to us in nature, and sympathy, and experience, but veritable man. This is

well, were it not that in the heart of the movement there is the determination, not less fixed, that He shall be no more than man. For a time this tendency was veiled by so-called "Kenotic" theories; but now the superfluous appendage of a depotentiating Logos is set aside, and we have man pure and simple. This is the characteristic of the newest lives of Christ—Bousset's, e. g., or Neumann's, both translated. And the above-described "historical-critical" method comes in conveniently to remove all that fits in badly with such a construction. Yet when one looks at its operations with narrowness what fantastic tricks is it seen playing! Leaving aside Gunkel, who has written a brochure on the new lines, we take up a book like Cheyne's *Bible Problems,* or Farnell's *Evolution of Religion,* both published in what is called the "Crown Library," and get a lesson as to how the new method works. "Conservative theologians," we are told, "will have to admit that the New Testament now has to be studied from the point of view of mythology as well as from that of philological exegesis and church-history * * * For the due comprehension of the New Testament, it is essential that the help of mythology, treated of course by strictly critical methods, should be invoked. * * * And the leading factor in this is Babylonian." So, for the explanation of the story of the Virgin-Birth we are taken to "the N. Arabian myth of Dusares," and to "corroborative Assyrio-Babylonian, Egyptian, and Persian illustrations," and to "the Graeco-Asiatic myth of Leto." As if there was the slightest probability that the writers of the realistic and chaste stories of the Gospels ever heard of these extravagances! The narratives directly or indirectly, of the Descent into Hades—of which the Gospels say nothing—and of the Resurrection and Ascension are similarly accounted for. Paul's allusion to Christ's death and resurrection in 1 Cor. xv. 3, 4, "in reality points," we are told, "to a pre-Christian sketch of the life of Christ, partly—as we have seen—derived from widely-spread non-Jewish myths, and em-

bodied in Jewish writings." As if there was the faintest evidence of the existence of such a "sketch," or as if the historic witness to the fact of the resurrection in the streets of Jerusalem a few weeks after the event did not preclude all insubstantial concoction of the kind! More outrageous and bizarre than anything else, probably, is the extraordinary theory of Dr. J. G. Frazer in the 2d edition of his *Golden Bough*—a theory whose absurdity is mercilessly exposed at unwonted length by M. A. Lang in his *Magic and Religion*. The Babylonians and their Persian conqueror, he avers, were wont yearly, at a vernal feast, to dress a condemned criminal in the royal robes (a proxy for the divine King of Babylon, who, in an age less civilized, had been sacrificed annually—so Dr. Frazer thinks), to enthrone him, to grant him access to the ladies of the royal parlor and there, at the end of five days, to strip, whip, and hang him. The Jews are supposed to have borrowed this feast, which they called Purim, from the Babylonians and Persians, and with it the practice of crowning, stripping, flogging, and hanging a mock-King, a condemned criminal, in March. They are also conjectured to have borrowed a custom of keeping a pair of condemned criminals, one of whom was hanged, *i. e.*, died as an incarnation of the good of life; the other was set free for the year. It is this role of mock-King which was forced on Jesus, and which is the real explanation of his crucifixion. Hence the belief in His divinity, etc.; in a word, Christianity! The whole thing, as M. Lang shows, is a tissue of fables from beginning to end; but imagine this seriously put forward by a sane man as an account of the origin of the Christian faith! From it one may learn the general worth of the theorizing on religion in *The Golden Bough*.

No; the foundation of God standeth sure, so far as this whole class of theories is concerned. We end where we began—that none of the currents at this hour assailing the bulwarks of our Zion are likely to do them even temporary damage.

THE PLACE OF SCIENCE IN MINISTERIAL EDUCATION.

BY PROF. C. W. CHAMBERLAIN, GRANVILLE, O.

We are assured almost daily by the public press and by popular consent that the present is not only an age of scientific progress, but that it is pre-eminently THE age of scientific progress. Has the idea been ingrained into our lives to such an extent that we have forgotten the reason for our existence? Have the mighty achievements of science intoxicated us? Have we so closely watched the investigator of whom Chaucer wrote?

"Fortune him hath enhaunced so in pride,
That verily he wend he might atteygne
Unto the sterris upon every side;
And in a balance weyen each mounteyne,"

have we watched him laying his hand upon the swiftly moving sunbeam and forcing it to give up its secret, turning the lightenings from their course of destruction into channels of peace and usefulness, gathering materials from every part of the earth, from the mountain top to the lowest levels of the mine, from the ocean depth and the depths of space and patiently, thoughtfully sifting out from them the gems of truth; and then turning them all to practical account to ease the burdens of tired humanity; seeking out the wondrous and mysterious forces and compelling them to run as the swift messengers and patient servants of mankind. Have we watched these things so closely that we have permitted the college, so dear to our hearts, to forget that it was founded to provide for the education of a Christian ministry? Or is it true that these things, modern as they may be, have an important part to play in the education of a young man preparing himself for the Gospel ministery?

I do not propose to make a plea for scientific education. That course of training which is best, which is necessary

for the education of a young man preparing himself for a technical profession, is not the course to be pursued by a young man preparing to enter the ministery. I do not propose to enter upon a discussion of the comparative educational merits of the Classical and Scientific courses, as offered in our college. Had I believed, as many men do, that our college curricula are still in the hands of the medieval church, which demands the study of words instead of things, and that these curricula have become heavy with age, I would not have done as I did—take a classical course in college when it was my intention to spend my life in scientific pursuits. Had I believed that a college course might be likened to emery used in polishing a piece of metal, and that we are not concerned for the emery after that metal has been polished, I should hardly have consented to the lengthening of my course made necessary by my desire to put myself in thorough sympathy with both phases of modern educational methods.

I do not propose to resurrect the ghost of Conflict between Science and Religion. Dramatic events have been involved in the rise of science from the Alexandrian epoch to the present day. We all recognize the existence of a family skeleton. A few men still love to speak of the "warfare of science," and the "martyrdoms of science," and recall to memory the cruelties of the dungeon and rack, suffered by truth seekers at the hands of ecclesiastical intolerance. The scientific man who loves to call to mind these early mistakes too often preserves the spirit of the persecutor rather than that of the martyr, the spirit of intolerance creeping in with the consciousness of power. Mistakes have been made on both sides. He who claims to be the "Successor of Peter," conscious that men believed he possessed power to open Heaven to them or shut them out, found it easy to assume dominion over the earth. On the other hand, unsupported guesses at the unknown are often uttered with an assumption of authority, beside of which the

pretensions of the Pope and Council seem slight and shadowy.

A young man preparing himeslf for the ministry ought to take enough scientific work in his college course to obtain a fair view of the place such courses should occupy in the college curriculum. He is about to enter a profession from which college presidents, trustees, and administrators are largely drawn. May the time never come when the connection between the college and the interest of the church shall be less marked than now. Schools and colleges, wherever they exist, almost without exception owe their origin to the church. Christianity has always been friendly to learning. Its ministry is a teaching and preaching ministry. Christianity produces an inquiring, observing, thinking people. Occasionally infidelity or irreligion have founded colleges, but as such, they have not prospered, and it has been found necessary to transfer them to the hands of religious teachers and guardians to save them. We have in the United States at least one great university founded by atheists, who became convinced that Christians were gaining an undue advantage through their Christian schools. Should you visit that institution to-day, probably the first structure you would enter would be the Christian Association Building. A college president of our own denomination has made the statement publicly that one of the most important cares of his administration, the laboratories, while not outside his interest, were quite beyond his comprehension because his own education had given him no insight into their proper functions.

Why should not he who is making an effort to read God's thoughts as he left them, written in these wonderful things about us, be a Christian man? For my part, I do not see how it is possible for a man observing the wonderful things revealed to his senses in the laboratory to fail to see God's hand in it all. And yet it sometimes occurs that a man is looked upon with suspicion because he happens to be a scientist.

Not long ago a young man received the hand of fellowship in a New England Baptist church, and the pastor, good man that he was, took occasion to remark upon the strange circumstances, "A man of science knocking at the doors of the church." Had he known a little more of the facts of the case the scene would not have appeared so strange to him. Had he seen that same candidate enter his laboratory and with bowed head ask God's guidance in the research of the day he would not have been suspicious of the young man's profession.

No system of education is a good one in which the student gets out of touch with the great body of men. This is beyond doubt a scientific age. The young minister to whom nature is a sealed book will be greatly handicapped. Modern science has so lessened and narrowed hardship and suffering, so widely diffused ease and comfort, covered with a soft cushion the rough places in life, not only for the rich but also for the poor, that a great majority of our young men, consciously or unconsciously are following its leading. The terminology, the figures of speech, the points of view of science are quite common in the realms of thought. The minister who possesses a sympathetic understanding of these things has at his command a wealth of illustration and influence over those he is seeking to direct. He can hardly afford to be out of intellectual touch with his hearers, for the pews contain many men "gifted with the sad endowment of a contemplative mind."

It is an interesting thing to observe the student as he discovers for the first time that he cannot trust his unaided senses in the investigation of the simplest and most obvious phenomena. He must make correction for his personal equation. Watch the expression on his face as he measures for the first time the amount by which another man sees a thing too late, and he in the excitement of anticipation sees it, or thinks he sees it, before it really happens. He realizes as he never did before that his own judgment may be no better than that of the other

fellow. From that time on he is never quite so cock-sure of a thing, and, believe me, he is a good deal more agreeable to live with.

How unfortunate it is that in this day and age there should be abroad in the land so much false—philosophy, I almost called it, but it is hardly proper to dignify it by that term. And how much of it is foisted on the public in the name of religion? Did the Baptist denomination ever lose a minister to one of these many isms? While they were with us we believed them to be good devout men. And they were. What they lacked was balance. Education in the traditional humanities alone does not seem to be sufficient protection to those who fall easy victims to the vagaries of quacks. There is no better antidote for unworthy credulity than a consistent course in some good laboratory.

The spirit of the laboratory is not dogmatic, as some would make us believe. Intolerance has no place in it. Mistakes have been made and the truth is being sifted from error. The ghosts of phlogiston, caloric, and luminiferous ether, and a crowd of other phantoms haunt the investigator. Science, like Bunyan's hero, has sometimes had to pass through the "Valley of Humiliation." Theories have been propounded and for a time accepted, which later investigation has disproved. This does not necessarily discredit the method. Faith in the fundamental principles persist notwithstanding the difficulties encountered. The student cannot help seeing that however much science may analyze and explain, back of it all is God. A student of elementary chemistry, profoundly impressed with the ability of the teacher to explain natural phenomena, asked him: "Professor, why is gold yellow?" Whereupon the wise man answered: "Because God made it so."

The good college teaches science to the ministerial students in a reasonable way. He is not allowed to fritter away his time in acquiring a little knowledge of this thing and, a dangerous omitting of that. He is allowed

to choose from a wide range of scientific studies, one suited to his ability and taste. His time would be well spent if the only thing acquired were the knowledge of how little he knew about it after all. Who can tell how many mistakes he may thus avoid and the chargrin he may be saved. There is a wide-spread taste for sensationalism which gains with the efforts made to satisfy it, which offers a premium upon anything startling or revolutionary. If a fraction of the wonderful scientific discoveries which have been announced in the public press and too often referred to or made the basis of an illustration in the pulpit, had actually been made, this would indeed be a sign of scientific progress. The daily newspapers and popular magazines sometimes make as sorry a mess of their attempt to describe a scientific discovery as they do to report the doings of a religious convention.

A few years ago an attempt was made to fix the ratio of the circumference to the diameter of a circle by legislative enactment. That legislature was chosen by the people of one of the greater states of the Union, a state ranking high in the number of eminent men it has produced, and the excellence of its educational institutions. In the legislature of this great state, House Bill No. 246 was introduced. The bill has this title: "A Bill for an Act introducing a New Mathematical Truth," which truth in the second section of the bill turns out to be that the circumference of a circle is just 8 1-5 times its diameter. One of the great daily papers of the state capital, a paper famed for the excellence of its editorials, its clean management and complete lack of sensationalism, devoted several columns of its first page to an exploitation of this fake discovery which had been made by a doctor living in an obscure part of the state. Announcement was made that at last the circle had been squared, and the method, copyrighted, and the demonstration had been accepted by all great mathematicians; at Washington it had the support of the National Astronomical Observatory; the

mail of the discoverer was packed with letters from scientific men in Europe and America, and so on for several columns the unsuspecting editor continued to present the effusions of this lineal descendant of Ananias. The article furnished a wealth of illustrations for sermons on the following day. When the bill was introduced in the House, the Speaker, a graduate of a famous educational institution, happened to be a man with a sense of humor and ordered it referred to the Committee on Swamp Lands. Two days later the great discoverer had a hearing before the State Superintendent of the Public Schools and the Committee on Education, who immediately endorsed his views. The Committee on Canals and Swamp Lands reported the bill back, recommending that it be referred to the Committee on Education. This committee carefully considered the bill and reported, "the same back to the House with recommendation that the said bill do pass." The bill was called up by the committee and actually passed the House by a good, safe majority. Before it actually became a law its character began to be recognized and its progress was stopped. It will be a good many years before the participants in that comedy can contemplate their part in it without a blush of shame.

On the top shelf in an obscure corner of a department library of a great institution rests a book donated to the library by its author. It holds its position in the crowded shelves, not because of the author's reputation, the title, or the flaming Harvard crimson in which it is bound. The contents are most unique. The author of "My Sound Philosophy" is a demented man. The book is a strange combination of witticism, fact and insane fancy. Many a time have I seen my fellow-students, wearied by the labors of the day, gathered about the library table, while one of their number read extracts from "My Sound Philosophy." Whenever the red book was taken from the shelf, it was the signal for fun and recreation.

In the same city is a minister of the Gospel. He is

well known all over the United States as an earnest Christian man and an eloquent platform orator. His church was one of the largest in the great city and at the time of which I speak was attracting wide attention because of the old-fashioned revival which the good doctor was conducting. May I ask pardon for making a personal reference. It seems necessary to do so in relating an incident which affected me deeply at the time. My fellow-students were men of rare intellectual gifts, picked men training for special positions. They are all college professors now, leading the world of thought in their particular investigations. Not one of them is a Christian man. My own position and belief was thoroughly understood and respected. I was particularly anxious that these young men, richly endowed by nature for leadership, might be set to work in the Master's cause. As my old teacher, C. L. Herrick, used to say, "The influence of these men seemed destined to run wild like an uncontrolled prairie fire, but when once placed under subjection by the Master Hand, might be made to burn as a back-fire in the same Master's cause. One night I asked them to go with me to the particularly mentioned church. They readily consented. I hoped for much. I had heard this famous man lecture in my college town. He was a man with large gifts and spoke with conviction. He seemed to have the power to move men. Imagine my surprise when the speaker announced that the evening's discourse would be taken from a scientific lecture. Imagine my companions' amusement and my own shame when it appeared that the speaker's information had been gathered from "My Sound Philosophy" and similar sources. Should I quote from that lecture, you would be greatly amused. So were my companions part of the time; at other times they were angry. On our way home, one of them, a strong intellectual man, said, "Do you expect me to accept religious instruction on questions concerning which I have honest doubts, from a man of whose inability to distinguish truth from error I have no

doubt?" If the college can save its young ministers from mistakes like that it will mightily increase their usefulness.

A reasonable amount of scientific study will give the young ministerial student an educational balance, and broaden his view. Dealing directly with the concrete things which God has created he will obtain a wider grasp of what God's creation means.

> "———— verily many thinkers of this age,
> Aye many Christian teachers, half in Heaven,
> Are wrong in just my sense, who understood
> Our natural world too insularly, as if
> No spiritual counterpart completed it,
> Consumating its meaning, rounding all
> To justice and perfection, line by line,
> Form by form, nothing single nor alone,
> The great below clenched by the great above."

BOOK REVIEWS.

I. NEW TESTAMENT.

The Development of Palestine Exploration.

By Frederick Jones Bliss, Ph. D. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. 1906. $1.50 net.

In this volume the author of "A Mound of Many Cities," "Excavations at Jerusalem, 1894-1897," etc., puts us under new obligations. It presents the lectures delivered before the Union Theological Seminary in 1903 on the Ely Foundation considerably amplified and modified. It treats in a broad and scholarly way the development of Palestine Exploration from its dawn down to the present time, but is in no sense a compendium of the results of Palestine Exploration. The shifting point of view of travellers from age to age; the displacement of the classic geographer by the credulous pilgrim; the gradual evolution of the pilgrim into the man of science; these are some of the subjects treated and illustrated; but we must look elsewhere for lists of sites identified, inscriptions found, monuments described, etc. The lectures take up in order the following subjects: "The Dawn of Exploration," "The Age of Pilgrimage," "The Crusaders and After," "From Fabri to Robinson," "Edward Robinson," "Renan and his Contemporaries," "The Palestine Exploration Fund," and "The Exploration of the Future."

Without intending to be such, the volume is in itself no mean essay toward an eclectic and comparative bibliography of the subject. It is interesting to find how rich our country is in the literature of Palestine. "Scattered among our various libraries," the author says, "I have found every book that I have sought except Michel Nau's 'Voyage Nonveau de la Terre Sainte.'" He warns the reader that he will not find in all the names he

mentions "The Ideal Explorer." Robinson in field work and Petrie in excavation come near the mark, but they do not reach it. The Ideal Explorer of the Holy Land must combine the qualities of a geographer, a geologist, a naturalist, an architect, an archæologist, an ethnologist, an historian, an epigraphist, a Biblical student, a painter, a mystic and a poet, and, if an excavator, an engineer and miner as well; but first and foremost he must be a man of common sense, who is your only real diplomatist. "Fact, hitting the mark in one's dealings with men, hitting the mark in dealing with one's own observations, in building theories upon these—this is the one thing needful."

The author aptly likens our present knowledge of Palestine to a mosaic and colored tesseræ, which, though broken here and there, yet shows broad patterns and many curious details. Scattered in the surrounding *debris,* and sometimes buried by this, are the little cubes waiting to be found and fitted into their proper places. For the parts of the mosaic now complete we have to thank the Explorers of the Past, for the filling of the *lacunae* we look to the Explorers of the Future.

The book is well printed, well bound and supplied with an exhaustive index.

The lecture on Edward Robinson, the pioneer scientific explorer, the man who reconstructed the map of Palestine, who "found it afloat like an island in a sea, almost like a cloud in the sky of fable, and left it a part of Asia," is alone worth the price of the book. Every young American, especially every young minister, should read it. That he was "raised up, endowed and trained for this very purpose," the story here told makes clear. He stands at the focal point where all the various lines converge. The time had come for a scholar equal to the best in acuteness and breath of judgment to enter this tempting field with thermometer, telescope, compass, and measuring tape, but, above all, sharp-eyed and sufficiently sceptical, and then make report of what he had seen and

measured. "Such a man," says Dr. Hitchcock, "was Robinson; so keen of vision that nothing escaped his notice; so sound and solid of judgment that no mere fancy could sway him; so learned that nothing of any moment pertaining to his work was unknown to him; and yet, withal, so ardent in his religious affections as to pursue his task like a new crusader." "There was never a man better suited to his calling."

It is interesting to note that in the scientific exploration of Palestine, America took the initiative. America was followed by Germany, Germany by France, and France by England. The "great quartette" is Robinson, Tobler, Conder and Guérin, and the work of these four shows "a logical progression." Robinson established the correct principles of research, Tobler applied these minutely over a limited range, Guérin with the same minuteness tried to cover the whole field, but was limited by straitened resources, and Conder, with an expedition adequately manned and splendid, was enabled to fill in the topographical *lacunae* left by his predecessors.

GEO. B. EAGER.

The Works of Josephus.

Translated by William Whiston and newly edited by D. S. Margoliouth, D. Litt. New York, E. P. Dutton & Co. 1906. Pages 989. Price, $1.50.

This is not a new translation of Josephus like that of Shillito, but is a correction of Whiston by the text of Niese. Whiston's notes are omitted and the division of Niese's text into sections is introduced also. In a brief introduction, Dr. Margoliouth discusses succinctly and satisfactorily the main problems concerning Josephus and gives a survey of the most important literature concerning him. There are besides a few notes appended concerning such points as the Testimony of Josephus to Christ, the Chronology of Josephus, Josephus and S. Luke. Dr. Margoliouth does not think that Luke had made any use of Josephus. The recent work of Harnack is reassuring on this point, since he argues strongly

that Luke, the physician, the companion of Paul, was the author of both Gospel and Acts (Harnack, Lukas der Arzt, der Verfasser des dritten Evangeliums und der Apostelgeschichte. The print is rather small, but otherwise this is the most serviceable edition of Josephus to be had. Dr. Margoliouth is Professor of Arabic at Oxford University and a thorough scholar.

A. T. Robertson.

Die Entstehung des Neuen Testaments.

Von Prof. Lic. Dr. Carl Clemen, G. J. Göschensche Verlagshandlung, Leipzig, Germany. 1906. Pages 168. Price, 80 pfennig.

This is one of the volumes in the popular *Sammlung Göschen* and aims to give a presentation of the modern views of the origin of the New Testament. There is no question as to the ability or scholarship of Dr. Clemen, but his judgment is warped by his extremely radical views. He dates sixteen books of the New Testament between A. D. 94 and 140! He does it by processes of reasoning that have been long exploded. At the very time that Clemen is dating Luke's Gospel and Acts about 94 or 95 A. D., Harnack, the leader of the liberals in Germany, comes out with a book (Lukas der Arzt und Verfasser, etc.) in which he argues for the authorship of both Gospel and Acts by Luke. Clemen rejects also Eph., Heb., 1 and 2 Peter, the Epistles of John, James, and Jude, as well as the Pastoral Epistles save 2 Tim. 1:15-18; 4:9-18; and Tit. 3:12-15.

Galatians he puts in A. D. 50 as the earliest of Paul's Letters.

This handbook will be serviceable to those who wish to know the views of a German radical of much ability, but not as a sample of the soberer German criticism of the present day. It seems a pity that such an extreme radical should have been asked to prepare a popular handbook for general circulation.

A. T. Robertson.

The New Testament. A Chronological Arrangement. By Principal Lindsay. New York, E. P. Dutton & Co. London, J. M. Dent & Co.

This is a new volume in Everyman's Library. It is the King James' Version with all the words of Jesus, other speeches and quotations set in narrower form. The type is clear and the binding is pretty. The books are printed in chronological order, as Dr. Lindsay conceives it, though Jude and 2 Peter are put at the end and Revelation before Acts. The trend of opinion is now towards the later date of the Revelation. It is difficult to use the New Testament intelligently purely on the chronological plan for the reason that the books thus arranged do not represent the actual knowledge of the early Christians. They knew much more either from personal acquaintance with Jesus and the Apostles or from tradition. You cannot think of a Christian community knowing only James or the Thessalonian letters. Dr. Lindsay has sought to remedy this by printing first a brief summary of the Synoptic tradition. On the whole it is best to put the Gospels and the Acts first and then the Epistles, in chronological groups. I am more than ever convinced about it since seeing this new attempt. There are no notes at all as in Moffatt's Historical New Testament and the Students' Chronological New Testament.

A. T. Robertson.

Η Καινή Διαθήκη.

Novum Testamentum Textus Stephanici A.D. 1550, cum variis lectionibus, etc. Curante F. H. A. Scrivener. Editio Quarta ab eb. Nestle Correcta. Londini, G. Bell and Filii, 1906. Price, 6 shillings. pages 600.

This is a delightful edition of the New Testament in Greek. It is the Textus Receptus indeed, but with the various readings of Beza, Elzevir, Lachmann, Tischendorf, Tregelles, Westcott and Hort, and the English Revision of 1880. Thus the student has conveniently before him the readings of all the great Greek New Testaments in any given passage. The text itself is thus not that of Westcott and Hort with which scholars are so familiar

now, but the text of Westcott and Hort is always at hand at the bottom of the page. For one who has no critical apparatus like Tischendorf this arrangement has a great advantage in giving him at least the various readings.

The marginal references are also useful. The pages are longer and wider than in Westcott and Hort and the whole make-up of the volume is exceedingly convenient.

Dr. Nestle has done his work with all the marvellous accuracy of detail, so characteristic of him. He has the eye of a microscope.

The book is bound to be widely used, and even those who have Westcott and Hort will find it very handy to have Nestle's Scrivener also. And what book is there which so richly repays continual and enthusiastic study as the Greek Testament? A. T. Robertson.

The Prophet of Nazareth.

By Nathaniel Schmidt, Professor of Semitic Languages and Literatures in Cornell University. The MacMillan Company, New York. 1905. Price, $2.50 net. Pages 422.

It is difficult to treat this book with the seriousness that it deserves. It treats the highest of themes, but with a narrowness and a rancor that one can find only in a work like O. Holtzmann's *Leben Jesu.* Of the author's ability and research there is no question. Where he fails utterly is in spirit and judgment. He is a Baptist who no longer regards Jesus as divine. He dismisses what Matthew and Luke have to say of the Virgin Birth as "Parthenogenetic speculations" (p. 249). The resurrection of Jesus did not take place, but was due to belief that God could not allow his Holy One to see corruption (p. 398). It is now "recognized by critical students" (p. 294) that Jesus did not predict his death and resurrection. He denies that Jesus ever called himself "Son of God" (p. 152) or Messiah (p. 134), or "Son of Man" (p. 134). He gives an elaborate argument to show that "Son of Man" can only mean "man," in spite of Dalman's denial that *bar nasha* in

Galilean Aramaic means "man" and in spite of the absurdity that this translation would make in many places. He knows that "Jesus did not speak Greek" (p. 115). He knows that the Old Testament has nothing about a Messiah in it (p. 55), such an idea arising for the first time about 63 B. C. (p. 68). "He never ordained either baptism or eucharist" (p. 379). This is not all that Prof. Schmidt "knows." He knows that Jesus wrought no miracles (p. 238), that John's Gospel is a Gnostic production (p. 213, shades of Cerinthus), that Luke did not write his Gospel (p. 226), that neither Jesus nor David was born at Bethlehem (p. 247). In this book of 422 pages there is only one chapter on The Life of Jesus (pp. 240-292). The rest is taken up in showing what we do not know about Jesus. But in this chapter Schmidt contends that we have "a few glimpses of the real life of Jesus" (p. 240). The one-sided narrowness of the author is apparent in many ways, but especially in his use of adverbs. The story of the Virgin Birth is "clearly a later insertion" (p. 248). "It is equally clear that he was a Gnostic," speaking of the author of the Fourth Gospel (p. 213). "Papias evidently did not know the Apostle John" (p. 209). He is sorry for the rest of us. "Undoubtedly, the traditional conception of Jesus will long continue in the world, and through it his power will be felt as of yore" (p. 340). But "the devil will never be raised from the dead" (p. 346), and he implies that ere long the old idea of Jesus will be buried for good.

The author makes a justification of his attack on the deity of Jesus by several times appealing to the example of the Unitarian Anabaptists like Denck. He wrongly calls these Baptists and seems to argue that the only true Baptist is of the Unitarian type. That is a perversion of the facts and an insult to Baptists of to-day.

"The Baptist churches in Poland were quietist and Unitarian" (p. 22). "But it was among the Baptists of the Sixteenth Century that freedom from dogma, a reverent yet critical study of the Bible, personal loyalty

to Jesus and a high conception of the worth of human nature, led to the complete rejection of the trinitarian idea of the term "Son of God" (p. 136). This is not a just appeal. Those Anabaptists were not Baptists. There are some Unitarian Baptists to-day in England, but they are not allowed in the Baptist Union. The author tells of the "deep satisfaction" (p. 233) that he has in coming "to the conviction that Jesus of Nazareth actually existed."

I conclude this review with the remark that the tone of the book is one of insufferable dogmatism and intolerance. A. T. ROBERTSON.

The Letters of Christ.

By Charles Brown, Minister of Ferme Park Baptist Church, Hornsey, London. James Clarke & Co., 13 and 14 Fleet St., London.

The author treats the letters of Rev. II. and III. as actual letters of the glorified Christ and the churches, and as one reads he feels that there is no other adequate source. Mr. Brown writes in the full light of present-day scholarship with much spiritual insight and teaching skill. The divine "goodness and severity," as revealed in these sternly gracious messages of Christ, are brought out with great clearness and force.

Perhaps there is no one thing the churches need more at this time than to take heed to these letters and "hear what the Spirit saith." Mr. Brown's little book should help us all so to do, for it breathes the spirit of faithfulness and tenderness in which such searching messages should be given. J. H. FARMER.

What is the Lord'sComing.

By Fred Erdman. Price 10 cents.

The Sychar Revival.

By S. D. Gordon. Price 10 cents.

Bible Outlines or the Second Coming.

By C. C. C. Price 5 cents. Published by Charles C. Cook, 150 Nassau street, New York.

These pamphlets all bear on the question of the Lord's Second Coming. A. T. Robertson.

The Gospel of Matthew.

By Alexander Maclaren, D.D., Litt. D. Three Volumes. New York. A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1905.

These volumes belong to the set of six comprising the First Series of Expositions of Holy Scripture. The set sells for $7.50 and is wonderfully cheap at that price. Dr. Maclaren expects to prepare the whole series on the entire Bible. It is a monumental undertaking, and this first installment whets our appetites for the rest. Dr. Maclaren appears at his best in these noble volumes on Matthew. What more can one say? He is indeed the Prince of Preachers. Here is exposition that is scholarly and practical. It is the beaten oil alone that is given. There is the keenest insight into human needs and the strongest grasp of Scripture teaching. The English of Dr. Maclaren is so rich and stately that this alone repays reading his sermons. But if one wishes spiritual edification and enlightend exposition of the Word of God, he will find it in these volumes. They sparkle with ripe wisdom and stimulate to highest endeavor. Sooth to say one is a bit at a loss when it comes to giving an adequate review of three such books. A sense of helplessness takes hold of you. Let us hope that the series will be completed. A. T. Robertson.

Jesus. An Unfinished Portrait.

By Charles Van Norden, D. D. Funk & Wagnalls, New York. 1906. Price $1.00. Pages 295.

This is a very remarkable book. It is readable, almost fascinating in style, and contains many noble and true ideas. Dr. Van Norden has keen insight and a realistic imagination and often luminously reproduces the historical situation. But with all its brilliance it is a very one-sided book. The author takes the usual Unitarian ground that Jesus is only a man, though the greatest of

men. He frankly admits his inability to explain all the facts on this hypothesis, but claims that he can come nearer to it than by any other. Many of his sentences are roughly repulsive to evangelical sentiment, as when he says: "Dogmatism began with Paul and culminated with the Inquisition." It was the Judaizers whom Paul opposed whose work terminated in the Inquisition. The book lacks balance and comprehensiveness, but is incisive and suggestive. A. T. Robertson.

The Gospel According to St. Luke.

Edited by W. Williamson, B. A. Methuen & Co., 36 Essex street, W. C., London.

This volume is one of a series of "Methuen's Junior School Books," and is a characteristic English commentary—scholarly, concise, suggestive.

It admirably answers its purpose as a college textbook, but it is serviceable to all who wish a small, cheap and withal a first-class exposition of the Gospel of Luke.

Besides the "Text with Notes," the Introduction treats of Luke as a writer, and as an evangelist; the sources of the Gospel; time, place, and purpose; characteristics of thought, style and language; the parables and miracles peculiar to this Gospel; and a brief analysis of the book. The appendices consist of a comparison of the Authorized Version, and the Revised Version; a classification of the parables and the miracles of our Lord; a series of examination papers given on Luke by Oxford and Cambridge Universities, and a goodly list of miscellaneous questions and topics. Byron H. Dement.

Addresses on the Gospel of St. John.

Printed and circulated by the St. John Conference Committee, Providence, R. I. 1905. Pages 505.

These are popular addresses on the Gospel of John by various men from different parts of the country, so arranged as to cover the whole of the book. It is a practical view of the Gospel and may be of use to some.

A. T. Robertson.

The Gospel of the Rejection. A Study in the Relation of the Fourth Gospel to the Three.

By Wilfred Richmond, Chaplain of Lincoln's Inn. John Murray, Albemarle street, London, England. 1906. Price 5s. net.

Mr. Richmond has made a fresh and luminous study of John's Gospel in a very helpful way. He shows clearly that the Synoptics presuppose the facts supplied by John, that the antagonism toward Jesus was provoked by work in Jerusalem, and that the Galilean disciples needed preparation for the reception of the new truth. The ideas advanced are not so novel as they are lucidly expressed. The author has a mastery of the Gospel and convincingly uses the facts in relation to each other. Incidentally the book serves as a strong defense of the genuineness of the Fourth Gospel when taken in connection with Drummond's *Authorship of the Fourth Gospel,* or Sanday's *Criticism of the Fourth Gospel.* Such a candid examination of the facts will be reassuring to many who have wandered afield after speculative will o' the wisps. The book is interesting in style though critical in subject matter. A. T. Robertson.

Die Reden Unseres Herrn Nach Johannes im Grundtext Ausgelegt.

Von Dr. Siegfried Goebel, Professor in Bonn. Druck und Verlag, von C. Bertelsmann, Gütersloh, Germany. 1906. 9 M. Gebunden 10 M. Erste Hälfte, Kap. I—II.

Goebel accepts the genuineness of the Gospel of John and seeks to reproduce in the historical setting the words of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel. These are chiefly in the form of dialogue, not set discourse, especially in the first eleven chapters, covered by this volume. We have here a straightforward and careful discussion of the great sayings of Christ in John 1-11. The style is more simple than one always finds in German theological books. But the clearness and lucidity of the sentences must not blind one to the real merit of the treatment. Goebel is a real scholar, and, though he uses little of the lumber of the workshop, he has mastered the material. Those who

have difficulty with theological German will like this book. Many helpful remarks are made in the setting forth of the historical situation. His *Die Parabeln Jesu* is one of the best books on the subject of Christ's Parables. He is thoroughly at home in the field of this new work. He takes the resurrection of Lazarus from the grave as a real event. It is clear that all German scholars are not yet ready to give up the supernatural element in Christ and Christianity. A. T. Robertson.

The Economics of Jesus. Or Work and Wages in the Kingdom of God. A Study of the Money Parables.

By E. Griffith Jones, B. A. Cincinnati. Jennings & Graham. New York, Eaton & Mains. 35 cents net.

Here are six short discourses, the first considering the Inequalities of Life, the last presenting Some Final Considerations. The other four deal respectively with the problems of Ability, Opportunity, Diligence, and Motive, as these are presented by our Lord in the parables of the Talents, the Laborers in the Vineyard, the Pounds, and the passage (Luke 17:7-10) about the servant coming from the field and serving his master without receiving thanks. Thus the teaching of our Lord in regard to the fact and the lessons of the four sets of inequalities is set forth by an expository study of the passages named. The little book is thoughtful, clear, and interesting, without being very thorough or profound. E. C. Dargan.

Keywords in the Teaching of Jesus.

By A. T. Robertson, D. D. Philadelphia, American Baptist Publication Society. 128 pp. 75 cents.

The "Keywords" are seven: God the Father, The Son, Sin, The Kingdom, Righteousness, The Holy Spirit, The Future Life. The lectures on these topics of our Lord's teaching were given at a summer assembly at Jackson Springs, N. C., in June, 1904, "published practically as they were delivered, and at the request of the assembly."

The treatment is characterized by the thorough scholarship for which the author is well and widely known. Mastering of the text of Scripture, and of the mass of opinion upon it, is easily in evidence. Reverence of mind and heart toward the Great Teacher is shown everywhere. There is sane, balanced, but not colorless discussion of the great problems involved. Our author knows what and why he believes, and is not afraid to stand up and speak his mind. The style is crisp, vigorous and forcible. There is no dullness or dragging, but perhaps a too great fondness for short sentences, not giving the requisite variety; and both smoothness and clearness sometimes suffer. But far better is a string of aphorisms than a flow of vapid sweetness! The little book deserves and will receive wide and careful reading.

E. C. Dargan.

Our Lord's Resurrection.

By the Rev. W. J. Sparrow Simpson, Chaplain of St. Mary's Hospital, Oxford. Longmans, Green & Co. New York and London. 1906. Price $1.40 net. Pages 320.

This is a very timely book, for the resurrection of Jesus is denied by the modern radical critics. We need fresh accent on this great fact, this fundamental Christian reality. Mr. Simpson has done a fine service in this sane and scholarly discussion of the subject. It is a book that laymen as well as ministers would find helpful. While it is thoroughly able and modern, the style is clear and the arguments easily grasped. It is a comfort to get hold of so fresh and frank a book that does not truckle to modern infidel views in the least. A. T. Robertson.

The Last Message of Jesus Christ.—Or the Apocalypse in a New Light.

By John Hamilton Timbrell. Eaton & Mains, New York. 1905. Price $1.75 net. Pages 456.

We are making headway in understanding the book of Revelation. Prof. W. M. Ramsay has done a great service in his Letters to the Seven Churches in pointing out the relation of the book to the history of Asia Minor,

and especially to that of the seven cities whose churches are addressed. Dr. Timbrell calls us back to the Old Testament imagery. The general plan is perhaps artificial, but it is of value to recall the symbols in Ezekiel and Daniel and to see that they *are* symbols. As to the thousand years or millennum he says (p. 397f): "To take this one lone number as a literalism, in a book which is built upon the mystic principle from beginning to end, is to violate every rule of interpretation upon which enunciation is grounded, and to take leave of sane exegesis as of good common sense." It will be a distinct gain when this number is admitted to be symbolic, not literal.

A. T. Robertson.

The Gift of Tongues and Other Essays.

By The Rev. Dawson Walker, M.A., D.D., Theological Tutor in the University of Durham. T. & T. Clark, Edinburg, Scotland. Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons. New York. 1906. Price $2.00.

This is a book of the ripest scholarship. Dr. Walker brings the widest reading and the ripest judgment to bear on the problems here under discussion. He carries conviction by the evident fairness of his mind and his care to put all the facts before the reader. I do not know anywhere quite so good a discussion of the Gift of Tongues, which has real difficulties enough, but which has had needless complications in abundance. The problem is to reconcile all the facts in Acts 2 with those in 1 Cor. 12-14. In a long, patient examination Dr. Walker concludes that on the Day of Pentecost the Galilean disciples did speak with foreign tongues and that this same sign reappeared at Corinth, with perhaps rhapsodical features also. Dr. Walker does not stress a point which seems to me to have weight. An interpreter was needed at Corinth, and not at Jerusalem, for the obvious reason that at Jerusalem the various tongues were understood by the representatives from the land in question, while at Corinth as a rule that was not the case. As to the legal terminology in Galatians, Dr. Walker concludes that the background was Graeco-Roman, but the Jewish ideas are also present.

He sums up in favor of Lightfoot's position that the visit to Jerusalem in Gal. 2 is the same with that in Acts 15. He indorses the possibility that the visit of the "certain from James" may have been before the conference at Jerusalem. This is a possible interpretation, but not the natural one. What Peter and Barnabas did at Antioch was not so much a change of view concerning the freedom of the Gentiles as a yielding to the pressure on social grounds. They had been eating with the Gentile Christians. Peter had once before been arraigned at Jerusalem on that point and probably was afraid that he had gone further than was meant by the decision of the conference. Or at any rate that point could have been made against him. It is delightful to see Dr. Walker have the boldness to put Acts at "about 62 A. D." and the Gospel of Luke "somewhat earlier" (p. 246). It has been a long time since I have read a book of New Testament criticism which is so able, so just, so reassuring. This is real scholarship of the Lightfoot-Hort-Westcott type.

A. T. Robertson.

Hebrews, James, I and II Peter.—A Commentary. By O. P. Eaches, D.D. American Baptist Publication Society. Philadelphia. 1906.

This volume belongs to a series known as Clark's Peoples Commentary. The title page calls it "a popular commentary upon a critical basis, especially designed for pastors and Sunday-school workers." The author has successfully carried out this purpose. His work is not so elaborate as the Cambridge Bible, he aims to give results rather than processes, and the style is of a more popular kind. Every page shows a thorough knowledge of the great critical commentaries, but all the writer sets before us is concise, lucid, bright and very readable. The preface indicates how thoroughly alive the author is to the dangerous theological tendencies of this age. He believes those Epistles furnish the right antidote to many such pernicious doctrines. The introduction to each of

the four Epistles if brief, yet sufficiently comprehensive. Little here is new, but the best results of conservative scholarship are placed before us in excellent form. The author's method is to take up the Epistles chapter by chapter, give first a brief digest of each, then the interpretation, and this followed by a series of pithy and pointed practical remarks. The commentary proper is praiseworthy, the difficult passages, such as Heb. 6: 4-8 and 1 Pet. 3: 19-20 are well handled. A serious fault is the fineness of the type, otherwise it is an admirable Peoples Commentary. J. J. Reeve.

James the Lord's Brother.

By William Patrick, D.D., Principal Manitoba College, Winnipeg. T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. 1906. Price $2.00 net. Pages 369.

This is a needed book, for James has not before been adequately treated in a separate volume. There is nothing startling in the discussion, but there is something far better. The author is eminently sane and well-balanced. His discussion is comprehensive, is just, scholarly, and satisfactory. It is not a mere traditional repetition of previous opinions, but a carefully reasoned statement of all that we really know about James. This volume will help every student of the New Testament. It is the kind of book of which we have all too few. The author denies that those who came "from James" to Antioch represented the mind of James. He holds also that James does not oppose Paul's idea of faith. "The reality of faith can be attested only by works" (p. 326.)

A. T. Robertson.

The Epistles of Peter.

By the Rev. J. H. Jowett, M. A. New York. A. C. Armstrong & Son. 1906.

The indefatigable Dr. Robertson Nicoll has undertaken to edit a new series of commentaries to be entitled "The Practical Commentary on the New Testament." The third volume of the series is on the Epistles of Peter,

and is prepared by the Rev. J. H. Jowett, the brilliant successor of Dr. Dale at the Carr's-lane church Birmingham. In the advertisements of this series reference is explicitly made to Dr. Nicoll's earlier success, the well-known "Expositor's Bible," and thus comparison becomes almost inevitable. The earlier volume on Peter by Professor Lumby was more than half larger than that now put out by Mr. Jowett, and, laying the books together, seems throughout more soundly exegetical. On the other hand it must at once be recognized that Jowett is constantly more suggestive and stimulating than was his predecessor. No introductory matter is furnished, even for the much disputed Second Epistle. The present reviewer has certainly no objection to the conclusion that Peter wrote it, but to assume it without a word of justification or discussion appears scarcely the most helpful course in these days of widespread questioning, when one needs to be able to give a reason for his conclusions as well as his faith. Much, not to say most, of Jowett's book is homiletical rather than exegetical in tone and temper. It begins with a striking example (on 1 Peter i. 3-5): "How easily these early disciples break into doxology! Whenever some winding in the way of their thought brings the grace of God into view, the song leaps to their lips. The glory of grace strikes the chords of their hearts into music, and life resounds with exuberant praise," and so on for a full page. There is a whole chapter of twelve pages on "Be pitiful!" (1 Pet. iii. 9). The theological position of the author it is not easy to gather from his book. These Epistles themselves are to be sure rather practical than theological, and the few theological teachings are ignored, it would seem studiously ignored, by the author. The thoughts of Peter, that Christ is our sin-bearer on the tree, and that we are to be sprinkled with his blood, seem not to be touched upon at all. The acuteness of the sufferings of Jesus is emphasized with reiterated assertions (pp. 139-'42), but that is about all. The most definite teaching which the reviewer has noted is

in connection with the words "By whose stripes ye were healed," (p. 99). "Do not let us overlook the experience because we cannot find an explanation. Do not let us reject the fact because we cannot contrive a theory. The sorest places in human life, the raw, festering wounds of indwelling sin, can only be remedially touched by the healing influence of his stripes." One will naturally turn also to the discussion of "the spirits in prison" (1 Pet. iii. 19, 20). From this passage the author draws the conclusion, "No man's destiny is to be fixed until he has heard of Christ" (p. 144), but as usual no reason is given for the statement. Here at least it might fairly be said that exegetical justification of the position taken is imperatively demanded, but it is searched for in vain. The book as a whole will doubtless be found a helpful stimulus for many preachers; if only it had been made even more helpful! D. F. Estes.

The Bible and Christian Life.

By Walter Lock, D. D., Warden of Keble College, Oxford; Dean Ireland's Professor of Exegesis. Methuen & Co., 36 Essex street, London, W. C., England. 1906. Price, six shillings.

Dr. Lock has a ripened culture and a balanced judgment that show to great advantage in this collection of essays. They are partly critical and exegetical and partly practical. The discussion of The Sources of the Prologue of St. John's Gospel, Presuppositions of N. T. Study, and the Christology of the Earlier Chapters of the Acts of the Apostles is rich in original suggestion and penetrating insight. Common sense is applied to matters of criticism, a trait by no means common among great scholars. Dr. Lock accepts more of the modern critical view of the O. T. than I think the facts justify and a Baptist cannot indorse the ecclesiastical views at all points. But for great ability blended with rich scholarship and real wisdom these papers have a high place. They are modern in spirit, devout in tone, and really edifying and stimulating. One is grateful to Dr. Lock for publishing the volume. A. T. Robertson.

Die Inschriften von Magnesia am Mäander und das Neue Testament.—Eine sprachgeschichtliche Studie.

Von Lic. Therl Gottfried Thieme. Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, Goettingen, Germany. 1906. Pages 43. Price, M. 1.20.

This is a helpful treatise and supplements Deissmann's *Bible Studies.* In the inscriptions of Magnesia are found such N. T. words as λογεία, κυριακός, etc. There will be more of such detailed application of the language of the inscriptions to the N. T. This piece of work is well done and can be commended to all who are interested in the new knowledge of N. T. Greek.

The work of Thieme is of course, not so extensive as that of Nachmanson, Laute und Formen der Magnetischen Inschriften, 1903, but none the less it is of real value.

A. T. Robertson.

The Disciple and His Lord, or Twenty-six Days with Jesus.

By Rev. J. S. Kirtley, D. D. American Baptist Publication Society, Philadelphia. 254 pages.

This attractive and instructive volume has just come from the press, and emanates from the pen of the beloved and scholarly pastor and writer, Dr. J. S. Kirtley. These studies recently appeared in "Service" as a part of the sacred literature course of the B. Y. U. A. for 1905-1906, and are now wisely combined into permanent form. They reveal a clear insight into the life and work of Christ, and present the most significant events in the matchless life of our Lord in chronological order. The volume deserves a wide circulation among all who wish a clear, succinct, orderly and attractive presentation of the Gospel narratives. It should be used extensively in the homes of our people, in Sunday-schools and young people's societies. It is indeed a capital book.

Byron H. Dement.

II. HOMILETICS.

Homiletics and Preaching.

By Walter Rhodes, Baptist Minister, Baltimore. The Peters Publishing and Printing Compony. 255 pp.

Lectures on Homiletics, by Henry C. Graves, D.D., Teacher of Homiletics in the Gordon Bible and Training School. Philadelphia. American Baptist Publication Society. 1906.

The first of these books comes from a busy pastor, and is the enlargement of papers presented at the Baltimore Baptist Ministers' Conference. The book has some blemishes of style and proof-reading that need to be removed, but the matter is judicious, clearly presented, and for the most part pleasingly set forth. The aim and spirit of the book are good, and many a pastor would find profitable suggestion and stimulus in reading it.

The second book is from the pen of one who has had large and varied experience in the ministry, and is now teaching in the Gordon Training School at Boston. It is needless to say that the book is neatly printed and bound, pleasing to the eye. The Publication Society is doing excellent work in bookmaking. The contents of the book are well worthy of their dress. The incisive style, the sound comment, the excellent principles, the modest expression of a personal acquaintance, all go to make up a sensible and pleasing presentation of many of the essentials of Homiletics. The little volume will reward an attentive reading.

After all, it is rather hard to say anything new about Homiletics! Here are two quite different books. They draw freely upon the masters, saying little that has not been as well or better said before and often; and yet they are things that constantly need to be said over and over again. The theme must be wisely chosen, properly analyzed, clearly and forcibly presented. The Bible must be regarded as the preacher's storehouse both of texts and doctrines. The preacher must be a man of character and prayer. The aim must ever be to win men and build them up in the spiritual life. All this and more these books tell us. Each one in its own way gives the author's theory

of his work. Dr. R. W. Dale has been quoted by some one recently as saying that he read every book on preaching that came under his notice, and with profit. So it is needed that there should be frequent presentation of the principles underlying preaching, as of every other great and worthy work. Each age must adapt universally recognized principles to its own demands. So books are helpful that keep freshly before us the greatness of the work of preaching and the best ways of making it effective to our own times. E. C. Dargan.

Bread and Salt from the Word of God.—Sixteen Sermons.

By Theodore Zahn, Professor of Theology in the University of Erlangen. Translated by C. S. and A. E. Burn. Edinburgh. T. & T. Clark. Imported by Charles Scribner's Sons. New York. $1.50 net.

Dr. Zahn has long been known as a theologian and scholar of first rank, especially in the department of Introduction to the New Testament. This volume of sermons, which are admirably translated, will introduce him to English and American readers as a preacher of decided merit and power. The sermons range in date from 1871 to 1900, most of them having been delivered at Erlangen. The principle of selection is thus stated by the author in his preface: "When choosing a limited number out of the large mass of sermons which I was permitted to preach in my official capacity before Easter 1877, and since then as a voluntary substitute only, I have given the preference to those which, as far as I can remember, fulfilled their object better than the others, and partly to those which, in accordance with the wish of some members of my audience, had already found a certain, though very limited circulation."

The sermons are marked by a clear evangelical note, which is very refreshing. The preacher holds firmly to orthodox views of the deity and the atonement of Christ. He accepts the miraculous elements of the Bible, and preaches it as the true Word of God. Thus in the sermon on the Temptation of Jesus (date 1891) he says: "My

friends, I do not wish to be misunderstood. From time immemorial there have been teachers, both inside the church and outside the church, and there are such also at the present day, who preach on the old Bible texts, and take the old sacred words into their mouths, speaking of the Son of God and His miracles, of the Atonement and of the Resurrection, and, if need be, of the devil also; but by it all they mean something quite different from that which Jesus and His Apostles, and the community of the faithful, have ever understood by it. May God, in His mercy, preserve this pulpit of St. Paul's at all times, so that none who are thus double-tongued may ever preach here!"

There is also a strong and capable handling of current moral issues and present-day problems from the point of view of a devout and evangelical German Lutheran. The sermons well repay reading, as they show how the best modern scholarship can still retain a devout grasp upon Gospel realities. E. C. Dargan.

The Ministryof the Eternal Life.—A sermon preached before the National Baptist Societies at their Anniversaries at Dayton, Ohio, May 20, 1906.

By William C. Bitting, D. D. Philadelphia. American Baptist Publication Society. 1906.

The sermon received at the time of its delivery—and most justly—wide commendation both for its timeliness and power. The Publication Society has done well to give to it in this neat form a wider audience than that which was privileged to hear the discourse when delivered. A number of texts from John's Gospel are quoted so as to present the teaching of the Master on the great theme. But the prime object of the sermon is to discuss the duty of those who receive this eternal life from Jesus to pass it on to others. It is the missionary plea, presented from a very important and often neglected point of view, and presented with thoughtfulness, feeling and power, and in a style both forcible and pleasing. The characteristics of the eternal life are described;

that it is spiritual, ethical, free, and indestructible; then the variety, unity and witnessing power of the various agencies for its dissemination are considered; and finally the call for such dissemination is set forth in the needs of men for this eternal life, their capacity for receiving it, and in the value put upon it by those who possess it. It is a fresh, stimulating and helpful sermon.

E. C. Dargan.

Literary Illustrations of the Bible.

Edited by James Moffatt, D. D., Ecclesiastes. The Gospel of St. Mark. New York, A. C. Armstrong & Son. 40 cents each, net.

These little volumes contain what the title sets forth—a number of quotations from great writers, in illustration of texts from the Bible books named. There is of course difference of value and appositeness in the quotations. This sort of thing must be largely a matter of individual taste; but those who like to see how well a good reader can gather and arrange such a series of quotations for preaching and teaching purposes will find help from the series. Any who may find it accordant with their principles and tastes to have this sort of work done—and well done, in the main—ready to their hands may find another and dubious sort of aid in these selections. The little books are beautifully printed and are pleasant to eye and mind. E. C. Dargan.

III. MISSIONARY.

Students and the Modern Missionary Crusade.

Addresses delivered before the Fifth International Convention of the Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions, Nashville, Tenn., February 28th—March 4, 1906. New York. Student Movement for Foreign Missions. 1906. XVI. 713 pp. Price $1.50.

This report, for the most part, complete and exact, covers the general meetings and all sectional meetings and constitutes a contribution indispensable to every missionary library that seeks to be.

The remarkable success of this movement is due to a masterful leadership that nowhere becomes more evident

than in the plans and programmes of its conventions—quadrennial, as is well known. The programme reported in the present volume covers a series of subjects in the theory, history, and relationships of Foreign Missions, as well as Comparative Religion, and personal appeals. In sectional meetings the various countries have separate treatment, the various denominations their own presentations, and the schools discuss their relation to the great movement. W. O. Carver.

Missions from the Modern View.

□By Robert A. Hume, of Ahmednagar, India, with an introduction by Charles Cuthbert Hall. Published by Fleming H. Revell Co., New York, Chicago, Toronto. 1905. 292 pp.

No sphere of Christian work can remain unaffected by the "modern views," and none should seek or desire to avoid that view. Because of its vital power and its creative Work Missions is the last cause much to feel change induced by *Modernism*. Vital forces ever more affect every situation than are affected by them. The channel and method of operation for a vital force are in their measure influenced and determined by the spirit, ideas and ideals of the time and place. Moreover, it is the aim of missions to redeem what at the moment is ever the modern view and to turn it into the channel of the redemptive Kingdom. Certainly then, missions must need and be adjusted to the modern view. What the nature of that adjustment shall be depends on the conceived aim of missions. Missionary workers are occupied first with the unlimited demands of energetic service and, then, with the assurance that they are working with those eternal principles that are effective for every age. Hence are they slow, as a rule, to recognize the ever-changing "modern views." Too few have been the attempts to view missions modernly. One recalls at once Clarke's *Study* of Christian Missions, Horton's the Bible a Missionary Book, Gulick's Evolution of the Japanese, and now this of Dr. Hume. Several other volumes with titles suggestive of a treatment of the *modernism of mis-*

sions, again to employ that term, prove not to deal with this phase of the subject. Dr. Hume is conservative and really has few changes to suggest, although he thinks his "modern view" quite other than that of a generation agone. He presents ideas as new that have been commonplaces of missions for a half century. His work is fresh and interesting enough, and especially as it has the life of personal experience and conviction. There are several aspects of the modern view that are not fully presented and some not touched. W. O. Carver.

On the Borders of Pigmy Land.

By Ruth B. Fisher (nee Hurditch). Published by the Fleming H. Revell Company, New York, Chicago, Toronto. 1905. 215 pages, 32 full page illustrations and picture of the author.

A remarkably bright, informing and fascinating account of the country and people of the Uganda Protectorate, especially the Toro territory in which Mrs. Fisher has spent four or five years of most energetic and effective service as missionary. She is a bright, vivacious writer with an eye for the humorous. The style is graceful though several errors appear in the last three chapters, and the proof-reader occasionally nodded elsewhere.

W. O. Carver.

IV. CHURCH HISTORY.

A Propos de la Séparation des Eglises et de l'etat.

Par Paul Sabatier, Librairie Fischbacher. Paris. 1906. Pp. 1-216. Price 75c. Quatrian edition. Completement revue et tres Augmentee.

It is very difficult for Americans to understand the religious situation in France. Until the apearance of this book by Sabatier, already well known through his "Life of St. Francis of Assisi," we have been compelled to gather our information from passing articles in the press written largely for polemical purposes. Sabatier comes at the question from the point of view of a liberal theologian rather than that of a Protestant. He deals with the "Origines of the Crisis," the "Actual Situation of the

Roman Church in France," the "Consequences of the Denunciation of the Concordat," and then add several appendices giving documents illustrative of the religious condition of contemporary France. A wide knowledge of the current literature of the controversy in France, a vivid and striking style and intense earnestness have combined to make a most interesting book. The story of the causes of the crisis and the view of the religious conditions in France are gloomy reading—a story of ignorance, passion prejudice, obscurantism, servile submission, violence, lawlessness, political chicanery on the part of the church which can scarcely be paralleled. The marvel is that the crisis was so long delayed. The author declares that liberal thought in France is not hostile to Christianity, but to clericalism. He believes the liberal elements in the church will regenerate it, not by bringing it to Protestanism but by liberalizing it, introducing spirituality into its forms and free thought into its theology. He has no hope for the great body of the church, regards it as in the death-throes, but he looks with joyful hope to the liberal wing. He may be a prophet, but it is doubtful if the leopard can change his spots even when fed on the soft diet of liberalism.

W. J. McGlothlin.

Papst Stephan I, und der Ketzertaufstreit.

Von Dr. Johann Ernst, Verlog von Kirchheim & Co., Mainz. 1905. Pp. 1-116. P. M $3.50.

One of the most interesting and important controversies within the folds of the ancient church was that about heretical baptism at the middle of the third century. Cyprian the great bishop of Carthage, supported by most of the churches in North Africa and Asia Minor, held all baptisms administered among the sects (heretics) invalid, and required rebaptism on entering the Catholic church. Stephen, bishop of Rome, held the opposite view, maintaining that the practice of that church had always been to receive these alien baptisms. The controversy

waxed hot and little reverence was shown to the bishop of Rome. The correspondence gives us the clearest view we have of his relations to the rest of the church at this period. It differs so widely from the position he holds to-day that it has long given the Catholics great trouble. In 1902 Leo Nelke published a vigorous book setting forth the Protestant view of this correspondence. The work before me is by a Catholic and is an answer to Nelke's work. It does not treat the question of heretical baptism as its name indicates, but the position of Stephen as revealed in this controversy. It has ecclesiastical approval and of course supports the claims of the Pope to-day. Neither its arguments nor its conclusions are to be accepted. W. J. McGlothlin.

The True Story of Robert Browne (1550?-1633.)—Father of Congregationalism, including various points hitherto unknown or misunderstood, with some account of the development of his religious views, and an extended and improved list of his writings.

By Champlin Burrage, M. A., Brown University. Research Fellow of Newton Theological Institution. Henry Frowde. London. 1906. Pp. 1-75.

Robert Browne is one of the most interesting figures in Christian history. His life has been the subject of numerous treatises and not a little controversy. The author of this pamphlet has become deeply interested in the subject in recent years and has made valuable additions to our knowledge of Browne's writings and life. These he sums up in the little work before us. It is published "as a supplement to, and corrective of, Dr. Henry Martyn Dexter's account of Robert Browne's life,' and "as a companion work to Dr. Dexter's little volume, entitled "The True Story of John Smyth the Se-Baptist." The author does not believe that Browne was a coward or apostate, nor that he lost his mind in his old age. He differs from the current views on several other minor points. The pamphlet contains extended extracts from Browne's works, reproduced in the most exact and scholarly manner. The work is a real contribution to

church history. It must be consulted in order to know all there is to be known about Robert Browne.

W. J. McGlothlin.

Nero.

By Stephen Phillips. New York. MacMillan Company. 1906. Price $1.25 net. Pages 200.

This is a wondrously graphic tragedy. The poem does not cover all the career of Nero, but closes with the burning of Rome. It gives, however, the development of Nero in strong relief. There is the sure grasp of a master workman in this drama. One doubts if Mr. Phillips has done anything better than this brilliant portrayal of the world's most capricious tyrant. The world was at its nadir in moral conceptions and Nero was its exponent.

A. T. Robertson.

V. SUNDAY SCHOOL.

How to Conduct a Sunday School, or Twenty-eight Years a Superintendent.

By Marion Lawrance. Fleming H. Revell Co. New York, Chicago, Toronto.

This is one of the most practical and helpful books which has been issued from the press for many a day on the Sunday-school. Mr. Marion Lawrance is an expert on the Sunday-school in all departments. The book consists of twenty-two chapters, with three appendices. Some of the topics dealt with in the chapters are as follows: The Sunday-school Equipped, The Sunday-school Organized, The Sunday-school Graded, Sunday-school Giving, Special Occasions, The Blackboard and Object Teaching, Temperance Day, Decision Day. The last chapter is on an intensely practical theme. That Big Boy and How to Deal With Him. Appendix A, is on A Superintendent's Suggestions to Himself; Appendix B, One Hundred Good Books for Sunday-school Workers; C, My Former Pastors: An Appreciation.

Simplicity of style, clearness of view and practicality

are the distinguishing marks of this volume. Mr. Lawrance is one of the warmest-hearted men in the country. He is brimming over with enthusiasm for the Sunday-school, and is a host in himself. This book contains the cream of his experience as a Sunday-school man. He is to-day superintendent of a great and successful Sunday-school, and thus speaks out of the very heart of modern Sunday-school life. Every pastor, every superintendent and every teacher ought to have a copy of this book. I can commend it most heartily. E. Y. MULLINS.

The Making of a Teacher.

By Martin G. Brumbaugh, Ph. D., LL. D., Professor of Pedagogy in the University of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia. The Sunday School Times Company. 1905.

This is a volume of 351 pp. designed as "a contribution to some phases of the problem of religious education," and well has the distinguished author executed his noble purpose. The very title, modest and practical, rather than pretentious and technical, is a fair indication of the statements of the chapters and of the development of the topics.

The author intentionally avoids many technical expressions usually found in discussions of Educational Psychology. For this he may be slightly criticized in some ultra-scientific quarters, but highly commended by those who are led in natural paths into the fertile fields of a charming study.

The Elements of Psychology which render genuine service to a practical teacher are clearly and attractively discussed and illustrated by an able scholar and efficient teacher. Dr. Brumbaugh is an expert in the science of education and in the art of teaching, and in this volume he gives the essence of his philosophical thought in its application to the teaching process. He has given the public an admirable treatise on the true psychological principles with a general application to the work of any successful teaching and a special application to the teaching of religious truth. It is a timely and practical volume

full of guiding principles and suggestive illustrations easily comprehended by the average Sunday-school teacher, and yet refreshing and illuminating to those who are at home in the more advanced and technical treatises on educational psychology. Though not scholastic, it is scholarly; though not technical, it is fundamental. The reviewer's opinion of the volume is further indicated by the fact that he has selected it as one of the text-books for the classes in Sunday-school Pedagogy in the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary.

BYRON H. DEMENT.

Reform in Sunday School Teaching.

By A. S. Peake. M. A., B. D., Professor of Biblical Exegesis and Dean of the Faculty of Theology in the University of Manchester. Etc James Clark & Co. London. 1906. Pp. 1-128. Price 1s 6d.

The reform on which Prof. Peake insists is that of the lessons, the curriculum. He recognizes the need of trained and efficient teachers, but does not, as does Prof. Brumbaugh, think it useless to attempt to improve the lesson system until we have provided our schools with better teachers. pp. 116ff. He exposes unsparingly and in the main justly the weaknesses of the present system of lessons. It certainly can not be justified on sound principles of teaching, and it is to be feared that it is not giving the children any adequate knowledge of the Bible as a book, of Bible history, or of religion and morals. Some reform along this line must come in the near future; but the question is exceedingly difficult and complex and it can not be said that Prof. Peake is equally as successful in his constructive as in his destructive work. His desire is for a system of lessons graded to suit the capacities of the children, and not simply a graded treatment of the same lesson as at present. Reform will come along this line and we welcome this and all similar discussions as leading toward this end. W. J. MCGLOTHLIN.

The Development of the Sunday School.—Official Report of the Eleventh International Sunday School Convention at Toronto, 1905.

1905. W. N. Hartshorn, Fort Hill Press. Boston. 1905.

This volume is a most valuable contribution to Sunday school literature. It has four main divisions. The first is historical, containing accounts of the modern Sunday school movement in its various aspects. There are chapters here on Robert Raikes and the Eighteenth Century, The Nineteenth Century Sunday School, Organized Primary Work, 1870-1905, National and International Conventions, and on many other valuable subjects.

In division two the addresses of the Toronto Convention are printed in full. This section is an astonishingly rich collection of Sunday school literature and will repay careful reading and study. The third division contains reports of the various conferences which were held. In these proceedings numberless practical and pertinent topics are considered and they furnish valuable assistance to the seeker for light on Sunday school work and method. The fourth division contains tables and appendices. From this very inadequate outline of the contents of this volume the reader can form an opinion as to its attractiveness. It should have a wide circulation and careful reading. It will prove exceedingly valuable to all who desire material for addresses, as well as to other students of the Sunday school movement.

E. Y. Mullins.

A Century of Bibles.

By a Sunday School Teacher. The Griffith and Rowland Press. Philadelphia.

This booklet of 88 pages was written for Sunday school teachers. It contains a mass of valuable information concerning Bible publication and distribution in the last century put in a form that will be specially attractive to Sunday school teachers. It is an inspiring story well told.

W. J. McGlothlin.

The Country Sunday School.

By Rev. Hight C. Moore. American Baptist Publication Society.

This is an excellent pamphlet of 27 pages on a very important subject. The author knows the country Sunday school, its limitations and imperfections, but also its excellencies and possibilities. He believes in the country Sunday school and this pamphlet will help others to believe in it and make it useful. W. J. McGlothlin.

Moral Education.

By Edward Howard Griggs. B. W. Huebsch. New York. 1904. $1.50 net.

In noticing this second edition of a well-known work by one of the most thoughtful and high-souled lecturers of America, it may be well to recall the lofty and worthy aim of the author. Recognizing that much of the literature dealing with ethical problems is born of the study rather than of the world, and that it shows a detachment from human life that involves a loss of appreciation of its actual and concrete problems, he was led to adopt a method that would keep close to the process of life itself. Setting out reverently to answer the question, what is the truth, and seeking to find the eternal in the best life of the moment, he hoped to achieve something toward making the process more real, and toward retaining, both in the study and the practical work of moral education, something of the deep interest that ethical problems possess for us in our real experience. He set about, therefore, to make as exhaustive a study as he could of the whole problem of moral education according to this method and from this point of view: its purpose in relation to society and all the means through which that purpose can be attained.

His aim was "sanity not novelty." "In education, as in life, we are led astray by brilliant half-truths." "Wisdom means putting half-truths in their place, viewing each element in widest relation, and, therefore, truest perspective; seeing life, as Matthew Arnold said Sophocles saw it, 'steadily and whole.'" The avowed aim of the

author in this book, then, is just that, to see "steadily and whole" both human life and the process of moral culture that leads to it and makes possible at once the happiest and most helpful living. It is especially intended to guide parents and teachers in their delicate duties, but is an effort, also, at a complete and inclusive view of the problem for all who are interested in moral culture. Whatever the author may lack, he is always sincere, vigorous and suggestive, believes that the great truths of life are simple and universal, is singularly clear in seeing and lucid in stating them, and is always superior to the temptation to be sensational. GEO. B. EAGER.

Religious Education.—Mainly from the Psychological Standpoint,

By Prof. Albert E. Garvie, D.D. The Sunday School Union, 57 and 59 Ludgate Hill, London, E. C., England. Price, one shilling net. Pages 94.

Dr. Garvie has packed into these four lectures (all but one of the British Chautauqua) a vast amount of thought, and thought that is worth while. Some will not agree with all that he says about sin and the conversion of children, but the book is full of suggestions and helpfulness. It is a timely discussion for Great Britain, but most of the questions treated are of a fundamental nature. Dr. Garvie has a keen mind and he writes pungently and clearly. He wisely sees that the minister of the future must know how to teach children and to train teachers of children. He will be interested to know that our Seminary has recently established a chair of Sunday School Pedagogy.

The book will help all who take genuine interest in the religious training of children. A. T. ROBERTSON.

Method in Soul Winning on Home and Foreign Fields.

By Henry C. Mabie, D.D. F. H. Revell Company. New York, Chicago, Toronto. 1906.

The author of this book, the well-known home secretary of the American Baptist Missionary Union, has

peculiar gifts and attainments for writing on the subject of soul winning. Experience as pastor and pastor-evangelist at home, further experience as a soul-winner during an extended tour of foreign missionary fields, and a singularly rich experience in his own spiritual life unite in imparting the needed qualifications for the task.

There are six chapters. The Presuppositions of the soul-winner include the vision of God and the consequent possession of something to impart. This is set forth and illustrated in chapter one. In chapter two The Evangelizing Message is expounded. It is necessary to delimit the evangelizing message. We should not require the sinner to understand and accept an entire body of divinity before accepting Christ. "To evangelize a soul is to make clear to it the evangelical status made possible for it by Christ" (p. 37). The evangelizing message is "the message which announces that on the basis of what Christ has done in his eternal atonement, a new kind of probation, namely, a probation of grace—offering salvation by gift outright on the ground of what Christ has done in His new covenant or will—exist for all, is their new birthright" (p. 40). In chapter three "The Immediate Practical Aim" is discussed, and in chapter four "The Nature of Saving Faith" is very suggestively and forcibly set forth. The author's definitions of faith and his exposition of the idea are of great value. His discussion of "Tact in Personal Approach" in chapter five, and of "Christ's Method of Self-Disclosure" in chapter six will prove most helpful in practical evangelistic effort. Dr. Mabie possesses rare spiritual insight and sympathic appreciation of the profoundly doctrinal in combination with a practical skill acquired through long experience. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that this volume on soul-winning has already found a large sphere of usefulness. We expect for it an increasingly useful career as the years pass. E. Y. Mullins.

A Text-Book in the History of Education.

By Paul Monroe. The MacMillan Company. New York. 1905.

This volume, by Prof. Monroe. of Columbia University, has 759 pages, and is a very valuable contribution to its subject. The discussion is comprehensive and clear and as thorough as the nature of the case would allow. A vast amount of ground is covered in a most satisfactory way. Prof. Monroe begins with primitive education, which he describes as non-progressive adjustment. The next chapter is devoted to Oriental education, which conceived of education as recapitulation. Next he discusses Greek education, which was progressive adjustment, and in Chapter IV., Roman education, which was conceived of as practical training. In Chapter V., education as discipline is discussed. Then comes a discussion of humanistic education, and that of the Reformation and counter-Reformation, which involved the religious ideal in education. In Chapter VIII., he discusses realistic education. In Chapter IX., the disciplinary conception of education is set forth, with John Locke as representative. Next, Rousseau's ideal of education is set forth. Chapters XI., XII. and XIII. give a very illuminating and helpful discussion of the three great tendencies in modern education—the psychological, the scientific and the sociological. These three tendencies are the most pronounced in modern education. Under the first, the author outlines the influence of Pestalozzi, Herbart and of Froebel. The psychological tendency in education relates chiefly to method. It conceives of education as the natural development of the mind and follows psychological laws. The three writers mentioned above gave special attention to this aspect of education. The scientific movement in education lays special stress upon the inductive method and upon the study of nature, its facts and phenomena. The sociological tendency in education chiefly puts emphasis upon the institutions of society and the mission of the individual to society. Chapter XIV. gives a conclusion and

summary, and discusses in a telling way the present eclectic tendency in education. Under this head the author shows that the present educational activity aims to secure the harmonious co-operation of the psychological, scientific and sociological tendencies; that is to say, to incorporate into our educational ideals and methods all the good features of all the tendencies of the past. He also makes the point that the highest aim of modern education is the production of character.

As the title indicates, the book is eminently adapted for text-book purposes. The analysis is entirely clear, the arrangement is progressive, the argument is cumulative. There is an excellent index, and the table of contents is sufficiently full to indicate without difficulty the various stages of the discussion in the text itself. The bibliography is full and very valuable. A great deal is done to aid the student in finding the sources and material in the history of education. Of course no reviewer will agree with all the positions maintained by the author of this book, but I do not hesitate to say it is one of the most valuable contributions to the subject in recent years. Every pastor and every teacher in the land should possess a copy. E. Y. Mullins.

The Christian Doctrine of Salvation.

By George Barker Stevens, Ph. D., D.D., LL.D., Dwight Professor of Systematic Theology in Yale University. New York. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1905.

It is saddening to reflect, on taking up this book, that it is the author's last contribution to theological learning. In June, 1906, his days were numbered and his earthly work ended. It is, consequently, his last as well as first book in the field of dogmatics, which he had been teaching for some years. It may also be said, if in view of the author's earlier work any should be surprised at his latest conclusions, that the reviewer is informed that this work is the result of a fresh and, so far as possible, independent and impartial investigation of its theme.

Of a work with which so many personal considerations

are entwined it would be pleasant to do no more than to call attention to its devout and pure temper, well worthy the theologian, and its sweep and strength of thought and clearness of statement, no less befitting the scholar. Yet as the really extraneous considerations named above might lead some to give it unjustified authority, it belongs to the reviewer in all simplicity and respect to discuss this book simply as a contribution to theological literature.

This book is divided by the author into three sections, "The Biblical Basis of the Doctrine," "The Principal Forms of the Doctrine," and "Constructive Development of the Doctrine," occupying respectively 135, 126 and 275 pages (indexes, pp. 537-546).

Any one familiar with the Biblical work done by Professor Stevens will expect the clearness and strength of exegetical work here displayed, though on several points, there is room for most serious question as to the trustworthiness of his views. That "cleansing" in John's speech is anything other than ceremonial, that "taking away sin" means to bring it about that men should not go on to sin further, that "to give the life," or "to lay it down" could mean something besides dying, and, finally, that the offering of the "blood" does not involve death, these are not unfamiliar propositions, but as yet they have not been demonstrated. Professor Stevens asserted with convincing cogency that the Godward efficacy of the death of Christ is a part of Paul's teaching. But, mainly by the use of the exegetical assumptions stated above, this thought is eliminated from the teaching of Hebrews and John. First Peter is ignored as a mere result and echo of Paul's teaching, and, finally, it is held that the words of Jesus are not sufficiently clear for use as a basis for the "traditional" doctrine. It remains only that Paul's clear and reiterated teachings should be stigmatized as survivals of "his Pharisaic training" and character as truly Jewish and rabbinic, and the field is clear for the author's own constructive work.

Under "The Principal Forms of the Doctrine," Professor Stevens discussed in turn, "The Commercial Theory of Anselm," "The Governmental Theory of Grotius," "Modern Penal Satisfaction Theories," "Modern Ethical Satisfaction or Ethicized Governmental Theories," and "Modern 'Subjective' Theories," showing in his Historical Statement as also in his "Summary and Conclusions" the difficulties which to his mind beset these various theories.

Part III., "Constructive Development of the Doctrine," occupies, as has been noted, more than half of the book. The doctrine set forth and substantiated with all the clearness and force which seems possible is the "moral" or "ethical theory, that "Christ's whole aim was to induce men to desire and accept pardon. . . . . His mission was to incite men to faith in the infinite love of God" (p. 534). Every other theory and thought in relation to the saving work of Christ he sets aside, controverting it at greater or less length.

As a statement of this "ethical" view and the arguments for it, a view already considerably prevalent and possibly gaining ground, this work possesses great significance and value. Whatever may be its fate later, it is reasonable to expect that for a generation to come no discussion of Christ's saving work can ignore it. It should also be said, in detail, that the language and expression is almost invariably worthy of the high theme, that the author's statement of the views against which he has argued seems to be fairly justified by his abundant quotations, that his argument is usually clear and seems the strongest presentment of his case likely soon to be made, and that his spiritual tone is lofty and pure.

There is no room in the space of this notice to attempt to justify or to controvert the argument as a whole. A few suggestions may reasonably find place here.

(1) Part III., styled by the author "constructive," deserves no less to be styled "controversial." This the author himself recognized and attempted to justify (p.

529). It may be, as he claimed, that he could fairly and helpfully present his view and as he did present it, as in turn his criticism of some other discussions seems reasonable, but a reader may be pardoned for feeling regret at times that the controversial element so outweighs the constructive.

(2) Among the theories which are set aside, the purely "penal" theories receive much the largest share of attention. The author said "the ultimate choice among theories of the atonement reduces at last to the alternative between the penal satisfaction and the moral theory." They "alone are definite and consistent. * * * The choice should be frankly made between them" (p. 531). Now this opinion may be correct, but to convince his readers Professor Stevens should have not merely asserted it but given conclusive demonstration of it, even if we grant that he has successfully controverted the "penal" theory, many of his readers will find themselves unaffected by his assaults, for they do not feel themselves shut up to these alternatives.

(3) Many readers who are in fullest sympathy with the author's positive assertions, will fail to join in some at least of his denials. For his purposes it was essential to show that we must limit ourselves to a single view of the significance of Christ's work. Granted that Christ aimed "to induce men to desire and accept pardon," as Professor Stevens contended, (a view which some may have too little emphasized, but which none, to my knowledge, have set themselves to controvert), it will seem to many that it is more than possible that it may also have conditioned the activity of God, and that too, in more than one aspect. Why must any one theory of the atonement, even Professor Stevens', be regarded as exhaustive and as excluding other views? Why may not the partial conceptions of many thinkers be mutually complementary?

(4) Indeed, were it not for positive assertions that Christ's aim was merely to win men, Professor Stevens has so put the thought of the satisfaction of God in the

work of Christ, that it might naturally be held that he had held to this as an essential element in his doctrine (see Chapter IX., Part III.)

(5) While certain phases of the doctrine (the "penal") find thorough discussion, certain other phases are insufficiently discussed, if, indeed, in every case clearly recognized. That propitiation makes each loving in heart or gracious in sentiment is more than abundantly controverted, but the really distinct, even though apparently kindred, idea that propitiation is a conditioning of activity, not sentiment, is practically ignored. The notion that propitiation of God can be *ab extra* is dealt with repeatedly, but that it was wrought in Christ by God himself (a Pauline idea, to be sure) is too much neglected. It were indeed to be denied that Professor Stevens had given, as seems demanded in his teaching on this subject, his view as to what the relation of Christ to God really was. He seems inclined to discredit his pre-existent personality at any rate (pp. 297ff, 440). The criticisms of the author on the use of the words "subjective" and "objective" (pp. 258, 259) may be more than justified, but they have been used, and their use in reference to men, that "subjective" refers to effects in the man himself, and "objective" to effects outside his own soul, on his relations, not his character, deserves an attention which it did not receive.

(6). Not only did Professor Stevens intend to be scrupulously fair, but in general his success should be recognized. But he was not accurate whenever he seemed to imply the conception of faith which he strongly urged, not "a passive acquiescence or intellectual assent, a notion, however correct, concerning the essence or policy of God," but "a faith which binds the soul to Christ in sincere preference and aspiration for the life he bids men live" (p. 465), that this conception is not equally consistent with any theory of the atonement. And if the following extract was intended as a description of the work of any worthy antagonists of the author's, he sadly mis-

understood them: "Who that has observed religious movements at all closely has not often heard an account of the process of salvation of which the following would be a fair outline: you must, first of all, believe that Christ has paid your debt to God for you; accepting this for true, you are released from the burden of your guilt and from liability to punishment in the world to come; as an additional assurance of heaven, it will now be your duty to join this or that church, which, by its divinely authenticated organization, or, its correct theological theories or ritual practices offers superior guarantees for your future safety" (p. 495). The reviewer can only protest that he never read or heard of any such preaching.

(7) Finally, it should be noted that this "Doctrine of Salvation" does not rest upon the Scriptures as its basis. To be sure the argument from the supposed silence of Christ is pressed to the extreme, but beyond this, as has been remarked, positive teaching of the Apostle Paul, which he emphasized more than once, which he claimed, as it is fair to infer, to be a revelation from Christ, is unceremoniously set aside as unworthy of credence or respect. We may appeal to the author's own definition of "scriptural" as formulated in reference to "eternal atonement." "The question here is not, of course, whether such a generalization was elaborated during the first age in the form in which modern thought conceives it, but whether we meet in the New Testament the elements of which it is composed. To me it seems clear that the earliest speculative thought is moving in that direction. Take, for example, Paul's idea of the cosmic Christ" (p. 438). Now, by the same token, some thought of atonement other than that set forth in this book is "scriptural." Here as in so many cases the question ultimately resolves itself into the more far-reaching question, what value have the teachings of the Apostles?

Gottes Sohn und Gottes Geist Vortrage zur Christologie und zur Lehre vom Geiste Gottes.
By Von Wilhelm Lütgert. George Böhme. Leipzig. 1905.

This is a series of discourses delivered by Professor Lutgert, of Halle, upon various occasions. They relate to a number of the most important issues now agitating the theological world. A number of them are controversial in character. Some of the subjects are as follows: The Confession of the Divine Sonship of Jesus; The Mission as Proof for the Divinity of Jesus; The Credibility of the Picture of Christ in the Gospels; The Cross of Christ and Our Reconciliation; The Doctrine of Justification by Faith; God's Word and God's Spirit. The Controversy About Baptism.

The views expressed in this volume are for the most part evangelical and wholesome. The author, unlike so many German scholars, does not seem bent upon economizing the Gospel away in the interest of a philosophic theory. He is willing to allow the religious interest to have proper sway in dealing with Christ, the great Leader and Revealer of the True Religion. That Christ is divine is a proposition susceptible of proofs in various ways: "The acknowledgement of the divine sonship of Jesus finds expression in prayer to Jesus. Historically this fact cannot be called in question. The Christian church arose from the circle of men who prayed to Jesus. This constitutes the peculiar character of their piety. But prayer to Jesus is the confession of his deity (Gottheit), for prayer pertains to God alone; every prayer to man is sin. Prayer to Jesus is the simplest, most primitive and at the same time the highest expression of faith in him." (p. 3.)

The series of subjects is not developed in a strictly progressive order, hence there is not the logical and internal unity which would simplify the reviewer's task. Only a glimpse of the argument here and there is possible. In the chapter on God's Son and God's Spirit the author holds that unless the Gospel records are trustworthy as a whole, apart from details and minor questions, we can never know Jesus. The synoptic records agree in the following vital points: All agree as to Christ's raising

the dead; as to his never refusing a prayer for help; in all divine energy works; the death and resurrection of Christ are the chief goal in all. Is the picture authentic which is thus one? The answer is that Jesus is essentially miraculous, and to exclude the miraculous is to destroy the picture. The denial of the supernatural is not a result but a presupposition of modern science and historical criticism. But these, which are presuppositions are dogmas. And all dogmas root themselves in a God-consciousness. This thought the author does not develop. He probably means that a belief in God is the basis of every assumption as to a fixed order of things.

The miraculous element is credible because Jesus is credible. We reject the miracles of the saints of after ages because we do not believe in the saints. Jesus is the proof of his miracles.

The question of the credibility of the Gospels is the question of God. The distinction here is radical. Christ was a product of nature with only natural gifts, or he had supernatural origin and gifts. The Gospels give us not an unnatural but a supernatural Christ.

Thus throughout the volume. The argument is clear, compact and strong. There is no wavering on vital issues as to the Person and Work of Christ. The book is a stimulating discussion of many vital themes.

E. Y. Mullins.

The Witness of Sin.—A Theodicy.

By Rev. Nathan Robinson Wood. Fleming H. Revell Co. New York, Chicago, Toronto.

This little book grapples with the age-long problem, why God permitted sin to enter the world. The author discusses somewhat fully past attempts to explain the origin of sin and points out their failure. He concludes in general that sin is a witness to God, his love and his power. He makes the point that the greatness of any creation is in proportion to the fullness of life which it receives from its creator and its distinctiveness from the

creator. The author illustrates by means of the poets. For example, Byron's poetical characters are all reproductions of some phase of the poet's own character. Byron could not create a character distinct from himself, while the poems of Shakespeare, on the contrary, and of other great poets, are quite distinct from the poets themselves. That is to say, the measure of the greatness of the poet is his ability to create a character totally distinct from and independent of himself. Now, argues the author of this little volume, man who was created in God's image was nevertheless created such that he could assert his independence of God. His capacity, therefore, to choose evil and depart from God is a witness to the greatness and power of God. The question as to the final cause in the creation of man is answered, according to the author, in the redemption provided through Christ, God's greatness and power being witnessed even in the choice of evil on the part of man. God's purpose of love in creating man is fulfilled in the redemption that is in Christ. The style of the book is simple and clear, and indicates that the author has done a great deal of careful thinking on his theme. His book, while it does not fully solve the great question with which it deals, is a suggestive contribution to the problem of evil. The young author should continue to give himself earnestly to theological study, as he gives evidence of much ability in this direction.

E. Y. Mullins.

The Gospel in the Gospels.

By William Porcher Dubose, M.A., S.T.D., Author of "The Soteriology of the New Testament," etc., Professor of Exegesis in the University of the South. Longmans, Green & Co., New York and London. 1906. $1.50 net.

This book has to do with the Gospel only so far as it is contained in our canonical Gospels, or can be legitimately deduced from them. "My true objective point," says the author, "has been the complete construction of the Gospel according to St. Paul, to be treated in a volume to

follow the present one." But that the epistles of Paul are an interpretation only, and not a transformation, nor even an essential modification, is—next to the hope of casting a new ray of light upon the nature of the Gospel itself—the point which he avows he has most at heart to prove in the end. In defiance of what is claimed in high quarters to be the well-nigh acknowledged conclusion of present criticism, and after a careful and critical survey of the field, the author unhesitatingly declares his own firm conviction that the variant conceptions of the Gospel in the New Testament, so far from being different Gospels, are consistent and mutually competitive aspects of the one and only Gospel; that, while there are, even within the limits of our Gospels, actual diverse impressions of what the Gospel is, and that full justice is due to each such impression, the main point to be kept in view is that the very fullest justice to each is the only way of arriving at the truth of all, or at the truth of the whole of which they are the complementary and necessary parts. At the first no less than now it was needful, and now as much as then it is needful that the truth of every variant opinion and the light from every opposite point of view be duly considered. This may indicate the high purpose, as well as the temper and spirit in which the book is written. It is divided into three parts: (1) The Gospel of the Earthly Life, or the Common Humanity of Our Lord; (2) The Gospel of the Work (What our Lord Came to Do and Did), including the Resurrection; and (3) The Gospel of The Person, or the Incarnation. The author believes these to be three aspects or stages of one and the same Gospel and treats them accordingly; and thus adroitly adapts himself to certain aspects or schools of present-day thinking. He furthermore believes that, however honest we may be in the effort to do justice to each set of facts, or distinct aspect of the subject by itself, and to keep them apart and distinct, so predetermined are they, and so determined, to find each its own meaning and fulfillment, not in the separate truth of each, but in

the united and common truth of all, that such effort results, and in proportion as it is thoroughgoing, must ever result, in failure, until it issues in the unity of the common truth. The book abounds in clear and cogent thinking, which, though often abstract, in the main surely, issues in sound conclusions. At points author and reviewer and reader may have to agree to disagree; but we may hope it will be with the blessed result contemplated by the author, that, bringing all our differences together at the last, we may be able to see if they together are not wiser than we, and if they cannot and will not of themselves "find agreement in a unity that is higher and vaster than we."

Christianity in its largest sense, the author concludes, is "the fulfillment of God in the world through the fulfillment of the world in God." This assumes that the world is completed in man, in whom also God is completed in the world. So God, the world and man are at once completed in Christ—who, as He was the *logos* or thought of all in the divine fore-knowledge of the past, so also is He the *telos* or end of all in the predestination of the future. That is to say, the perfect psychical, moral, and spiritual manhood of which Jesus Christ is to us the realization and the expression is the end of God in creation, or in evolution. "I hold that neither science, philosophy, nor religion can come to any higher or other, either conjecture or conclusion, than that." But when we come to the actual terms or elements of God's realization in us and ours in Him, we cannot think or express the process otherwise, the author contends, than in the threefold form of the divine love. "Putting it into scripture phrase we speak as exactly as popularly, in defining the matter of the Gospel to be, the love of the Father, the grace of the Son, and the fellowship of the Spirit." As our spiritual life is dependent upon each and all of these three constituents, so we can know God only as we know Him in the actual threefold relation of Father, Son, and Spirit. The book will command, require, and repay serious study.

GEO. B. EAGER.

VII. PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION.

Religion und Religionen.

Von D. Otto Pfleiderer. Professor an der Universitat zu Berlin. J. F. Lehmann's Verlag. München. 1906. Pp. 1-249.

The professors in the University of Berlin are accustomed to give a series of public lectures, one a week, each winter semester to the students of all faculties and others who may be interested in the subject treated. They sum up in a popular and easily comprehensible form the professor's views of the essential outlines of the subject. Some of these have been published and have reached a wide public reading, notably Harnack's "What is Christianity?" Dr. Pfleiderer published such a series on the rise of Christianity in 1905 and now gives us a second series, the work before us, on Religion and Religions." All the fifteen lectures were actually delivered except the last on Islam, which was not delivered for lack of time. They have, therefore, the length, style and form of a forty-minute popular lecture. The first three are introductory to the whole. They are: "Das Wesen der Religion," "Religion und Moral" and "Religion und Wissenschaft." The essence of religion consists in a feeling of dependence, reverence and duty; it is the basis of sound morals. In the fourth lecture on "The Beginning of Religion" the author is much more modest than investigators in this field were a few years ago. He asks, p. 53, "What do we know concerning the beginning of religion? To be perfectly accurate, nothing." We can only set up suppositions, but not one of them can be proven. He relies for his theories on the religion of barbarous people and upon certain elements in the religion of cultured people which do not seem to harmonize with the rest of their lives and may therefore be regarded as the remains of their primitive religion. However, he frankly admits that the religion of barbarous people may be a degeneration rather than a case of arrested development, and further admits that there are some evidences that such is the case (p. 54). After these admissions he

proceeds to derive religion from dreams, personification, hallucination, etc., in the usual naturalistic way.

The remaining lectures are devoted to a brief exposition of the peculiarities of the great historical religions in their relations and contrasts. He treats the Chinese, Egyptian and Babylonian religions, "The Religion of Zarathustra and the mithras cult," "Brahmanism and Gautama Buddha," "Buddhism," "The Greek Religion," "The Religion of Israel," "The Religion of Post-exilic Judaism," "Christianity" and "Islam." Want of space prevents even a notice of the contents of these various lectures. Suffice it to say that they were written with fullness of learning and religious earnestness. His views as to the origin of Christianity are already well known as radical and fanciful. He declares the characteristic thing in primitive Christianity was belief in redemption through Christ, a threefold redemption present, past and future; the hope of a future redemption of society as well as the individual in this world, the hope of a blessed beyond for each individual and a present redemption through the various ordinances of the church. Some of the doctrines of primitive Christianity which admittedly contributed most to its success have according to Pfleiderer no value for us because we can no longer believe in them. For example, he finds the origin of Paul's doctrine of the resurrection in the myth of the death and revival of Adonis in the Lebanon mountains with which Paul became acquainted during his first stay at Antioch. Nothing could be more absurd. But amid some wild speculations like this there is much that is highly valuable. W. J. McGlothlin.

The Philosophy of Religion.

By Dr. Harald Höffding, Professor in the University of Copenhagen. Translated from the German edition by B. E. Meyer. The MacMillan Company. New York. 1906. Pp 1-410. Price $3.00.

Professor Hoffding is already well known to English and American readers through his "Outlines of Psychology," "History of Modern Philosophy," and "Philo-

sophical Problems." His work is characterized by clear and penetrating thought illuminated by ample learning. He is a bold thinker, seeking to go to the heart of the problems presented and at the same time recognizing the limitations of thought. He recognizes the fact that religion has a permanent, in fact an essential place, in the life of man and he seeks to find the intellectual basis for it. "Religion itself never becomes a problem." He writes neither for the satisfied, whether orthodox or free-thinking, nor for the anxious who are afraid to think, but for those who recognize the value of religion and at the same time regard it as a legitimate object of investigation. "Our task is to elucidate the relation of religion to spiritual life. Religion is itself a mode or form of spiritual life, and it can only be truly estimated when it is viewed in its relation to other forms and modes of spiritual life," (p. 4).

The author treats the subject under three general heads: The Epistemological Philosophy of Religion, The Psychological Philosophy of Religion and The Ethical Philosophy of Religion. Under these general divisions there is gathered a mass of thoughtful discusssion that is scarcely equaled in similar works of the same length. The author's thinking is so clear, his style so simple and lucid that one scarcely realizes the difficulty and abstract nature of the subject. The work of translating was well done. Space forbids any extended exposition or critique of the book. Suffice it to say that it is one of the ablest recent books on the subject. W. J. McGlothlin.

VIII. MISCELLANEOUS.

Greece From the Coming of the Hellenes to A. D. 14.

By E. S. Schuckburgh, D. Litt. New York. G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1906. London. T. Fisher Union. Price $1.50. Pages 416.

This is a splendid manual of Greek history. The main things are told and well told with the result of modern research. The maps are large and comportable while the

numerous illustrations light up the whole story. The various parts are fairly well balanced, though one could have wished a little more concerning the literary and artistic life of the people. Still a closing chapter is devoted to this subject. At the bottom of page 205 there is a misprint, 305-303 being a slip for 405-403. But the movement of the Greek people and the Greek spirit are rightly presented. The leading men stand out with clear perspective and relieve the story of internecine war, the weakness of Greece. It is a sad, but an even wonderful story that Dr. Schuckburgh has told again. The book meets the modern requirements and ought to have a large circulation. It belongs to the Story of the Nations Series.

A. T. Robertson.

The Silver Age of the Greek World.

By J. P. Mahaffy, D.D., D.C.L. University of Chicago Press. Chicago. 1906. Price $3.00 net. Postpaid $3.17.

To students of ancient life and thought, Professor Mahaffy's scholarly volumes on the history of Greek civilization need no introduction. For this particular period, no modern authority ranks above him in the estimation of scholars. Indeed, in the minds of thousands of readers, the ancient world is a world re-created by this delightful writer—a world with a clear air and a serene sky. The subtle charm of his style will be found to have in no wise diminished in this, his latest book.

The author's purpose is well stated in the following extract from the preface:

"This book is intended to replace my *Greek World under Roman Sway*, now out of print, in a maturer and better form, and with much new material superadded. There has grown up, since its appearance, a wider and more intelligent view of Greek life, and people are not satisfied with knowing the Golden Age only, without caring for what came before and followed after. In this Silver Age of Hellenism many splendid things were produced, and the world was moulded by the teaching which

went out from Greek lands. If this teaching diminished in quality, it certainly increased greatly in influence, and led its higher pupils back to the great masters of the earlier age."

Prof. Mahaffey has made himself perfectly at home in the Graeco-Roman world, that world in which Christianity sprang into being. In no books can the general reader find a better conception of the movements of the time than in those of Prof. Mahaffy. Schuerer has a greater wealth of scholarship over a more limited field, but Mahaffy covers the whole field and gives the spirit of the time with rare skill. This volume now brought up to date is one of his very best.

A. T. ROBERTSON.

Memories of Life at Oxford, and Experiences in Italy, Greece, Turkey, Germany, Spain and Elsewhere.

By Frederick Meyrick, Prebendary of Lincoln, and Rector of Blickling John Murray, Albemarle street, London, Englnd. 1905. Price 12 shilling.

Mr. Meyrick has made a very entertaining book, especially for one who has personal knowledge of English life. He knows the ins and outs of Oxford, and sketches simply and graphically many great personages connected with the Oxford of his time. He is a strong opponent of the Oxford movement though a loyal churchman. This book is one that will afford real pleasure to the cultivated reader during the hot months. You can stop almost anywhere and go on again at your leisure. The book is chatty without being scrappy. After all, few things are as interesting as delightful people and they move before us in this book in great variety and each time with a touch of life. To one who has "Memories of Oxford" of his own a double charm is added to the pages.

A. T. ROBERTSON.

Sir Walter Scott.

By Andrew Lang. Illustrated. New York. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1906. Pages 216. Price $1.00

This book belongs to the Literary Lives Series edited by W. Robertson Nicoll. It has the flavor of Scotland and smells of the heather, the rare white heather. Mr. Lang understands Scot and the Scotch. The book has a touch of tenderness about it that is quite appropriate. One who is a lover of Sir Walter (and who is not) can speak of him only with reverence. But there is real criticism here also. For those who have not time for Lockhart this is just the book and many who know Lockhart will revel in the luminous pages of Lang. One effect of the book is to make you wish to take down the Waverley novels again and read them afresh.

A. T. Robertson.

Walter Pater.

By A. C. Benson, Fellow of Magdalene College, Cambridge. The MacMillan Co., New York and London. 1906. Price $1.00.

Mr. Benson writes sympathetically, though with reserve, of this very remarkable man. He cannot be said to be an easy subject, for he is elusive and even shadowy in his personality. The personality of Pater is not very vivid in Mr. Benson's treatment though much of his mystical charm is here. The style of Pater is peculiar though wonderful at its best. He is an artist in the use of words, and deserves a place in the English Men of Letters Series. Perhaps no one else could have discussed Walter Pater better than Mr. Benson unless indeed Dr. F. W. Bussell, of Brasenose College, Oxford, could have done so. Pater was tutor at Brasenose, though a student of Queen's College. In a way he was the most striking figure at Oxford during his prime, though his lectures were above the heads of the students. He will live in his books on artistic and critical subjects.

A. T. Robertson.

The New Far East.—An examination into the New Position of Japan and her influence upon the Solution of the Far Eastern Questions, with Special Reference to the Interests of America and the Future of the Chinese Empire.

By Thomas F. Millard. New York. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1906. XII-319 pages.

Here we get a note of discord in the harmony of current praise for Japan and all things and plans Japanese. Mr. Millard finds himself at variance in mind and spirit with the popular condemnation of Russia and admiration of Japan. He undertakes to account for the general attitude toward Japan as produced by a remarkably profound and shrewdly successful propaganda of the Japanese Government.

He gives the Japanese credit for being able to hoodwink the world, even to the extent of expecting us to believe that a really inferior and superficial people are practicing the deception upon us. England has of course been the ally, confederate and conspirator of Japan in it all.

One wonders whether Russia may not be pushing a propaganda with Mr. Millard in its employ; and whether the author may not also be nursing some grievance against the Japanese. Certain it is that a cool, calculating, material principle lies at the basis of judgment and advice to America throughout the volume.

The spirit of the work is never admirable and often repulsive. At the same time there is a deal of wholesome and timely information and warning here. One can not think of Mr. Millard as a statesman, certainly he is no diplomat; but materials for statesmanship and questions for diplomacy he does give.

The present situation in China, Corea, Japan, Manchuria, Russia is presented with cool calculation and the significance of the situation for Western governments, especially for America, is suggested rather fully. The author does not play the role of prophecy but seeks to present the materials of destiny. And one must think that he is quite correct in his estimate, for China is really for more significant for the future of the Orient than is Japan.

All students of the Eastern situation will be interested in this discussion and will do well to lay aside any pro-Japanese prejudices so far as to give proper considera-

tion to the phases of the question here presented.

W. O. Carver.

The Negro and the Nation.—A History of American Slavery and Enfranchisement.

By George S. Merriam, New York. Henry Halt & Company. 1906. 340 pages.

That Mr. Merriam has made an extensive study of the Negro, and that he has sought to maintain a spirit of judicial fairness to all parties involved, seems apparent enough. His accuracy and his calmness alike call for admiration though his effort to be calm frequently becomes an index of deep feeling.

Through forty chapters we have traced for us the history of slavery and enfranchisment and of adjustment of the emancipated enfranchised. This history has not been written for the sake of the history but for the sake of applying it to the question of the working out of the relation of white and black races in America. The solution of all the vexing questions as to the Negro in America are easy of solution when one seeks "not to predict what will be, but to see what ought to be, and what we (who?) purpose shall be." "The saving principle is as simple as the multiplication table or the Golden Rule. Each man must do his best, each must be allowed to do his best, and each must be helped to do his best. * * * The situation is less a puzzle for the intellect than a challenge to the will and heart." So indeed it will seem to the theorist, but a rather complicated puzzle it is proving for the intellects of sincere men dealing practically with the problems. When one begins to apply the principle, so admirably stated, to practical working in "industry, education, politics, and social relations," and then asserts that this means equality everywhere, he has assumed an equality in materials that remains undemonstrated.

This important study is frank, courteous, courageous, suggestive. It appeals to Christian principle and sentiment, as the author understands these. W. O. Carver.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

The Cynics Dictionary,by Harry Thompson. Henry Altemus Co., Philadelphia.

The Cynics Rules of Conduct, by Chester Field. Henry Altemus & Co., Philadelphia.

The Ten Diskers, by Lloyd Osbourne. Henry Altemus & Co., Philadelphia.

The Watermead Affair, by Robert Barr. Henry Altemus & Co., Philadelphia.

What a Young Girl Ought to Know, by Mrs. Mary Wood Allen. Vir Publishing Company, Philadelphia.

Thirty-one Thoughts from an Invalids Bible, by Mrs. Anna Ross. Griffith & Rowland Press, Philadelphia.

The Gospel According to St. Luke, by William Williamson. Meth uen & Co., London.